Reflections on national cultures - part V

This series of posts took an interesting turn when I read Howard Wiarda’s “Political Culture, political science and identity politics – an uneasy alliance” from 2014 which offers a fascinating account of how (over 2000 years) people have tried to convey a sense of the moral meaning of their collective lives. Almost all studies of political culture begin after the 2^nd World War and are academic in nature. The beauty of Wiarda’s book is he devotes and entire chapter to much earlier efforts to describe other worlds.

It was this which encouraged me to  start my list of texts with Madame de Stael but it could (and should) have gone back, if not to Plato (as Wiarda does) to Montesquieu whose Persian Letters (1721) gave some great insights into the mores of upper-class French society in the period before the French revolution. 

Modern academics have three problems in dealing with national cultures –

·       they assume they have to quantify everything (the great weakness of Basanez’s book);

·       they are, for the most part, specialists and

·       they lack a soul and therefore the sensitivity to grasp the essence of things

The one exception to the last generalisation are the historians – of whatever sort. Of necessity they have to cover all aspects of life. That’s why a cultural historian like Peter Gay’s book on the Viennese middle-class is in the list – and also the intellectual historian Daniel T Rodgers’ Age of Fracture about the 4 US decades after 1970.

And Kristan Kumar – whose The Idea of Englishness; English culture, national identity, social thought figures as a must-read - is a sociologist who, as a breed, still manage to keep their fingers on the pulse of nations. 

Perhaps my next project might be to identify the title which best conjures up the soul of each nation. “Natasha’s Dance – a cultural history of Russia” wold probably be my selection for Russia - although that country’s indigenous music, poetry and so many of their own writers have had such incredible talent as to make it easier to go for a general compendium such as Orlando Figes’. Perhaps only the Germans can compete with this richness – although few of us know much about the Chinese….

What is Culture?

Culture is a confusing term – covering both artistic pursuits and a set of societal values. A culture is what we grow up in – it’s our parents’ values and the class they inhabited. It’s the generation into which we were born - which will always reject some parental values. So nothing is static; we can move into a different class and many have; although it has become increasingly difficult to do - as Fiona Hill’s memoir superbly recounts 

I started this series of posts with a list of texts which, I now realise. were essentially academic if not technocratic. Howard Wiarda’s Political Culture, political science and identity politics – an uneasy alliance made me appreciate the insights from books which appeal to the general reader of whom academics are far too dismissive.

So the new list of some 30 books covers all genres – cultural historians like Peter Gay, intellectual historians such as Daniel T Rodgers, popularisers such as Richard Lewis and Erin Meyer as well as the more technocratic political scientists, social psychologists and anthropologists

The early works mentioned in the last post were intuitive and impressionistic. Survey work was one of the strengths of the Frankfurt School which showed the face of Nazism after the war – Almond and Verba‘s “The Civic Culture” (1963) paved the path for systematic comparative work. Big data has transformed the field in the last 3 decades. Wiarda gives us a nice conclusion - 

I have been thinking about this matter of culture, really political culture, for some time. Here are my conclusions—so far!

1. Culture is one of the three great explanations in the social sciences, the others being structuralism (by which is usually meant class analysis) and institutionalism in its several forms.

2. Some analysts (Weber and Landes interpretively; Inglehart empirically) see culture as the most important explanatory factor. That may yet prove to be correct, though it is still not proven.

3. Social structure and class analysis are especially important in the Middle East or Latin America; structuralism, in its broader sense, meaning trade preferences and favored access to US markets, was especially important in explaining Japan’s, Taiwan’s, and South Korea’s economic take-offs in the last half of the twentieth century.

4. I see culture, along with geography and resources, as a key variable initially in explaining why some countries and areas forged ahead (Northwest Europe, North America, and eventually East Asia) while others (Latin America, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East) lagged behind.

5. At this early stage, institutions are less important. Remember Bolivia: beautiful laws and constitutions but very little democracy. As countries develop, getting their institutions and policies right becomes more important.

6. But even as institutions acquire greater importance, culture remains an important variable. Witness the ongoing differences between Southern Europe (clientelistic, patronage dominated, and high corruption) and more efficient, rationalized Northern Europe.

