SIX MORE

Corrupted Kingdom – Britain’s Disappearing integrity and how we can get it back Robert Barrington (2026) preview only

Our body politic is in many places either infected or at risk of infection, but this lies 
beneath the surface. Our antibodies have until now been able to keep the infection 
in check, but the infection is getting worse – and the defences are getting weaker. 
It sounds pretty bad, and there is a risk that a book such as this will add to the doom 
and gloom of the nation. That is by no means my intention. On the contrary, I hope 
that by applying the lens of corruption analysis to institutions and events that are in 
many cases already well known, we will get closer to understanding the problem 
– and therefore be better placed to deal with it. My underlying approach is that 
understanding and evidence are the basis of good policymaking. After all, if we 
have a sound analysis of the problem, we are more likely to find solutions that are 
fit for purpose. This brings to mind a saying from Einstein: ‘If I had an hour to 
solve a problem, I’d spend fifty-five minutes thinking about the problem and five 
minutes thinking about solutions.’ In this country, we do not spend enough time 
thinking about whether corruption is a problem. If we were more aware, we might 
appreciate that while corruption does not explain everything about contemporary 
Britain, it can explain a great deal about political leadership, economic growth and 
the decline of our key institutions. While researching this book, I have often been 
asked what is going wrong with Britain – and whether corruption is the cause. 
Many people share a sense that things are out of kilter and are unsure where 
the country is heading. In fact, Britain may be experiencing what corruption 
analysts call a ‘big bang’ moment: a point when a country can choose between 
two paths – one that leads to more corruption or another that brings it under control. 
I often encounter deep-state conspiracy theories about the City and the 
Establishment. For example, that the outsourcing of so many public services to 
the private sector is driven by a small cabal of politicians, financiers and business 
leaders who want to feather their own nests irrespective of the quality of service 
provided, and that this is enabled by the fact that so many were at the same 
schools and universities together. The truth is both more complex and more 
worrying. As I will demonstrate, there are many pockets of corruption in the UK, 
sometimes barely kept in check by a set of weakened institutions. There is no 
single group pulling the strings, but corruption can be damaging without being 
coordinated. This comes against a background  without being coordinated. 
This comes against a background of some deep-rooted issues like increasing 
inequality, economic stagnation and political instability, constituting a series of 
social, economic and political threats to our national well-being. 
These are prime conditions for corruption to thrive, which gives rise to an 
uncomfortable reality: the corruption in this country may not yet have been 
as damaging as in other countries, but we should not believe the UK is immune, 
and there may be worse to come if corrective action is not taken. 
Based on thousands of interviews and conversations with everyone from 
ex-offenders to ex-prime ministers, this book explores the links between 
important contemporary ideas such as chumocracy and Londongrad, as well as 
high-profile issues like corruption in the Metropolitan Police and the monarchy. 
Britain is complacent about corruption, but the threats are rising and the defences 
are weakened. The rotten apples are starting to look like a rotting barrel. 
As a country, we can avoid waking up to the silent spring. If we do not act, 
we may move into illiberal democracy, state capture or systemic corruption. 
But there is an alternative. We could use integrity and standards to refuel 
Britain’s national well-being and international reputation. 
The choice is ours to make.  
The Political Theory of Liberal Socialism Matt McManus 2025

The Ukraine War and the Eurasian world order Glen Diesen (2024)

The book answers the research question: To what extent does the Ukraine War influence the world order? The book focuses primarily on the West’s actions as it has been the collective hegemon and main custodian of the world order over the past centuries. Subsequently, it focuses on the West’s failure to offer common rules to prevent and resolve conflict.

Instead, the unipolar world order contributed to, instigated and prolonged the Ukraine War. Exploring the war as a consequence of a collapsing world order should not be interpreted as supporting or legitimising the war. To answer this research question, the book first outlines the theoretical assumptions about world order and explores the rise of the Western-centric world order, providing an overview of the foundations of world order. Thereafter, it explores the rise and decline of the world order defined as liberal hegemony after the Cold War, and the significance of NATO expansion on the unravelling of the pan-European security architecture and a common world order. In the second part of the book, the Ukrainian crisis is explored as a key battleground for determining the preservation or abandonment of liberal hegemony. These chapters explore the rivalry for influence between 1991 and 2014, the civil war between 2014 and 2022 following the coup, and the Russian invasion from 2022. The final chapter outlines how the emergence of a Eurasian world order has intensified because of the Ukraine War. It is concluded that the world is entering a turbulent time as the Ukraine War has ended liberal hegemony, yet a multipolar Westphalian system has not yet asserted itself. 

