what you get here

This is not a blog which opines on current events. It rather uses incidents, books (old and new), links and papers to muse about our social endeavours.
So old posts are as good as new! And lots of useful links!

The Bucegi mountains - the range I see from the front balcony of my mountain house - are almost 120 kms from Bucharest and cannot normally be seen from the capital but some extraordinary weather conditions allowed this pic to be taken from the top of the Intercontinental Hotel in late Feb 2020

Monday, July 13, 2026

EIGHT MORE BOOKS

I start today's post with an interesting book written some 35 years ago by a member of China's politburo

America Against America Wang Huning (1991)

There are eleven chapters in this book, and I would like to briefly point to

here:

  • the uneven development of society and its various features;

  • the values that dominate political life and their flux;

  • the diverse character of the nation and its social efficacy;

  • the formal and informal mechanisms that regulate people's social activities;

  • the political forces active in society and their relations;

  • the democratic and non-democratic elements in election campaigns;

  • top-down political operations and their characteristics;

  • non-political coordination mechanisms and socialized regulation;

  • the reproduction of culture, values and even institutions and the connection with education;

  • the role of ideas in the development and management of society;

  • the various undercurrents that threaten future development.

Although these eleven chapters contain quite a few aspects, the object is a

large country, so the facets actually covered are only a limited aspect of

American society. From this perspective, I think the book falls short on two

counts.

First: The book is limited in its coverage and cannot possibly cover all

aspects of every tree in the American forest, so it should be said that there

are limitations. It cannot be said that these aspects adequately reflect the

subject matter of this book. I wanted to do a "peek-a-boo" thing, but the question is whether the "peek-a-boo" was found. I think we have found some, but not many. The good thing is that we can find a lot of other literature that can make up for the shortcomings of this book.

Second, I analyze American society as an observer rather than a researcher.

Some of the data and materials, though sourced, do not meet the standards

of rigorous statistics. I am afraid that some of the issues discussed may be

subjective, or even erroneous. Therefore, I hope that people will read this

book from a macro-sociological point of view, rather than treating it as

microbiology.

Parenti was an independent (in all senses of the word) academic, blackballed by academia by virtue of his activism but who was a prolific writer eg

This book invites those immersed in the prevailing orthodoxy of “democratic

capitalism” to entertain iconoclastic views, to question the shibboleths of free-market mythology and the persistence of both right and left anticommunism, and to consider anew, with a receptive but not uncritical mind, the historic eôorts of the much maligned Reds and other revolutionaries.

The political orthodoxy that demonizes communism permeates the entire political perspective. Even people on the Left have internalized the liberal/conservative ideology that equates fascism and communism as equally evil totalitarian twins, two major mass movements of the twentieth century. This book attempts to show the enormous differences between fascism and communism both past and present, both in theory and practice, especially in regard to questions of social equality, private capital accumulation, and class interest.

The orthodox mythology also would have us believe that the Western democracies (with the United States leading the way) have opposed both totalitarian systems with equal vigor. In fact, U.S. leaders have been dedicated above all to making the world safe for global corporate investment and the private proõt system. Pursuant of this goal, they have used fascism to protect capitalism, while claiming to be saving democracy from communism.

History for Tomorrow Roman Kznaric (2024)

The insights of history are a shared treasury for the future of humanity. We

live in an era dominated by the present tense, which vastly undervalues the

accumulated experience of the past as a guide for where we go next. Faced

with the collective challenges of the twenty-first century, from the threat of

ecological breakdown and growing wealth inequality to the risks of

artificial intelligence and genetic engineering, we are failing to draw on the

immense store of wisdom bequeathed by generation upon generation of our

forebears. There is an urgent need to look backwards to help chart a way

forwards.

Ecocivilization – making a world that works for all Jeremy Lent (2026)

The only way to structure society, it is assumed, is in the form of growth-based consumer capitalism—a system in which corporate profits ultimately drive the decisions that affect the lives of everyone on the planet, the health of the living Earth, and the destiny of future generations. Virtually all policy proposals under serious consideration to fix our grave problems work within the framework of the current system rather than examining the system itself. This book constitutes the dethronement of TINA. There is, in fact, an alternative.

