Getting to Denmark

I’ve always been a sucker for books which promised to reveal the essence or soul of a nation or Region and “The Nordic Secret” (2017) - which I’m now half-way through - offers insights not only into the Scandinavian “soul” but a solution to the puzzle Francis Fukuyama set us a more than a decade ago - How to get to Denmark?

And it’s written in a highly accessible style – offering a variety of superb vignettes into the various French, German, Scandinavian (and even British) characters who helped develop the thinking which led to the “folkschools” which, the book argues, are the basis of the much-admired Scandinavian success story.  Its focus is very much on a concept with which we Brits are not very familiar – what the Germans known as “Bildung” or “opening up of the world” – with a good short article here on the concept. The authors express it nicely here - 

As we kept on reading, Lene reading more ego development psychology and Tomas reading more about Bildung, we realized that we might have stumbled upon a connection between Bildung and ego-development theory that nobody in academia had explored before. As we kept on reading and went to the German sources, we saw more and stronger similarities between Bildung (as described by the German philosophers) and ego-development (as described by contemporary developmental psychologists) than we had ever imagined.

The trouble is that it poses so many questions and leads me down such an amazing number of paths as to leave me gasping for breath eg

·       How exactly did the Scandinavian countries manage to transform themselves from backward societies in 1850 to become the most advanced and envied nations today?

·       Is it true that Denmark started the process with an outspoken and activist priest/politician who established model inspirational rural schools?

·       Ever since Robert Putnam and Edward Banfield reminded us decades ago that southern Italy seemed stuck in the 19^th century, we have become ambivalent about the prospects for positive social change

·       Why have people lost interest in the question of getting corruption-free societies?

  and apparently given up on ever achieving effective states? 

I can’t hope to get through the reading my googling has unearthed – so let’s see is any of my readers can help with this annotated list of the more interesting stuff

I can’t hope to get through the reading my googling has unearthed – so let’s see is any of my readers can help. Here’s an annotated list of the more interesting stuff

Getting to Denmark (2020) – a very useful short report about the economic aspects of the Danish experience, which emphasises the importance of rural cooperatives 

Dougald Hine has lived in Norway for 30 years and produced this provocative article in 2019 which included some of the material he had found useful (it doesn’t mention The Nordic Secret which had come out in epub format in 2017) 

Lutheranism and the Nordic Spirit of social democracy Robert Nelson (2017) I’ve just unearthed what looks to be a crucial study in what remains a highly important topic for me 

A Utopia like any other – inside the Swedish model; Dominic Hinde (2016) A short book by a Swedish journalist now living in the UK and mentioned by in Hine’s article 

Viking Economics – how the Scandinavians got it right and how we can too; George Lakoff (2016) a marriage link allowed this American to gain some home truths 

Building the Nation – NFS Grundtvig and Danish National Identity et J Hall et al (2015) A fascinating study of the role this priest/politician played from the 1850s in forging a sense of national identity and loyalty. Includes a chapter by Fukuyama and also by one of the key writers on nationalism – Anthony Smith 

Becoming Denmark; Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) A very useful summary by one of the top European experts on anti-corruption on the historical stages which led to the Danish success. 

State-building, governance and world order in the 21^st century Francis Fukuyama (2004) A very important little book which reflected the interest in those days in nation- and democracy-building

The search for good government – understanding the paradox of Italian democracy F Sabetti (2000). Rather belatedly, the Italians get back at Banfield and Putnam

Who's having a good Covid19 War?

Covid19 certainly "separates the wheat from the chaff" - it didn't take long, for example, for us to identify the "good" leaders (both political and professional) whose judgements we felt we could trust - for example Ahern and Merkel and the Far-East leaders mentioned in Pankaj Mishra's article in the last post. The 1990s saw an interest in something called "good governance" - which tended to degenerate into a rather mechanistic list of desiderata unable, for example, to throw any light on the odd fact that  two of the countries with the highest Covid19 death rates (US and UK) are also the countries which
- have adversarial,”first past the post”, electoral systems;
- pride themselves on their ”exceptionalism”;
- gave us neoliberalism;
-  have a transactional approach to business which insists on paring costs down to a bare minimum – regardless, as Paul Collier argued recently, of the damage this does to social resilience.