7. Political-cultural explanations often have a number of weaknesses: vagueness, imprecision, stereotyping, and lack of clear definition or methodology. They also tend to ignore both class/structural factors and outside, international, or globalization factors.

8. But political culture also has its strengths. It gets you at first causes, the essence of things, the basics. And in Almond and Verba’s or Inglehart’s work, it gets you closer to an empirical, scientific explanation.

9. Studying political culture is both hard work and fun to do. It enables you to travel, go abroad, and learn about other countries and cultures.

10. While political culture is important, it is not, in my view, the only explanation. Other factors, as above, are also important. So political culture should not be reified or elevated into an exclusive or single-causal explanation. Political culture explains a lot but not everything. My own preference is for a more complex, multi-causal explanation. Culture should thus be used in combination with other explanations: geography, social structure, resources, and institutions. These factors can now best be weighed and evaluated through correlations and multi-variate analysis. Such analysis can give us the explanatory weight of each factor or variable.

11. At the same time, we must recognize that cultures do change. They are not deterministic or fixed for all time. They adjust, adapt, get altered, even undergo at times revolutionary transformations. Societies change; modernization and globalization go forward; and culture change both drives and is a product of these other changes. After all, culture is mainly a human and a societal construct; it has not yet been proven that it is genetic, inherited, and organic. As cultures change, so also will societies and political systems.

12. These are my views on political culture from a macro level. That is, from the point of view of the overall importance of political culture as an independent variable and its relations to other variables.

Wiarda 

My list of 30 books has been chronological - and this next one covers the decade from 1995 

Book Title	Takeaway
Value Change in Global Perspective P Abramson and R Inglehart (1995)	One of Inglehart’s early books – after the marker he put down in his 1988 article The renaissance of political culture
When Cultures Collide – leading across cultures; Richard D Lewis (1996) The diagram is from his book	Lewis is a linguist who has made cross-cultural management his field. The book which introduced most of us to the subject – and gave us marvellous if somewhat superficial/untheorized vignettes of the strange habits of almost all countries of the world
Culture matters – essays in honour of Aaron Wildavsky (1997)	“Grid-Group” theory was developed by another anthropologist, Mary Douglas and basically suggests that we all identify with one of 4-5 “worldviews” or collection of values which are almost ideological The approach is best summarised here
Riding the Waves of Culture – understanding cultural diversity in business; Frans Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner (1997)	the Dutchman who took on de Hofstede’s mantle teams up with a Brit – it’s pretty good introduction to the field which lays a lot of emphasis on how different cultures deal with dilemmas.
Culture Matters – how culture shapes social progress; ed L Harrison and S Huntington (2000)	For my money, this is one of the most interesting books – although some of the authors are no longer considered to be politically correct. But at least the authors feel free to express what they think!
Schnitzler’s Century – the making of middle class culture 1815-1914 Peter Gay 2002	Political culture is an analysis of social values  This is the remarkable biography of a class.
The Geography of Thought – how westerners and Asians think differently and why; Richard Nesbitt (2003)	An American social psychologist offers a thought-provoking book which seems a bit excessive in its argument that different continents have a different thought process
Developing Cultures - Essays on Cultural Change Lawrence Harrison and Jerome Kagan (2006)	A collection of essays by various authors which explores the role and influence of parenting and educational practices in various parts of the world – but pretty schematic
The Central Liberal Truth – how politics can change a culture and save it from itself; Lawrence Harrison (2006)	A book which both supports the idea that political cultures are distinctive but argues that they are capable of change
Adventures in Research vol 2 Howard Wiarda 2006	A delightful-looking text which has elements of a travelogue as Wiarda recounts his stays in so many countries

National Traits??

If you really want to upset the “politically correct” mob, bring up the subject of political culture and show that you actually believe that each nation has distinctive cultural traits. It’s become a forbidden subject in such company - which is strange given how far back the concept goes. Because I’ve lived and worked these past 30 years in ten different countries (with 8 years in different parts of Central Asia) I’ve become fascinated by two fundamental questions –

·       Do people in different countries have distinctive and predictable patterns of behaviour?

·       Are the “path-dependent” theorists correct in suggesting that history makes it very difficult for such patterns of behaviour to change? 