Chapter two theorises the concept of world order. The modern world order originating with the Peace of Westphalia is contrasted with the incentives of restoring a Pax Romana system to transcend the international anarchy with hegemony and universal values. The balance of power is also translated into a geoeconomic “balance of dependence” to explore how the disruption of the Industrial Revolution altered the mercantilist system. The struggle for world order is theorised to represent a series of dilemmas such as a balance of power versus hegemony, cultural distinctiveness versus universalism, and order versus justice.

Chapter three explores the rise of the Western-centric world order. Military superiority and control over the maritime transportation corridors enabled the rise of a Western-centric world from the early 16th century, which advanced further as the Industrial Revolution endowed the West with economic statecraft from the late 18th century. The world order was reformed by liberal principles due to the American and French Revolutions, the transformation of industrial capitalism, and the subsequent rise of ideologies following the First World War. The influence of economic and political liberalism on world order became a reflection of the international distribution of power.

Chapter four addresses Pax Americana, the new world order of liberal hegemony. After the Cold War, there were debates about the case for and against constructing a world order based on unipolarity and liberalism visà-vis restoring a balance of power. The hegemonic system lacked sustainability as the U.S. became reliant on military interventionism, exhausted its resources, failed to address domestic problems, suffered from declining legitimacy in the world, and inadvertently incentivised foreign powers to rival the U.S. in terms of military power, geoeconomics and political institutions.

Chapter five analyses the decline of liberalism as the organising principle of the world order. Liberal hegemony replaced international law with the rules-based international order and reinvented diplomacy as a subject-object civilising mission. The excesses of political and economic liberalism undermined the foundation for social cohesion, and a new authoritarian liberalism made it increasingly difficult for the West to present itself as a teacher of democracy. Cultural decline weakened soft power, the military-industrial complex corrupted democracy and governance, domestic political squabbles increasingly influenced foreign policy, and the concept of global civil society became a tool of state power.

Chapter six explores NATO expansion and the collapse of pan-European security and a common world order. After the Cold War, two rival models for world order emerged that influenced the European security architecture. A Westphalian balance of power system represented by an inclusive pan-European security architecture was institutionalised with the establishment of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which was based on indivisible security, sovereign equality, and a Europe without dividing lines. Concurrently, liberal hegemony in Europe manifested itself by expanding NATO, which implied abandoning the pan-European security agreements based on the Helsinki Accords, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and the OSCE. Many American and European leaders cautioned that NATO expansionism would revive the East-West division of Europe and possibly start another Cold War. Yet, the new dividing lines also revived an ideological divide as all subsequent tensions were largely interpreted through the heuristics of a wider struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. Diplomacy degenerated, arms treaties collapsed, and the security dilemma intensified. 

Chapter seven analyses how Ukraine became a pawn on the European chessboard between 1991 and 2014. Ukraine was destined to become the centre of a proxy conflict between a liberal hegemony and a Westphalian world order as Ukraine is a divided country in a divided Europe. Nationbuilding in post-Soviet Ukraine has been troubled by the lack of unifying narratives and identity. The ethnic, cultural, and linguistic connectivity between Ukrainians and Russians became a double-edged sword as the closeness eroded the distinctiveness required for full sovereignty. While Eastern Ukrainians commonly defined relations with Russians as a “fraternal bond,” Western Ukrainians tend to interpret the shared history as imperialism that diluted and undermined the development of a distinctive Ukrainian identity. Russia placed its support behind the Eastern Ukrainians and the West backed the Western Ukrainian nationalists due to competing visions of a regional order and world order in terms of the distribution of power and values.

Chapter eight outlines the Ukrainian Civil War sparked by the Western-backed coup in February 2014. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for Donbas brought the liberal hegemonic order under great strain. Hegemony, liberal values, and international law required a principled rejection of Russia’s incursion. Yet, the hegemonic order was supported by backing far-right nationalists that would purge the Russian-friendly elements in society and set Ukraine on a path to war. The new government in Kiev suppressed the Russian language, culture, and the Orthodox Church while it also purged the media and opposition parties, including the arrest of the opposition leader. Meanwhile, the West used the UN-approved Minsk Agreement to buy time to arm and train Ukraine which was becoming a de facto member of NATO.