Covid19 offers an opportunity to rethink what became a rather sterile academic debate about what was a pretty vague concept ("good governance") and to craft instead useful guides to the far more important topic of good government
There are, for example, thousands of books about leadership  but not so many about political leadership. It's certainly worth trying to identify what Merkel and Ahern have - which distinguishes them from Trump. Johnson and Bolsonaro - eg calmness under pressure; a search for a diversity of opinions; a refusal to be rushed into decisions; integrity; and effective story-telling are vastly underestimated features of the good leader

Fukuyama is one of many commentators who have identified the issue of Trust as a defining one for government systems in the future.

The crucial determinant in performance will not be the type of regime, but the state’s capacity and, above all, trust in government.
All political systems need to delegate discretionary authority to executive branches during times of crisis. No set of preexisting laws or rules can ever anticipate all of the novel and rapidly changing situations that countries will face. The capacity of people at the top, and their judgment, determine whether outcomes are good or bad.

And in making that delegation of authority to the executive, trust is the single most important commodity that will determine the fate of a society. In a democracy no less than in a dictatorship, citizens have to believe that the executive knows what it is doing.
It is a popular misconception that liberal democracies necessarily have weak governments because they have to respect popular choice and legal procedure. All modern governments have developed a powerful executive branch, because no society can survive without one. They need a strong, effective, modern state that can concentrate and deploy power when necessary to protect the community, keep public order, and provide essential public services. A democracy delegates emergency powers to its executive to deal with fast-moving threats.

But willingness to delegate power and its effective use depend on one thing above all, which is trust that the executive will use those powers wisely and effectively. And this is where the U.S. has a big problem right now.

Trust is built on two foundations.
- citizens must believe that their government has the expertise, technical knowledge, capacity, and impartiality to make the best available judgments. Capacity simply has to do with the government having an adequate number of people with the right training and skills to carry out the tasks they are assigned, from local firemen, policemen, and health workers to the government executives making higher-level decisions about issues such as quarantines and bailouts.
- The second foundation is trust in the top end of the hierarchy, which means, in the U.S. system, the president. Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt enjoyed high levels of trust during their respective crises. As wartime presidents, this trio succeeded in symbolizing, in their own persons, the national struggle. George W. Bush did initially after September 11, but as his invasion of Iraq soured, citizens began questioning the delegations of authority they had made to him via legislation like the Patriot Act. The United States today faces a crisis of political trust. Trump’s base—the 35–40 percent of the population that will support him no matter what—has been fed a diet of conspiracy stories for the past four years concerning the “deep state,” and taught to distrust expertise that does not actively support the president.

And even the world of political science has woken up to the importance of Trust - with the UK's Economic and  Social Research Council funding a programme on the subject which has so far released such papers as
- "Trust, Mistrust and Distrust"
- "Lesson-Drawing from New Zealand"
- "Nudges against pandemics - on the Swedish experience" ( by Swedish political scientist J Pierre)
For a more critical view of the Swedish left's response see here

But it's all of us who should feel under a moral microscope in times of crisis - not just our leaders. How we behave in a crisis is a mark of our character - which often finds expression in our choice of career. I was intrigued by a recent post which suggested that certain character deficiencies of economists had been exposed during the Covid Crisis

Update;

I missed this always-interesting Matt Flinders' article on The Politics of Covid19 - trust, blame and understanding 
The interesting UK Alternative journal commissioned and published this interesting report on how Plymouth activists have responded to the pandemic

Reading Week - part III

The second full category of books in my library are those which I have read but which need to be read and reread for their full value to be extracted. There are a lot in this category – but let me select the two which have so far made it onto my desk -

Political Order and Political Decay; Francis Fukuyama (2014) is the second volume of magnum opus of 1,300 pages and is one of these rare books of which I keep duplicate copies – although it can be freely downloaded in full from the internet.