We live in a globalised age in which social values have been shifting and becoming more homogeneous and yet the past couple of decades have seen the resurgence of nationalism. Indeed each nation now seems to be divided into two tribes – the “somewheres” and the “anywheres” – depending on the freedom people felt they had to select the professions and locations of their choice.

Last year I did a series of posts on the variety of confusing terms which have cropped up in recent decades which suggest that most of us can be classified into a small number of ways of understanding the world. Some of these are descriptive – simply statements of fact. Others are prescriptive and ideological – ways in which we both understand and act. I’ve selected 5 terms – political culture, national culture, world values and cultural theory. I hope readers find the table useful…. 

Term used	Meaning	Trajectory	Typical referents
“Political Culture”	A term used by political scientists which can be traced to de Tocqueville but whose modern origin is generally attributed to the 1950s and “The Civic Culture” by Gabriel Almond The best intellectual history of the whole debate is Political Culture, political science and identity politics – an uneasy alliance; Howard Wiarda (2014) which looks back over a century of interdisciplinary argument	In the 1940s and 1950s “culture” figured in the work of many American scholars as they tried to understand the challenge of modernisation faced by many societies but was then supplanted by the “rationality” of the economists   with  Culture Matters – how culture shapes social progress (2000) being a seminal work, criticised for really meaning “Western Culture matters”	Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, Edward Banfield, Gabriel Almond, SM Lipset  Lawrence Harrison Samuel Huntington  Howard Wiala  Brendan McSweeney is th arch critic of the school
“National Culture”	An indeterminate term	social psychologist Geert Hofstede started work in the 1960s with IBM on cultural differences – taken up by Frans Trompenaars It also figured in the discussions about “transitology” in the 1990s	Geert Hofstede   Frans Trompenaars
“World values”	Clusters of VALUES eg “traditional”, “modern” and “postmodern” used by technocrats to classify societies   Cultural Evolution – people’s motivations are changing, and reshaping the world ; Ronald Inglehart (2018) this article summarise that work.	This stream of work began in 1981 and resurrected the debate on political culture eg The renaissance of political culture Ronald Inglehart (1988) A World of Three Cultures – honour, achievement and joy; M Basanez (2016) a beautifully-written book by a Mexican academic which seems to have exactly the outsider’s take on the subject I need. And one of the early chapters is a literature review – which has no mention of Wiarda !	political scientists and psychologists particularly Ronald Inglehart
“World views”	collection of quasi- philosophical/religious BELIEFS which seem to give us our respective identities	Series of notes on the subject a very useful overview in 12 pages an excerpt from “World Views – from fragmentation to integration” book. the full book here	Kant Wittgenstein   Jeremy Lent
“Cultural theory”	Otherwise known as “grid-group” theory which suggests that mots of us can be classified into 4-5 worldviews	Anthropologist Mary Douglas first developed the “grid-group” approach in the 1970s which was then taken up by policy analyst Wildavsky and political scientist Thompson	Mary Douglas Aaron Wildavsky Michael Thompson

Plus Ca Change,,,,plus c’est la meme chose???

European countries have experienced massive changes since the end of the war – and yet, I keep on wondering, .”to what extent do national characteristics actually change”. The interview with Dorel Sandor does not seem to have attracted much notice in the country but, for me, has crystallised the various impressions about Romania I’ve conveyed in the blog in recent years

Let me summarise his key points -

- the so-called “revolution” of 1989 was nothing of the sort – just a takeover by the old-guard masquerading in the costumes of the market economy and democracy

- which, after 30 years, has incubated a new anomie – with the “mass” and “social” media dominating people’s minds

- So-called “European integration” has destroyed Romanian agriculture and industry - and drained the country of 4 million talented young Romanians

- After 30 years, there is not a single part of the system – economic, political, religious, cultural, voluntary – which offers any real prospect of positive change

- Even Brussels seems to have written the country off

- The country is locked into a paralysis of suspicion, distrust, consumerism, apathy, anomie

- No one is calling for a new start – let alone demonstrating the potential for realistic alliances

My last 2 posts have argued that -

- in the early 90s everyone (particularly outside Romania) expected too much – although remember that Ralf Dahrendorf - unique in his experience as both a German and British politician and one of the first academics in the 50s to explore the nature of the social changes which took place in Germany in the first half of the 20^th century (Society and Democracy in Germany) - had warned in 1990 that real cultural change would take “two generations”. For middle class academics, this meant 50 years!