Chapter nine explores the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the proxy war that ensued. NATO’s reluctance to prevent the war, the sabotage of peace negotiations after the Russian invasion, and the continued escalations are indicative of the failure of world order and what is at stake. NATO’s objective to weaken Russia as a strategic rival and send a clear signal to China could bring new energy to liberal hegemony, while a Russian victory could restore a balance of power system. As the war dragged on, the geostrategic objective of weakening Russia no longer harmonised with the goal of “helping Ukraine,” and NATO began to display its intent more overtly to “fight to the last Ukrainian.”

Chapter ten analyses the emergence of the Eurasian world order that intensified because of the Ukraine War. Russia, China, and other Eurasian states had already diversified their economic connectivity and aspired for a multipolar system for several years as the international distribution of power shifted. Yet, the war demonstrated the urgency of decoupling from the economic dependence on the West and it collapsed the normative justification of liberal hegemony. Irrespective of the military outcome, the war revealed multipolar realities as the world outside NATO did not accept the West’s narrative, did not join sanctions, and instead accommodated Russia economically and politically. Eurasian states are spearheading the transition to a multi-polar Westphalian world order with Eurasian characteristics. Western maritime powers lose their competitive advantage to Eurasian land powers as new autonomous centres of power emerge that reject liberal universalism in favour of civilisational distinctiveness. It is concluded that the world is entering a period of disorder as the world is between liberal hegemony and multipolarity. States that adapt to the multipolar realities will thrive and those that resist the necessary adjustments will contribute to war.

Stalingrad Vasily Grossman (2019)

How Westminster Worked – and why it doesn’t Ian Dunt (2023)

The book starts with an interesting case-study of how a hapless MP who just happened to be one Anthony Grayland selected a topic to make a mark – the privatisation of prisons and the mess he then made of it. Dunt then turns to the selection of MPs - the most important moment in British democracy happens when no one’s watching. It’s not the general election. The majority of votes at the election will be completely ignored. It comes long before that, in a room filled with party members, when they work out who is ultimately going to become an MP.

It’s called selection, and it’s the process by which candidates are picked to stand for a party at election time. It involves the headquarters of each political party – the Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and others. And it involves their constituency parties – the local organisations and their memberships. No one ever really talks about it. The British press spends far more time covering the Iowa caucus in the US than it does any of the pre-election procedures in the UK. But this moment decides who sits on the benches in the Commons or the chairs around the Cabinet table. It is the defining mechanism for establishing the talent pool in Westminster, from which everyone, up to and including the prime minister, will be chosen.

It happens behind closed doors, away from prying eyes, on the basis of a subsection of a subsection of a subsection of voters, with weak-to-nonexistent democratic standards, according to a set of incentives that bear no relation to MPs’ constitutional role.

CHAPTER 1 The Vote

CHAPTER 2 The Members of Parliament

CHAPTER 3 The Power

CHAPTER 4 The Ministers

CHAPTER 5 The Treasury

CHAPTER 6 The Civil Service

CHAPTER 7 The Press

Interlude: Evacuation

CHAPTER 8 The Commons

CHAPTER 9 The Law

CHAPTER 10 The Lords

Epilogue: Solutions

The Real Economy – history and theory Jonathan Levy (2025)

WHAT IS the economy? My aim in this book is to provide an answer to this

question, for the purpose of better studying the economy, its history, and its

politics. The larger hope is that the chapters herein might contribute to a

much-needed discussion in the social sciences and humanities about the

subject at hand, what the economy really is.

Why pose the question? Are there not already economists, economic

historians, economic anthropologists, economic sociologists, practitioners

of political economy or law and economics, or normative theorists of

economic justice and democracy? What is it they are doing if they are not

already studying the economy? And if that is what they are up to, must there

not already exist robust accounts (if not exactly shared ones) of what the

economy is—a “market sector,” a “general equilibrium,” a domain of

“materiality” or “material subsistence,” the “gross domestic product,” or

some other construction?

There are not—or at least not, in my view, adequate accounts. Long

preoccupied with honing methods, the core of the discipline of economics

risks losing sight of the economy. Preoccupied with either appropriating or

criticizing the methods of economics, other disciplines have failed to

articulate an alternative conception of the economy. Therefore, no discipline

in the humanities or social sciences today has a convincing theory of the

economy. The absence is the motivating concern that lies at the heart of this

book. To elaborate an account that is adequate, my strategy has been

essentially to start over again from the beginning, asking some of the most

fundamental questions, in search of the most basic building blocks.