Its introduction summarises the first volume and the opening chapter set out his framework -  showing the link between economic, social and political development; and how ideas about legitimacy have shaped our understanding of the three basic building blocks of “modern” government – “the state”, “rule of law” and “democratic accountability” (see the figure at p43)

This first chapter spells out how very different social conditions and traditions in the various continents have affected the shape and integrity of government systems (The sequencing of bureaucracy and challenge to political power is of particular interest)

Doughnut economics – 7 ways to think like a 21st century economist by Kate Raworth (2017) is another example of a book benefiting from a reread. She’s an Oxford economist whose book has made quite an impact. Indeed it’s one of a fairly short list of books I recommended last year for people wanting a different approach to economics.

Right from the start her text engages – with an explanation of how she was put off by the subject initially but came back to it almost 2 decades later….And then a rare exploration of the importance not only of “framing” but of diagrams and visuals – and how diagrams were used by Paul Samuelson in 1948 in the first popular economics textbook to plant false perceptions in student minds.  

Chapter one – “Change the Goal” - discusses how the measurement of an economy as know it today (GNP) was invented only in the late 1930s and how it was subsequently used by Roosevelt to measure the impact of the New Deal; and to prepare the US for war. Also how its inventor (Simon Kuznets) came quickly to see the crudities and deficiencies of the measure but remained a prophet in the wilderness. The rest of the chapter reminds us of the things which are left out of this metric – and the recent history of the attempts to bring in more suitable metrics  

The doughnut is her metaphor for the point we humans have reached – with us exposed on its outer rim to the limits of 9 planetary boundaries with climate change; land conversion; biodiversity loss; and nitrogen and phosphorous loading have already reached its limits….

The doughnut’s inner rim is composed of what she calls the “social foundation” which includes not only food, water and housing but gender equality and political voice…   

The book devotes a chapter apiece to the seven ways she offers for changing the way we think about economics – but with headings which lack punch and clarity. Her second chapter “Seeing the Big Picture” draws a brilliant parallel between the Economics narrative, on the one hand, and a play/film on the other. Each has its plot, goodies and baddies….There’s a good interview with her here

The early pages of Raworth’s book alerted me to a great book which, some 8 years ago, identified and explored this issue of our being taken over by a new ideology – what the French used to call “La Pensee Unique”, It is Monoculture – how one story is changing everything by FS Michaels and makes a fitting fanfare for the next post which will explore the world of books freely downloadable from the internet

Identity Politics

How has it come to pass that the world is divided these days on the issue of identity and political correctness?? Is it the insidious result of the American “culture wars” – which can be traced back  to 1968; Of an American left targeting Universities to help develop “identity politics”? Or simply the results of the polarising effect of the social media…..?

Whatever the precise origin, Brexit and the election of Trump have helped divide the world into two groups - “cosmopolitans” and “left-behinds” – with the former favouring open borders and a libertarian agenda; and the latter a more traditional one which has only recently found expression…

Except that this ignores a significant middle group which doesn’t fit such a Manichean perspective….and I readily confess to being a fully paid-up member of these “mugwumps” who don’t take up predictable positions - and are as a result considered unreliable – with “their mugs on one side of the fence and their wumps on the other”!

Take “human rights” as an example….I still remember my reaction when a young Kyrgz woman quoted some recondite UN declaration at me - viz to launch into an explanation that such rights were the results of long and bitterly-fought struggles eg for trade union let alone gender rights – and would not be enforced by simple diktat…from thousands of kilometres away. But she seemed to expect the magic waving of a wand……gain without pain…

And when feminism became active in the UK in the 1980s, I was responsible for a new “social strategy” which was trying to assert the rights of the unemployed and low-paid - and I confess that I had then little sympathy for what I felt were the interests of well-paid women pushing for an end to the “glass-ceiling”.… The issue, I felt, was simply one of priorities in what is, after all, always a crowded agenda for political attention….