- Absolutely no preparations existed in 1989 for the possibility that communism might collapse and for the choices this would present for political, economic and legal systems …..Everyone had assumed that the change would be in the opposite direction. The only writings which could be drawn were those about the south American, Portugese and Spanish transition ….

- The EC stopped treating Romania as in need of “developmental assistance” in 1998/99. The PHARE programme was phased out - the focus shifted to training for EU membership and the implementation of the Acquis (using the TAIEX programme). Talk of differences in political culture was seen as politically incorrect – eastern countries simply had to learn the language and habits of the European social market and, hey-presto, things would magically change……

- 30 years on, the names of Bulgarian and Romanian institutions and processes may have changed but not the fundamental reality – with a corruption which is nothing less than systemic.

- The billions of Euros allocated to Romania since 2007 under the EC’s Structural Funds programmes have compounded the systemic and moral corruption which affects all sectors.

- The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism is, after 11 years, deeply resented – despite the increasingly clear evidence of the collusion between the Prosecution and the Secret services…..

The Italian and German examples

In 1958 Ed Banfield coined the phrase “amoral familism” to characterize southern Italy and its resistance to change. In 1993 Robert Putnam extended this critique with his Making Democracy Work – civic traditions in modern Italy – pointing out that, centuries later, cultural patterns in the south still profoundly affected modern institutions …. The Italian system since then has demonstrated little capacity for change. What appeared to be a new opening in the 1990s disappointed….the old systems simply resurfaced

Germany’s traditional power structure, on the other hand, was able to change after 1945… The Weimar Republic failed to break it – but simply gave a Nazi regime the opportunity to let loose a blood-letting from which the world has not yet recovered. Three forces were required to transform German society in 1945-50 - the trauma of defeat on all fronts; the imposition by the victors of completely new institutional, legal, social and economic systems; and the Realpolitik calculations of the Cold War

Romania, however, has been able to brush off the institutional challenge which had been posed by membership of both the EC and NATO (see). The occasional scandal can and does cause the downfall of a government - but nothing now seems able to disturb its systemic inertia.

Conclusion

It has given me no pleasure to draft this post. But I feel that too many people for too long have not spoken out….In 2 months Romania will take over the Presidency of the EU which will see the full panoply(a)y of mutual sycophancy at full throttle……making it even more difficult for dissenting voices to be heard…

Dorel Sandor was least convincing when he tried to offer a way forward 

I have a list of what to do – starting with the need for an exploration of what sort of Romania we should be aiming for in the next few decades. Such a process would be moderated by professionals using proper diagnostics, scenario thinking and milestones.
It would be managed by a group with a vision emancipated from the toxic present.  

I have a lot of sympathy for such approaches – embodied, for example, in the Future Search method. It’s how I started my own political journey in 1971 – with an annual conference in a shipbuilding town facing the decline of the trade on which it had depended for so long….But any venture would have to demonstrate that it can deal with the astonishing level of distrust of others shown by the fact that, in 2014, only 7% of the Romanian population could say that “most people can be trusted” (compared with about 20% in Italy and 40% in Germany)

For my money Social Trust is one of the fundamental elements of the soil in which democracy grows. From the start of the transition Romania was caught up in a global neo-liberalism tsunami which has been corroding that soil….

A Short Reading List on Romanian political culture

Articles

RGY posts

When will it ever change? (July 2017)

Can Outsiders ever understand what’s going on in Romania? (Jan 2017)

Impervious Power (Jan 2017)

A Divided Country – dangerous times (Feb 2017)

Are Nations really masters of their fates? (April 2017)
Is it people who change systems - or systems which change people? (July 2017)

Academic articles on political culture - and Romania

Romania Redivivus (2017)

A Guide to Change and change management for Rule of Law practitioners (2015)

Hijacked modernisation - Romanian political culture in the 20^th century; Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2007)

Poor Policy-making and how to improve it in states with weak institutions; Sorin Ionitsa (CEU 2006)

“Fatalistic political cultures” Alina Mungiu-Pippidi 2006 (chapter in Democracy and Political Culture in East Europe in which she argued (a) that it was too easy for people (not least the political elite themselves!) to use the writings of Samuel Huntington to write off countries such as Romania; and (b) that we really did need to look more closely at what various surveys (such as The World Values Survey) showed before jumping to conclusions

books

In Europe’s Shadow – two cold wars and a thirty-year journey through Romania and beyond; Robert Kaplan (2016) - a fascinating book which has an element of the “Common Book” tradition about it with its breadth of reading

A Concise History of Romania; Keith Hitchins (2014) Very readable..

