“When I use a
word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I
choose it to mean — neither more nor less.' Alice in Wonderland
Discussions about “rule of law” and
of “corruption” are never easy – since (like “populism” or “neo-liberalism”)
it’s not at all clear what the terms mean. There’s a fragility about the words which
tend to convey simply our feelings about the relevant issues - positive about the first term and negative about the others.
When
I arrived, all of 30 years ago, in the post-communist world, an early bit of homework I had to
do was in the new field of “transitology”
which was occupied by the academics of the Soviet and Eastern European Studies University
departments whose previous focus had been watching the Kremlin power-plays.
They did at least have the contextual understanding of the different countries
of the Soviet bloc - although the only
experience people could draw on about the transition from authoritarianism to
liberal democracy was actually to
be found in Portugal, Spain and Latin America – with Philippe Schmitter’s
“Transitions from Authoritarian Rule – prospects for Democracy” published in
1986 being much studied after the Wall fell and “Problems of Democratic
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and
Post-Communist Europe” by Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan becoming the new map
in 1996.
And it was 1998 before the first exclusive studies of the
transition progress being made in central and eastern Europe namely Jon
Elster and Claus Offe’s famous “Institutional
Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea” and David
Stark’s Postsocialist
Pathways – transforming politics and property
But this was the precise point that
the EC took the decision that the central European states who had applied for
EU membership could – despite (or because of?) their 45 years’ experience of
communism - be treated seriously as potential members. Of course,
conditionality was strongly applied – in other words, the countries were
required to demonstrate their compliance with the requirements of membership –
meaning in particular rule of law and competition. I was in Romania at the time writing In
Transit – notes on good governance (1999) which captures well my perceptions at the time
– about the scale of the challenge facing these countries; about transitology; and about the lessons I felt Britain had learned about its reform efforts. It's a fairly unique book since very few other westerners had actually moved to the Region or were trying to capture key messages to convey to the reformists in ex-communist countries
And in due course, some 6-7 years
later, 8 of the countries were admitted – with Bulgaria and Romania following
in 2007. Once they had become members of
the club, of course, the new states could - and did - relax. My blog
started in 2009 when I was alternating between Bulgaria and Romania and able to
get a sense of “progress” – such as it was. There’s more English-language material
available about Romania which has therefore been the subject of more posts –
perhaps the most interesting and insightful (if pessimistic) being one entitled
When
will it ever change? which
- reminded readers of Ralf Dahrendorf’s Reflections
on the Revolution in our time in which he had made the optimistic prediction
that it might take 15-20 years for those countries to create the rule of law
but two generations to have a fully functioning civil society.
- and of Head of European Delegation in Romania, Karen Fogg’s giving
all consultants a note about Robert Putnam’s book on Italian democracy which
had made the point that Italy’s south was trapped in a two-century old culture
- quoted excerpts from a rare pamphlet written by Sorin Ionitsa on Poor Policy Making in Weak States (2006) which
indicated the strength of old ties in his home country of Romania
- made the obvious point that Dahrendorf had been
overly optimistic in 1990/91 when he talked of one or two generations being
necessary for a democratic culture to take hold in central europe
I had actually planned to use this
post to discuss some excellent new material on anti-corruption which has just been
published but, for some reason, my thoughts kept pulling me back to the transitology
debate – of which, incidentally, one hears very little these days. The result is a rather confused post which doesn’t do
justice to either the transition issue or to anti-corruption - and will therefore require a follow-up.
Let me finish the post with what I
consider the best analysis of all the huge literature on anti-by corruption – and it’s
by a Romanian, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, who was commissioned by Norway in 2010 to survey the
field and give recommendations. The result – Contextual
Choices in Fighting Corruption (2011) - has some very helpful diagrams and tables although it can, on occasion, be a bit abstruse -
What is
presented in most anti-corruption literature as a principal-agent problem is in
fact a collective action problem, since societies reach a sub-optimal
equilibrium of poor governance with an insufficient domestic agency pushing for
change.
The report
argues that the question “what causes corruption” is therefore absurd. Particularism
exists by default, since people tend to share in a particular way, most notably with their closest
kin and not with everyone else. Modern states are based on universal
citizenship, which entails fair treatment of every citizen by the government.
But there are very few states that have thus far succeeded in moving from the
natural state to this ideal of modernity. The question should change from “what
causes corruption” to “what makes particularism evolve into universalism”. What
determines a change in the equilibrium?
Her report
suggested that societies could be distinguished by their commitment to three
very different sets of values
-
Universalism; where the state treats its
citizens impartially
-
Neopatrimonialism; which have single rulers who treat the state as their ‘own’ patrimony.
-
Competitive particularism; which hold elections and have
freedoms and competing political
parties but have similar non-universal allocation systems, including patronage,
nepotism, and favours
and then went on to draw 10 lessons
from the global experience of which these are perhaps the most important
Lesson
number one is that, the battlefield upon which this war is lost or won remains
national. Case
studies of historical and contemporary achievers show that although external
constraints played a large role in inducing disequilibrium in particularistic
countries and triggering change, a transformation has to be reflected in a new
equilibrium of power at the society level for it to be both profound and
sustainable.
Lesson
number two is therefore that the transition
from corrupt regimes to a regime where ethical universalism is the norm is a political and not a technical-legal
process. There is no global success case of
anti-corruption as promoted by the international anti-corruption community. Successful countries followed paths of
their own. Fighting corruption in societies where particularism is the norm
is similar to inducing a regime change: this requires a broad basis of
participation to succeed and it is highly unrealistic
to expect this to happen in such a short interval of time and with
non-political instruments.
The main actors should be broad
national coalitions, and the main role of the international community is to
support them in becoming both broad and powerful. All good governance programs should be designed
to promote this political approach: audits, controls and reviews should be
entrusted to ‘losers’ and draw on natural competition to fight favouritism and
privilege granting. No country can change without domestic collective action,
which is both representative and sustainable over time.
The media,
political oppositions and civil society should not be seen as non-permanent
guests taking part in consultations on legal drafts but as main permanent
actors in the process of anti-corruption and holding decisive seats in all institutions
promoting ethical universalism. Which windows of opportunities to
use, which actors are more interested in
changing the rules of the game and how to sequence the change depends on the
diagnosis of each society and cannot be solved by a one-size-fits-all solution.
Other relevant posts
https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2017/04/why-transition-will-last-hundred-years.html
https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2017/07/when-will-it-ever-change.html
https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2018/01/roman-romania.html
https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2018/11/plus-ca-changeplus-cest-la-meme-chose.html
https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2019/06/whatever-happened-to-good-governance.html
https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2020/09/crowds-and-power-in-sofia-and-bucharest_18.html