With its referendum on the constitutional definition of a family, Romania provides another recent example. This grass-roots initiative would have restricted the definition of a family unit to that between a man and a woman (thereby denying that definition to single mothers!). This did not prevent three and a half million voters from voting yes but this was (at 21%) below the required 30% threshold. Many who supported the amendment argued that social values were offended by same-sex marriage and that it was unrealistic to expect villagers suddenly to accept that such behaviour was normal….     

Francis Fukuyama’s latest book - Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment - reminds us of the dual aspect of identity - individual and social….the first being our own sense of who we are ( very much to the fore in this narcissistic age), the latter being the sense of group differentiation. It is an issue which has clearly been eating away at Fukuyama for some time – evidence this powerful 2007 article Identity, immigration and liberal democracy which is very good on the contrast between US assimilation v European multiculturalism…

From the excerpts, his new book seems a good overview of how fundamentally politics has changed from being a fight between labour and capital to being a contest over identity and belonging…. 

While the economic inequalities arising from the last fifty or so years of globalization are a major factor explaining contemporary politics, economic grievances become much more acute when they are attached to feelings of indignity and disrespect. Indeed, much of what we understand to be economic motivation actually reflects not a straightforward desire for wealth and resources, but the fact that money is perceived to be a marker of status and buys respect.

Modern economic theory is built around the assumption that human beings are rational individuals who all want to maximize their “utility”—that is, their material well-being—and that politics is simply an extension of that maximizing behaviour. However, if we are ever to properly interpret the behaviour of real human beings in the contemporary world, we have to expand our understanding of human motivation beyond this simple economic model that so dominates much of our discourse.
No one contests that human beings are capable of rational behaviour, or that they are self-interested individuals who seek greater wealth and resources.

 But human psychology is much more complex than the rather simpleminded economic model suggests. Before we can understand contemporary identity politics, we need to step back and develop a deeper and richer understanding of human motivation and behaviour. We need, in other words, a better theory of the human soul.

I’m aware that this post has wandered a bit……starting with an (obvious) assertion about polarisation….with a defence of those who seek a more nuanced or “balanced” view… Some confession about past prejudices duly followed….and also a recent Romanian example ..…I then came across the Fukuyama book which clearly warranted inclusion....

Until now the conclusion read that - 

Grassroots pressure rarely leads to significant change – not at least on its own.……But neither do the imposition of national or international norms – which produces a push-back if not angry resentment  Social change generally comes from a combination of both.

A July post had explained that the pincer theory of change had been my default theory since the 1980s (although it later gave way to one called “windows of opportunity”)

In those days, it was clearly possible for some elite “insiders” to work together with activists to change things. The collapse in trust now seems to make such alliances impossible?

“The best lack all conviction, while the worst.. are full of passionate intensity”.

WB Yeats

Reading List

Identity, immigration and liberal democracy; F Fukuyama (2007) very good on the contrast between US assimilation v European multiculturalism…

New Yorker Review of Fukuyama book – Identity  

a rather fatuous review – but useful for getting you to read more..

podcast with Fukuyama

The political theory of recognition – the case of the white working class (article)
The Once and future liberal - after identity politics; Mark Lilla (2017)

The Limits of Identity – ethnicity, conflict and politics; article by Richard Jenkins (2000)

identity politics and the left Hobsbawm 1980s

It's All About...Values

For almost 30 years I have been living in central european countries (actually seven of the years were in central Asia) and working on projects designed to adjust their administrative and political cultures to European (indeed ”global”) norms of transparency and accountability.

A battery of techniques (variations of ”stick”, carrot and moral rhetoric) has been used over this period - by a legion of missionaries and mercenaries from organisations such as the World Bank, OECD, the EC and private consultancies - to pursue this task.

I drew on my own experience to present in 2011 a detailed analysis - The Long Game – not the log-frame – with the title trying to summarise the main thrust of the paper’s argument that too much emphasis was laid on rationalistic techniques which didn’t fit the local context - and which were expected to deliver overambitious results in ridiculously short time-periods.

