The last post had two purposes –
· to explore seven tools which governments have used
in efforts to alter the behaviour of both citizens and organisations (public
and commercial).
· to remind us that some preliminary efforts in the 1970s to identify the factors which accounted for some successful government initiatives of the 1960s had subsequently floundered in the 1980s - as Thatcherism, privatisation and neo-liberalism downgraded government in favour of what was little more than the downright worship of markets. New Labour may, in the new millennium, have brought back a few government programmes (such as Sure Start) but basically retained its faith in competition, globalisation and the market.
The global financial meltdown of 2008 took the gloss off all that – and it was not altogether surprising that Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness by Thaler and Cass became a best-seller in the same year. This was a long overdue recognition that governments could also be effective
Huge amounts of money, of course, are spent - and thousands of lobbyists employed – to persuade us otherwise; to keep us constantly supplied with stories of government waste and ineptitude. And most academics, it must be said, are happy to go along with this. Which is why I finished the post by paying tribute to the perseverance of people like Mark Moore, Paul du Gay and Paul t’Hart who are amongst the very few academics who have chosen to focus their efforts on trying to understand the preconditions for positive government efforts.
What I want to do in this post is to try to describe the theories of change I’ve found most useful in the 50 years I’ve been lucky enough to have the chance to practice leadership – initially political, then project management and, in retirement, more distant and reflective.
From “the Pincer Movement” to celebration of
opportunism
When I was
lucky enough to find myself in a position of strategic leadership in a new and
large organisation in the mid 1970s, we used what I called the “pincer approach” to set up reform
structures at both a political and community level. The organisational culture
was, of course, one of classic bureaucracy – but, from its very start, some of
us made sure that it had to contend with the unruly forces of political
idealism and community power. The regional body concerned was responsible for
such local government functions as education, social work, transport, water and
strategic planning for two and half million people; and employed 100,000 staff
but very little has been written about it. You’ll find the full
story of the strategy here – and a short
version here.
Thirty years
later. I was doing a lot of training sessions in the Presidential Academies of
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan and developed there what I called the
“opportunistic” or “windows of opportunity” theory of change against what I
started to call “impervious regimes” ie so confident of the lack of challenge
to their rule that they had become impervious to their citizens. Initially I
expressed it like this -
• “Windows of opportunity present themselves - from outside the organization, in crises, pressure from below
• reformers have to be technically prepared, inspire confidence – and able to seize and direct the opportunity
• Others have to have a reason to follow
• the new ways of behaving have to be formalized in new structures.
And then
developed a more detailed formulation which put more emphasis on the
individual, moral responsibility –
“Most of the
time our systems seem impervious to change – but always (and suddenly) an
opportunity arises. Those who care about the future of their society, prepare
for these “windows of opportunity”. And the preparation is about analysis,
mobilisation and trust.
·
It is about us caring enough about our organisation and society to speak out about the
need for change.
·
It is about taking the trouble to think and read about ways to
improve things – and
·
To help create
and run networks of such change.
·
And it is about establishing a personal reputation for probity and good
judgement
·
that people will follow your lead when that window of opportunity arises”.
I am not a fan
of Malcolm Gladwell but his popularisations have included the important notion
of the
Tipping Point (2010) where he
suggested that there were three key factors which determine whether an idea or
fashion will “tip” into wide-scale popularity
·
the Law of the Few,
·
the Stickiness Factor, and
· the Power of Context.
The “Law of the
Few” proposes that a few key types of people must champion an idea, concept, or
product before it can reach the tipping point. Gladwell describes these key
types as –
·
Connectors,
·
Mavens, and
· Salesmen.
(And a maven – in case you didn’t know - is a trusted expert in a particular field, who seeks to pass knowledge on to others. The word maven comes from the Hebrew, via Yiddish, and means one who understands, based on an accumulation of knowledge).
If individuals
representing all three of these groups endorse and advocate a new idea, it is
much more likely that it will tip into exponential success.
The other 2 concepts are, frankly, not so well dealt with – and we need to go the wider literature of change management and social marketing to get the whole picture.
A Final Point
Effective change doesn’t come from the “ya-boo yo-yo” system of adversarial power blocs of the UK and USA – it comes from a combination of sustained dialogue; coalitions of change; and grassroots activism and protest. And, often, it starts with an experiment – rather than a grand programme…Take, for example, what is now being called the Dutch model for neighbourhood care – started by Buurtzorg a few years back which is now inspiring people everywhere. That is a worker cooperative model… which, quite rightly, figures in Frederic Laloux’s Reinventing Organisations.
Further Reading; Annotated bibliogaphy for change agents" it may be a bit dated, but it’s still a useful resource for those who want to change the system of which they’re part.
Best explanation of ”theory of change” and annotated bibliography
To be continued