Mapping Romania - notes on an unfinished journey; Ronald Young (2014) See section 7.2 at page 31 and all the annexes for the political culture references

Romania and the European Union – how the weak vanquished the strong; Tom Gallagher (2009) great narrative

Romania – borderland of Europe; Lucian Boia (2001) Very readable and well translated

Why we need to be suspicious of the idea of “political culture”

We like to think that we are “masters of our fate” and it irks us when foreigners, for example, make us realise that our behaviour is often the result of specific cultural factors which can be questioned.

The last post has made me return to a question which has haunted me since I started to work in Europe more than 30 years ago…….”to what extent can we actually change national characteristics” – let alone state institutions ???

NB – this may look a long post (and it has certainly taken a full day to compose) but it actually divides fairly easily into three separate sections – which I felt still needed to be part of a single post

1. An ignored 1990 warning

Ralf Dahrendorf was a famous German sociologist/UK statesman who wrote in 1990 an extended public letter first published under the title “Reflections on the Revolution in Europe” and then expanded as Reflections on the Revolution of our Time. In it he made the comment that it would take one or two years to create new institutions of political democracy in the recently liberated countries of central Europe; maybe five to 10 years to reform the economy and make a market economy; and 15 to 20 years to create the rule of law. But it would take maybe two generations to create a functioning civil society there.

A former adviser to Vaslev Havel, Jiri Pehe, referred 7 years ago to that prediction and suggested that  

“what we see now is that we have completed the first two stages, the transformation of the institutions, of the framework of political democracy on the institutional level, there is a functioning market economy, which of course has certain problems, but when you take a look at the third area, the rule of the law, there is still a long way to go, and civil society is still weak and in many ways not very efficient.”

He then went on to make the useful distinction between “democracy understood as institutions and democracy understood as culture”  

“It’s been much easier to create a democratic regime, a democratic system as a set of institutions and procedures and mechanism, than to create democracy as a kind of culture – that is, an environment in which people are actually democrats”.

2. Where did talk about “political cultures” first start?

The idea of “political culture” is – as the academics have taken to put it – a “contested field”…Not that this has stopped wild assertions being made about national characteristics. Indeed it has spawned one of the most enjoyable of book genres - who, for example, can resist We, Europeans – with its amusing vignettes of our various mutual neighbours? And, although the Xenophobe series does rather take this to extremes, some of this stuff can actually be quite insightful – for example, this good expose of the phrases Brits use – with columns distinguishing what our European partners generally understand by various common phrases from what Brits really mean by them 

And, since we all first noticed globalisation in the 1980s, another new field has been spawned – that of “comparative management” whose foremost writers have been Geert Hofstede, Ronnie Lessem and Frans Trompenaars ….Richard D Lewis’s When Cultures Collide – leading across Cultures  (1996) is perhaps the most readable treatment.

There used indeed to be an area called “path dependency” which argued that our behaviour was much more influenced by historical cultural patterns than we imagined. It focused initially on technical examples such as the layout of the typewriter - but found new life after the fall of communism. Indeed it gave rise to a sub-field of political science called “transitology” (which I try to explain in chapter 2 of my 1999 book In Transit – notes on good governance) 
Political culture versus rational choice – the example of the Czech-Slovak transition is one of the better examples of the genre and The political culture of unified Germany (written by a German academic) puts the field in the wider context of “political culture”

Culture Matters – how values shape human progress; ed Lawrence Harrison and SP Huntington is not an easy book to find these days. It came out in 2000 but attracted the entirely appropriate comment that a more appropriate title would have been Western Culture Matters  

And that indeed is the problem - that commentary about other cultures is imbued with notions not only of “the other” but with those of superiority and inferiority….

This raises the obvious question of what sort of person might be best placed to do an insightful (if not objective) analysis of a political culture. The answer, I would suggest, comes from using 2 axes – one to denote the “status” one (insider/outsider); the other to denote something like “the generalist/specialist” spectrum.