The paper coined the phrase ”impervious regimes” to suggest not only that the elites of these countries treated their citizens with utter disdain but that this was hard-wired into their DNA – ie that the underlying social values made it difficult for the elites to behave in any other way....

There was a further strand to the argument I have been conducting for more than a decade – namely that the management techniques imported into these countries by the missionaries and mercenaries (who have morphed into local experts) have given the ”power elite” a new weapon in the armoury used to keep citizens in servility....

I might indeed have added that the EC’s Structural Funds have also given a powerful additional boost to the corruption which had for so long been systemic in most of the countries....  

But I realised yesterday that this ”values” and ”path dependency” argument is far too static....after all, so much of my writing of the past 20 years has been about the moral corruption of our very own ”Western elites”  (see the latest version of Dispatches to the Next Generation) .....

This week I came across an important book by the famous Francis Fukuyama - which he had written in 1999 but which had passed me by - The Great Disruption – human nature and the reconstitution of social order and which is a critique of the loosening of our social fabric (and declining social trust) which he argued has been going on since 1965.

At first glance, it bears some similarities to Christopher Lasch’s The Culture of Narcissism which does, however, bear the curious sub-title “American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations”.

Both books are important correctives to the all-too-familiar refrain from “the West” that “the East” has some catching up to do….More importantly they touch on a theme central to this blog’s very existence – the tension between what I might call “the moral universe” and “technocracy”. Remember one of the quotations which grace this blog (if you scroll far enough down the right-hand boxes) – 

"We've spent half a century arguing over management methods. If there are solutions to our confusions over government, they lie in democratic not management processes" JR Saul (1992) 

The final section of The Long Game – not the log-frame was a rare attempt to place the unease we feel about management techniques in that wider moral universe......but this post has been long enough.....

Tomorrow I will try to pick up the argument where I seem to have left it all of six years ago........

Do we need the state?

On Friday, the clouds were mottled and swirling in a string wind – autumn, it seemed, had closed down summer. But the last 2 days have been cloudless and the dawn now announces a similar day. Yesterday, as I was preparing the potato omelette with the eggs my neighbours had brought me (and a very tasty soup); the milk from their cow (who feeds on our grass); the locally prepared cheese I had bought from other neighbours; and the salami from a neighbouring village, I realised that, here in my village, I am almost self-sufficient (if we count the village as “self” and allow me to keep my oriental spices and large, white Bulgarian beans (“Bob” – as they are called). My overheads (I have to keep on pinching myself) are 100 euros a month (including power, heating, tax and insurance). It is petrol and the mobile phone (25 euros) which adds to the expenses (and the wine and palinka/Rakia stocks!)
By coincidence, I came across this American paper which confronts the possibility of the collapse of American society – and how people should cope. Sadly (but typically) a lot of space is concerned with guns and self-defence. And the paper makes no reference to the blog which has, for some years, been dealing (on a weekly basis) with the “peak oil syndrome”; how it would affect the (unrealistic) way of life of north americans; and what practical steps people could be taking now to develop the resilience which will be necessary to cope with the new conditions. One of my readers has drawn my attention to a book published in 2008 which suggested many of the conditions which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union (military spending; oil shortage, debt, trade deficit) are now present in the USA - Orlov’s Reinventing Collapse - but that much of the infrastructure available to the Russians to cope (eg District heating; vegetable plots) is missing in North America.
North Americans, of course, do not factor the state into these issues since they assume that the state is part of the problem. In Europe – despite the neo-liberal hollowing out of the state and politicians increasingly being seen as hollow puppits – many persist in our belief that collective action still has a role. The question is whether politicians and the state can rise to the challenge.

Last November I suggested that any convincing argument for systemic reform needed to tackle four questions -
• Why do we need major change in our systems?
• Who or what is the culprit?
• What programme might start a significant change process?
• What mechanisms (process or institutions) do we need to implement such programmes?