The path will, occasionally, wind. The topics and themes of the book are

various, as is the mode of exposition, which span historical narrative,

empirical description, exegesis, and abstract theorizing. The chapters

include a range of what might seem disparate topics: the economics of

ancient Egyptian pyramid building; the meaning of “radical uncertainty”;

theories of corporate personality leading up to the US Supreme Court case

Citizens United (2010); Keynes’s notion of “demand” in The General

Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money; debates in psychoanalysis

about the correct understanding of desire; the nineteenth-century

intellectual discovery of “altruism”; the Chinese demand for holding

American silver in the sixteenth century and US treasury bills in the twentyfirst; economic theories of capital; the story of Thorstein Veblen’s firing

from the University of Chicago. However, throughout there is an

overarching focus on the nature of the economy, and what developing an

account of the economy might mean for the writing of history (my home

discipline) and for other forms of social scientific and humanistic inquiry.

I should note that I arrived at the theme of the real economy only while

writing what became roughly the first half of the book. A historian very

much of my generation, which came of age after the global financial crisis

of 2007–2008, my initial concern was with articulating a theory of

capitalism and an account of its history. Soon, however, I discovered that

in fact I could not escape grappling with the problem of the economy—its

underspecified conceptual existence. Doing so, I kept finding myself

repeatedly turning back to an earlier moment in the history of economic

thought.

The book returns in spirit to the era, roughly stretching from the 1890s to

the 1930s, which first gave birth to the discipline of economics. I say

“spirit” because I make no attempt at any direct act of simple retrieval—to

suggest that some old master, or some old book, got the matter right long

ago and for all time. Rather, from this period I have taken inspiration from

the economic “Vision,” as the economist Joseph Schumpeter once put it. By

Vision, Schumpeter meant a general orientation to the world that inevitably

precedes analysis. In economic analysis, “to posit to ourselves any problems at all,” he wrote, “we should first have to visualize a distinct set of coherent phenomenon as a worthwhile object of our analytic efforts.”

In Schumpeter’s generation, what many economists were trying to visualize was the economy. This moment—after Marx made the last great contribution to “political economy” but before the triumph of “neoclassical” economics following World War II—was one of “methodological pluralism.” Before the discipline of economics found its bearings in neoclassicism, fierce debates raged, as many different visions of economics and of the economy circulated and competed with one another.

In my encounter with these “years of high theory,” as one perceptive chronicler characterized them, the economics of Keynes and Veblen have loomed the largest.5 Both Veblen and Keynes were economic theorists. Keynes entitled his most important books Treatise on Money and The General Theory, and Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class and The Theory of Business Enterprise. Writing before neoclassicals transformed economic theory into an entirely mathematical affair, when theorizing both preferred verbal exposition (Veblen nearly exclusively). Veblen and Keynes figure in the book most. But so do the economic Visions of a great many twentieth-century economic theorists, even if they do not often crack the text or even the notes. They cross diverse institutionalist, post-Keynesian, Marxist, Austrian, French Regulation, and even neoclassical traditions—from Irving Fisher to John Hicks, Joseph Schumpeter, Frank Knight, Joan Robinson, Albert Hirschman, Nicholas Kaldor, and others. If in different ways, all first cultivated or sought to carry forward the rich legacies of pre–World War II economic theory.

By revisiting traditions of literary economic theorizing that, if not completely lost, have long been overshadowed in the discipline of economics, and have not often been considered outside of it, my goal is to articulate a theory of the economy that is open to rich empirical study from multiple disciplinary and methodological perspectives, across the social sciences and humanities. Perhaps the effort will be of interest to contemporary economists, working in any tradition. My ambition is to convince non-economists in the interpretive social sciences and humanities that there are traditions in economic theory of ecumenical interest, no less than traditions in, say, philosophy, social theory, cultural theory, or political theory. Of course, I also wish to convince historians that it is worth conceptualizing the economy in the ways outlined here. In the chapters, I flesh out this concept and put it to work by constructing historical narratives informed by it. Finally, while I believe this effort can help sharpen capitalism as a category of analysis, for it to succeed the theorization of the economy must be more generally valuable, beyond capitalism—including for understanding what kind of economy existed before capitalism, and what it would mean for an economy to come after it.