Robert Kaplan would be an example of a generalist outsider in Romania’s case – Mungiu-Pippidi an example of a specialist insider, although perhaps not the best example in view of her Berlin location and international profile…The historian Lucian Boia might be a better example…..

3. How 2 American political scientists tarred the Italian Image

Edward Banfield’s study in the early 1950s of a small town in southern Italy whose inhabitants displayed loyalty only to the members of their nuclear family and who had absolutely no sense of social responsibility for wider circles. The book (published in 1955) was called “The Moral Basis of a Backward Society” 

Banfield concluded that the town's plight was rooted in the distrust, envy and suspicion displayed by its inhabitants' relations with each other. Fellow citizens would refuse to help one another, except where one's own personal material gain was at stake. Many attempted to hinder their neighbours from attaining success, believing that others' good fortune would inevitably harm their own interests. "Montegrano"'s citizens viewed their village life as little more than a battleground. Consequently, there prevailed social isolation and poverty—and an inability to work together to solve common social problems, or even to pool common resources and talents to build infrastructure or common economic concerns.

"Montegrano"'s inhabitants were not unique nor inherently more impious than other people. But for quite a few reasons: historical and cultural, they did not have what he termed "social capital"—the habits, norms, attitudes and networks that motivate folk to work for the common good.

This stress on the nuclear family over the interest of the citizenry, he called the ethos of ‘amoral familism’. This he argued was probably created by the combination of certain land-tenure conditions, a high mortality rate, and the absence of other community building institutions.

Fast forward sixty years to an article in “City Compass Guide Romania” in which an expat (and, full disclosure) friend of mine wrote….

If you are fortunate enough to drive in Bucharest you will witness what is probably the clearest evidence of mass individualism in global human society. Romanian people, of all shapes, sizes, social and educational backgrounds and income brackets will do things in their cars that display a total disregard for sanity and other drivers.

Manoeuvres such as parking in the middle of the street, u-turning on highways without any warning and weaving between lanes in heavy traffic at 150 kilometres per hour are commonplace and point to an extreme lack of concern for the safety or even the simple existence of others.

The next time you are waiting to get on a plane at Henri Coandă airport, take a little time to observe how queuing in an orderly and effective manner is clearly regarded as an af­front to the sovereignty of the Romanian individual. Enjoy the spectacle of the pushing, shoving and general intimida­tion that follows the arrival of the airport staff to supervise boarding. Even while watching an international rugby test match you will only occasionally see the same intense level of barely controlled aggression.

Outside of their core social networks Romanians closely follow the rule stating that it is every man, woman and child for themselves. ……There is an opinion poll, published in early 2012, show­ing that around 90 percent of the Romanian population regards almost all of their compatriots as utterly untrust­worthy and incompetent. At the same time 90 percent, possibly the same 90 percent, see themselves as being abso­lutely beyond reproach. This is clearly an extreme response no matter how you view it and provides evidence of an ex­traordinary and troubling imbalance within the generality of Romania’s social relationships.

There is a well-known prayer in Romania, which roughly goes: “Dear God, if my goat is so ill that it will die, please make sure that my neighbour’s goat dies too.”

So what does this commonality suggest? The EU’s first Ambassador here was Karen Fogg who gave every consultant who came here in the early 1990s (like me) a summary of what can be seen as the follow-up to Banfield’s book – Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work – civic traditions in Italy (1993) which suggested that the laggardly nature of southern Italian Regions was due entirely to this “amoral familism”.  Putnam made an even greater play of missing “social capital” – indeed spawned an incredible technocratic literature on the concept and ideas on how it could be “engineered” to deal with the new alienation of modern capitalism..

Romanian communism, of course, had almost 50 years to inculcate more cooperative attitudes and behaviour – but the forced nature of “collective farms”; the forced migration of villagers to urban areas to drive industrialisation; and the scale of Securitate spying created a society where, paradoxically, even fewer could trusted anyone.      

From 1990 the market became God; Reagan and Thatcher had glorified greed; the state was “bad"; and television – which had been limited by Ceausescu to 2 hours a day - the great “good”……As the commercial stations and journals spread, the values of instant gratification became dominant (one of the points Dorel Sandor makes)……

To be continued…..