Earlier this year I drafted a paper which tried, amongst other things, to summarise some of the writing on the second and third of these questions - but have not given proper attention to the last question.
One of the bloggers I respect has, however, recently turned his attention to the issue of the moral basis for a greater role for the state.
And a recent paper from the Quality of Governance Institute by Bo Rothstein, entitled Creating a sustainable solidaristic society - a manual is also relevant.

The proper and legitimate role of the state are, of course, central concerns of this blog of mine. It was only when I started my work with governments in transition countries 20 years ago that I started to think seriously about the subject – although my debureaucratising mission of the 1970s in Scottish local government had made me think very hard about the role of local government and its various stakeholders. But this was hardly the most appropriate preparation for the issue of what “the state” might reasonably be expected to do in the special conditions of post-communism? And, in any event, the basic questions of the role of the state were quickly settled in Central Europe in 1990-92 without any public discussion – thanks to international bodies such as The World Bank. You would nonetheless have thought that some academics in countries such as Slovakia (which has twice experienced the process of state-building - once in 1918 as part of Czechoslovakia, then in 1993) might have pulled together some lessons and considerations about the role of the state!

I’ve also started to Fukuyama’s latest tomb – The Origins of Political Order - which appeared in the spring. It’s a sequel of sorts to the late Samuel Huntington’s classic “Political Order in Changing Societies.” Fukuyama’s update of Huntington’s work examines what current scholarship understands about the evolution of states. Beginning with hunter-gatherers, the book ranges across an astonishing array of knowledge to look at the development of countries, up to the French Revolution. (A second volume is intended to pick up where “The Origins of Political Order” leaves off). Evolutionary biology, sociology, political philosophy, anthropology – all these disciplines are mined for insights into what is among the most difficult problems in international politics: the question of how to establish modern, functioning states. David Runciman summarises thus

Human beings have always organised themselves in tight-knit groups – there never was a Rousseauian paradise of free-spirited individuals roaming contentedly through the primordial forests. The trouble was that the first human societies were too tight-knit. These were essentially kinship groups and generated what Fukuyama calls "the tyranny of cousins". People would do almost anything for their relatives, and almost anything to the people who weren't (rape, pillage, murder). This was a recipe for constant, low-level conflict, interspersed with periodic bouts of serious blood-letting.
The way out of the kinship trap was the creation of states (by which Fukuyama means centralised political authorities), which were needed to break the hold of families. States are one of the three pillars Fukuyama identifies as providing the basis for political order. The reason that powerful states aren't enough on their own is that political power doesn't necessarily solve the problem of kinship. Instead, it can simply relocate it up the chain, so that all you get are strong rulers who use their power to favour their relatives, a phenomenon that is all too easy to identify, from the ancient world to contemporary Libya. So the rule of states needs to be supplemented by the rule of law, which imposes limits on political power and corruption. However, the rule of law itself can destabilise political order by undermining the ability of states to take decisive action when it is needed, and giving non-state organisations too much of a free hand. Hence the need for the third pillar: accountable government (or what we might now call democracy). This retains a strong state but allows people to change their rulers when they start behaving badly.
Fukuyama thinks that we too often treat the three pillars of political order as though they were separate goods in their own right, capable of doing the job on their own. We champion democracy, forgetting that without the rule of law it is liable simply to entrench social divisions. Or we champion the rule of law, forgetting that without a strong state it is liable to lead to political instability. But he also thinks that whole societies can make the same mistake. He distinguishes between a good political order, and an order that is simply "good enough", which occurs when only one or two of the building blocks is in place, giving the illusion of security. For instance, ancient China arrived at a strong centralised state far earlier than the west, in order to combat the problem of endemic civil war. But the Chinese state that emerged was too strong: it crushed the warlords but also crushed any incipient civil society or ideas of accountability. Thus China enjoyed an early advantage on the path to political order, but it was this advantage that set it back, because too much power was concentrated too soon. It is this fact, Fukuyama believes, that explains the autocratic condition of Chinese politics to this day.

Other useful reviews are here, here and here
The sculpture is in the park next to the Sofia City Gallery - marking the allied bombing of the city in 1944. For some reason some people want to remove it.....