B IS FOR BURNHAM

It has been remiss of me not to have recognised the incoming of a new Prime Minister – with this article covering Andy Burnham’s first week 

Because Starmer had nothing to say, he had no voice to say it in. We should have 
known. In 2021 he wrote a 12,000-word essay to define himself and his politics. 
It was remarkable for its emptiness. Opportunities would be seized, potential fulfilled, 
power harnessed and productivity unlocked. Sentences had verbs, but it wasn’t 
always clear what those verbs related to — under a Labour government, “community, 
wellbeing, security and opportunity” were to be “fleshed out”, which is nice, but it 
didn’t mean anything in opposition and was no guide to government. 
A Judgement on Keir Starmer by Will Davies
Many of the things that now seem exciting and impressive about Burnham as 
an individual leader are things that were taken for granted about Tony Blair and 
even David Cameron: having a plan that a leader appears to believe in, is willing to 
argue for, will take flack for (Burnham is still something of an unknown quantity here), 
and which others can then position themselves in relation to, either as opponents or 
supporters. Quite how radical Burnham will end up being remains to be seen, but 
some of the appearance of political radicalism is merely the shock of politics being 
done purposefully and enthusiastically, signalling how dysfunctional British politics 
had become in the decade following the Brexit referendum. 

Starmer’s absence could be felt and witnessed across three different aspects of 
political leadership: appetite, destination, ideology. It wasn’t clear why he wanted 
to be Prime Minister (appetite), it wasn’t clear what he wanted to do with power 
(destination) and it wasn’t clear why or with what justification he wanted to get there 
(ideology). It was this triple vacuum that made him such a bewildering figure, 
psychologically as much as politically. There weren’t even any significant stories of 
psychological frailty, sensitivity, rage or rupture, that usually leak out from centres 
of political power, simply because politicians are such unusual psychological 
specimens. It felt like there was no there there.
Burnham’s first 100 days 

Today – the ‘first 100 days’ is acknowledgement that first impressions count. In the case of Andy Burnham – seventh prime minister in 10 years and the Labour Party deeply unpopular – this is the chance, maybe the last chance, to turn around the government’s fortunes. There is, of course, no magic to 100 days as opposed to 90 or 110, but seeing each term (to use the unit of time I’m familiar with as a former teacher) as a key strategic period is a useful way to govern. Thinking in 100 day or three-month chunks forces the government to think beyond getting through the week.

Of course, all of these three-month periods should be part of an overarching strategy that Burnham puts together with a 2/3 year horizon, working back from where he wants to be at the next election. This in turn will need to fit into the 10-year plan that he has promised. I used to write these strategies in Number 10. They require pulling together several inputs from different parts of the building: the policy announcements, the big events, a speech programme – all in pursuit of the key strategic objectives for the period. Done well, the plan gives purpose and direction to Number 10 and the government. Rather than the prime minister’s diary being filled with activities from those who shout the loudest, this is a strategic way of ensuring he spends his time (his most precious commodity) in the most effective way possible. What follows is what a three-month plan could look like; a template for the kind of short document that ultimately needs to be interrogated and then signed off by the prime minister.

How to compile a 100 day/three-month strategic plan

Objectives

This is the key starting point. What does the prime minister want to have achieved in the first 100 days and how will he measure success? I have given some examples below of what the objectives might look like (ideally there would be 3 to 5 - I’ve done a menu of 6) and the kinds of steps that might exemplify them.

(i)To establish that Burnham is an insurgent and his government represents a ‘circuit breaker’ e.g
a. Appoint a Cabinet with the biggest reformers in the key positions and an instruction to work at pace.
b. Structural changes – reforming the centre of government plus creating task forces/mission teams to deliver the key priorities. (Instead of assuming that new Ministers and one more heave from departments will get there)
c. Make No10 North work as a new centre of power outside of Westminster
d. Signal new policy directions e.g on education

(ii)To bring to life his big idea about devolution and ‘rewiring the state’
Burnham’s big idea is to hand power back to the people and tackle an overly-centralised state. This needs to be worked into a narrative that lands with the public, accompanied by a set of speeches, activities and policies that bring it alive e.g.
a. A new devolution settlement with new powers and resources to communities
b. A massive reduction in Whitehall numbers and functions.
c. No 10 North opened and staffed and Burnham working there each week

(iii)To demonstrate a willingness to take tough decisions
If the perceived weakness is that Burnham is not willing to take tough decisions, he can establish the reverse in the first few months. And there will be many opportunities to do so e.g.
a. The zeal with which he gets stuck into public service and welfare reform
b. The tough choices in the first budget
c. the message of trade-offs to the faithful at party conference

(iv)To connect with the electorate and get them to take a second look at Labour e.g.
a. Design a new communications strategy
b. Use Labour Party conference for a reset with the public
c. Use No10 North as a platform for keeping in constant touch with the public.

(v) To show economic credibility and a plan for a new economy
e.g.
a. Deliver a successful first Budget giving confidence there is a credible economic
plan for stability and growth in every postcode
b. Unleash the power of business – particularly small and medium sized businesses - to create wealth
c. Take the first steps to making the tax system fairer
d. Take tough decisions on spending eg welfare spending

(vi) To show he is sure-footed on the international stage e.g.
a. First meeting with Trump
b. First meeting with European leaders
c. First visit to Ukraine
d. First armed forces visit

Narrative

The narrative – or washing line – is what all (or most) announcements should hang off. The narrative has to be big and go way beyond – ‘this is a cost of living government’. It needs to capture three things:
1. The big argument about an overly-centralised state and an unequal society requiring a new politics and a new economy - connected to the future and personal aspiration
2. A story about Britain’s place in the world – how it gets its reputation back - after the last 10 years of instability
3. A personal story about Burnham and his values and purpose
The narrative should be turned into a message note that gives Cabinet Ministers the context for all their communications and shows everyone pulling in the same direction.

Speech programme

Speeches still matter. They are where arguments are honed and stakeholders and the public get a sense of clarity and direction. Continuous explanation (long form and short form) is essential for a government to be effective in the attention economy. For a new prime minister this is particularly important. e.g. He should make a series of big reforming speeches in the first few months that might include:
a. How I will rewire the state
b. Why we need to rethink education providing parity of esteem between academic and vocational.
c. How I will give young people their future back – building on Neet review etc
d. Why we need to change our economic model to ensure living standards rise
e. The part you can play in renewing Britain
f. My vision of Britain in the world

Big moments

There will be key moments during the first 100 days that need to be planned for. Some are already fixed: the leaders’ speech at Labour Party Conference, the first PMQs. Others are still to be scheduled (I have guessed when they might be in the table below). Some, not yet scheduled, are likely to happen in the next few months – for example, the first meeting with Trump, and the first major engagement with EU leaders.

The key is to build a strategy around them.

Building Burnham’s profile

Burnham needs to define himself as prime minister before opponents do it for him. The public do not know Burnham well. While he is loved in Manchester, the rest of the country needs to get to know him. Some of this will come in his good use of social media and his successful narration of his premiership. But there needs to be a strategic view too of how he is seen to be making the shift from Mayor to Prime Minister. The sort of questions that need answering are:
a. How does he want to tell his own personal story - his family, his political journey, his hopes and fears, his interests and passions?
b. What media vehicles best suit his new style of politics?
c. How does he best engage with opponents? How does he demonstrate his aim of greater cross-party working? How should he handle PMQs?
d. How does he remain an insurgent and not become just another incumbent? Should he have weekly/fortnightly town hall meetings? How should he use No 10 North as an antidote to Westminster business as usual? One sign of success would be that the political lobby has to create its own ‘Lobby North’ to reflect the amount of activity going on outside of London.

Designing a ‘playlist’ of big issues and arguments that need to be fought for each day.

What are the four or five big things that the government is fighting for on a daily/weekly basis? This is where the idea of a story factory comes in. Each of these needs a constant stream of media stories to win the argument and show progress. How does the prime minister’s diary reflect these priorities? E.g.
a. Building more social housing
b. Growth in every postcode
c. Fairer utility bills
d. Parity of esteem in education between academic and technical
e. Reform of social care

One of the many reasons why the British government has been so unstable in recent years has been the lack of strategy and strategic capacity in Number 10. Short-term tactics have dominated over long-term strategy. Now is the time to reassert the importance of having clear objectives for each three-month period and relentlessly pursuing them. That is a good way of showing ‘grip’ and providing the clarity and purpose Britain so desperately needs.

Head North Any Burnham and Steve Rotherham (2024)

Bella Caledonia is an important Scottish site and this is what one of its editors, Mike Small, had to say about Burnham
 
Burnham’s first task to establish that he is not simply a replacement for Starmer, is to set out his plan for Britain, and much of his thinking stems from Head North. Some of the key ideas are:

1. A Written Constitution

2. A Basic Law

3. Reform of the Voting System

4. Removal of the Whip

5. A Senate of the Nations and Regions

6. Full Devolution

7. Two Equal Paths in Education

8. A Grenfell Law

9. A Hillsborough Law

10. Net Zero to Reindustrialise the North

The platform emerges from the network called Mainstream, the Compass-founded 
campaign group that provided policy work for Burnham to start to build a leadership 
campaign. The Burnham movement sees itself as centre-left, and is motivated by a drive for progressive social policy, democratic reform and the need to provide a credible response to the rise of the far-right. The group were appalled by the regressive social policy of the Starmer government, the internal chaos and factionalism and the astonishing mismanagement of the Peter Mandelson appointment. They aim to overcome both the sense of internal chaos within Labour and the general feeling of Britain being moribund and in perpetual decline.
It remains to be seen if Burnham will implement any or all of his ideas, or be thwarted 
by the powers that be. But even as a nascent project it represents a political threat to 
the SNP as it aims to reform the UK both constitutionally and economically. 
Let’s try and unpack some of their ideas.
At the centre of Burnham’s political project is a form of constitutional reform including 
creating a written constitution, reform of the voting system, creating a Senate of the 
Nations and Regions, and something called ‘Full Devolution’. These proposals could 
be transformative, but they do land in an uncomfortable way. What is the democratic 
forum in which these ideas have been developed? It feels like, and this is true of the 
Burham project as a whole, as ‘democracy from above’. And the whole constitutional 
reform project also sits uncomfortably with the deeper constitutional crisis that still 
haunts Britain.
Dr Ryan Swift, writing for the IPPR has noted (On Home Ground) : “Devolution must 
become the organising principle of a rewired, forward-looking UK – one that drives 
economic growth and reduces regional inequalities, renews democracy and rebuilds 
political trust from the bottom up, and becomes firmly established within the governance 
of the country.” But while this feels radical it doesn’t really get to grips with the deeper 
national questions at play here. Instead, it tries to just bypass them.
Swift again: “The conversation on regional devolution shouldn’t stop at England’s 
borders. Greater regional devolution within Scotland and Wales for cities like Glasgow, 
Edinburgh and Cardiff could complement national devolution by strengthening cities 
and local economies while reducing the concentration of power within the devolved 
governments themselves. A genuinely multi-level UK should recognise that 
decentralisation is valuable at every level of government.”

The F Bomb, again
It feels like an agenda for breathing some democracy into English local government. 
But that’s not really the same as genuine constitutional reform. It’s noted, too, that the 
language has shifted from ‘abolish the House of Lords’ to ‘reform the upper chamber’. 
Burnham’s revelation that Britain has power and wealth concentrated in London may 
be amazeballs to the political class but it’s not exactly news to Scots. 
Essentially, this is bits of Gordon Brown’s blueprint document. That’s certainly true of 
the Council of Nations and Regions shtick.

As John Denham wrote in 2024: “Today Keir Starmer will chair the first meeting of the
Council of Nations and Regions (CNR). It’s an innovation 
with an important message about Labour working to 
deliver across the UK.  But how much difference will it 
make to the way the United Kingdom and its nations are run? The Council has its origins in Gordon Brown’s report on the future of the UK which  recommended ‘a new and powerful institution to drive co-operation between all its governments – a Council of the Nations and Regions.’ I was critical of Brown for not being radical enough but I also warned that  ‘Labour in government is usually less radical than in opposition’. That’s certainly the case with the new Council.” He goes on: “Brown wanted the Council of Nations and Regions based in statute, with an independent secretariat. It was to be part of a series of constitutional changes, including stronger legal protection for the devolved parliaments, the replacement of the Lords with a union-wide second chamber, a new Council of England to represent English mayors and local government, and a new body to bring together the First Ministers with the UK Prime Minister.”
“Today’s Council was reportedly set up without even informing the Scottish government and will, it seems, be run out of Whitehall’s Cabinet Office by the recently demoted Sue Gray.  While Brown’s Lords reform did raise some serious difficulties, the King’s Speech contained no proposals to give the CNR legal status and the rest of Brown’s proposals have, for now at least, disappeared.”
I didn’t quite know what was meant by ‘Removal of the whip’. The Guardian journalist 
Andrew Sparrow explained: “In the book they suggest getting rid of the whipping system 
altogether. But now Burnham is proposing whipping-lite – in particular, not suspending 
people who vote against govt whip.”
There’s a strong element of the zeitgeisty ‘consensus’ speak that is all the rage among 
wonks and the chattering class.
In 2024 Burnham made a speech advocating that a Grenfell Law should be introduced to 
enshrine the right for decent housing for every citizen in Britain. He said: “We need a new 
housing-first strategy, because you can’t have anything without a good home. It should 
be a human right for everyone to have a decent, secure home and that’s what we should 
be working towards.” 
 real threat to the arguments for Scottish independence because it posits the idea, again, that Britain is reformable. But the constitutional reforms are so wracked with inconsistencies and contradictions

Ask Andy Anything
Burnham has made great play of Mamdani-like sessions in which you could Ask Andy 
Anything. He did this in Cardiff city-centre the other day. It’s a good look.  One question 
would be: “If this is a voluntary Union, what is the democratic way to leave it?” But, if the 
answer is there isn’t one (dear readers – that is the answer)  then all of the policy 
proposals about Mayors and constitutions seem an odd distraction.
But my notes on the inadequacy of Burnham’s constitutional programme are complemented 
by other observations about the absence of power analysis in Labour’s outlook. European 
Powell points out that: “Andy Burnham is days away from becoming Prime Minister. 
His incoming chief of staff is James Purnell, CEO of Flint Global, a corporate lobbying firm 
whose clients include Amazon, Uber, BP, Airbnb, Apple and Thames Water, the utility 
Burnham says should be nationalised. In December 2025, Flint was acquired by private 
equity firm Cinven for £190 million. The firm at the centre of a Burnham government is not 
merely connected to corporate capital. It is owned by it.” “While at Flint, Purnell told 
corporate clients to expect deregulation, no tax rises, and spending cuts. That is the stated 
position of the man who will occupy the most powerful unelected role in the British government
.” This political/apolitical trope is played out in an interview Andy Burnham has with Gary 
Lineker in which he said he didn’t want to “create new divisions” when asked if he would 
set up a wealth tax: 

Burnham does not have Starmer’s fatal flaw, of an almost complete lack of any policy ambition whatsoever. However he is divorced from any political base and guilty, like his predecessor, of constant flip-flops.
As Grace Blakeley points out (The Labour Machine always wins):
“Burnham has managed to ingratiate himself with what remains of the Labour left over the last
 few years, thanks in part to some genuinely impressive achievements as Mayor of Greater 
Manchester. But a cursory look at Burnham’s public statements during his recent campaign 
reveals a politician just as slippery and opportunistic as Starmer.”
“As Harriet Williamson shows in this excellent video for Novara media, Burnham has made 
multiple, contradictory promises to different factions within the Labour Party. He says he’s 
going to invest in public services, while also sticking to Rachel Reeves’ nonsensical fiscal 
rules. He has previously articulated liberal attitudes towards migration, but recently 
supported Shabana Mahmood’s draconian immigration reforms. He’s criticised the Israeli 
government, but refused to call out Israel’s genocide.” “This opportunism is, of course, what 
makes Burnham palatable to the Labour machine. To be sure, he is not their preferred 
candidate. They would prefer someone like Wes Streeting, who has clearly demonstrated his 
obedience by taking vast donations from private healthcare lobbyists only to advocate 
ceaselessly for greater private involvement in the NHS. Burnham hasn’t been quite so 
grasping. But he has flip-flopped enough times for the Labour machine’s apparatchiks to 
accept he is no threat to their project.” Burnham’s project is over-sold because the British 
political class thinks it’s radical to point out that Britain has a concentration of wealth and 
power in London. Manchesterism is good but limited as explored by Mike Danson here 
On No 10 North and the Limits of Manchesterism – Bella Caledonia and by Laurie 
MacFarlane here: Scotland has already tried ‘Manchesterism’. It won’t solve Britain’s 
economic crisis alone,
The post-Starmer era is upon us, but Burnham is still wedded to centrist ideas of 
ameliorative change that remain within the range of acceptable political discourse but are 
woefully inadequate for the state we’re in

X

ThisThis podcast covers the main points

And some other ideas from Will Davies in A Legitimacy Trap   

When people do not see the state solving problems, faith that politics can improve their lives fades. This erosion is experienced first at the level of everyday life: in those potholes, waiting lists, and polluted rivers. Small-scale local problems can accumulate into national discontent. The damage is compounded when there appear to be no actors with the authority or ability to fix them. Market-conforming, low-visibility interventions – from planning reform to “nudge” policies – have been both too modest for the scale of the problems, and they have failed to produce a clear demonstration of state effectiveness. Furthermore, serious high-profile failures – such as the infected blood scandal – do not seem to result in adequate learning on the part of system designers. Without visible improvements in public services, the state will struggle to rebuild trust; yet repeated failures to improve them have simultaneously eroded support for the very measures (most notably higher taxation) required to do so. 

Human Landscapes of my country Nazim Hismet (2001) 

The Productive State – a framework for Manchesterism Mark Williams (2026)