A FAULTY OPERATING SYSTEM

The alternative we’ll be exploring, though, is not the kind that Thatcher, Reagan, and countless adherents of market-based capitalism had been railing against. Back in those days, and in fact throughout the entire twentieth century, the battle lines were clearly drawn between capitalism on one side and socialism (or, in its extreme form, communism) on the other. A society could either be organized primarily by the market or by the state.

There were, of course, many countries that attempted a blend between the two, most notably European nations after the Second World War that explored possibilities of a welfare state with a meaningful safety net for those who fell through the holes ripped open by the market. In the United States, after FDR’s New Deal, the state played a significant role in people’s lives. But the choice was always between the poles of market and state, closing off any other possibility for organizing human activity. Surprisingly perhaps, these opposing sides shared considerable common ground. Both prized their particular ideology over the dignity of normal human lives: Submit, people were told, either to the invisible hand of the market or the authoritarian fist of the state. Both worshiped at the altar of economic growth as the supreme aspiration of policymaking. And perhaps most consequentially, both viewed the entire Earth as nothing more than a resource to exploit in the interest of pursuing that growth.

This pursuit of endless growth on a planet with limited resources has propelled human civilization onto a terrifying trajectory. The uncontrolled climate crisis is the most obvious danger: Even as we reel from the impact of little more than one degree Celsius of global heating, the world’s current policies have us on track for a staggering three degrees increase by the end of this century—and climate scientists publish dire warnings that amplifying feedbacks could make things far worse than even these projections.

But even if the climate crisis were somehow brought under control, continued untrammeled economic growth in future decades will bring us face-to-face with a slew of further existential threats. Our civilization is already running at forty percent above its sustainable capacity. We’re rapidly depleting the Earth’s forests, animals, insects, fish, freshwater, and even the topsoil we require to grow our crops. Animal populations worldwide have declined by a staggering 73 percent since 1970. In the oceans, coral reefs are on track to be virtually annihilated by the middle of this century. At this rate, we’re well on the way to causing the sixth great extinction of species since life began on Earth—except this is the first driven by the actions of a single species. Surveying this devastation across the board, in 2017 over fifteen thousand scientists from 184 countries issued an ominous warning to humanity that time is running out: “Soon it will be too late,” they wrote, “to shift course away from our failing trajectory.”

Look around the natural world, and you will see fractal patterns everywhere. From microscopic living structures to the entire Earth system, nature uses a fractal design with similar patterns manifesting at different scales. You can see them in the shapes of tree branches, coastlines, cloud formations, lung brachia, and neural networks, to name just a few. Ecologies are themselves fractal, with tiny cells that are part of an organism, which is nested in a population, which is embedded in an ecosystem, which is integrated into the living Earth. In all cases, the longterm health of the larger system requires the flourishing of each of its parts. This universal principle of fractal flourishing inspires the ultimate objective of an ecocivilization: to create the conditions in which the flourishing of each of us naturally contributes to the greater wellbeing of the systems in which we’re embedded.

Lent’s Conclusion

The Japanese experience is the poster child for a decidedly grim theory of transformative change in history laid out compellingly by historian Walter Scheidel in The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century. Scheidel’s thesis is as simple as it is disheartening. Stable times, he argues, invariably cause elites to accumulate wealth at the expense of ordinary people. Historically, he maintains, only cataclysmic systemic shocks have reduced inequality, in the form of what he calls “the Four Horsemen of Leveling”: war, revolution, pandemics, and state failure. Even these four “horsemen” only achieve leveling if they are apocalyptic in scale, rupturing society’s bonds with extraordinary levels of violence, suffering, and misery. Scheidel’s research is extensive and authoritative. If his thesis is correct, the implications are daunting. It suggests that the only pathway to an ecocivilization is a blood-soaked one, littered with bodies. In the words of historian Roman Krznaric, “no historical thesis could be more disempowering,” because it renders futile all well-intentioned efforts to transform society by peaceful means. Is apocalypse, indeed, our only gateway to a better future, or are there alternative routes that might avert calamitous suffering? The bulk of this book has sketched the contours of an attractive potential future for humanity and the living Earth—one that creates conditions for all to flourish. In this final section, we’ll investigate how we might possibly get from here to there. How can we transform our currently ruinous system into one that’s beneficial for all? What are the most effective strategies that might enable such a transition to happen?

The Alibi of Capital – how we broke the earth to steal the future on the promise 
to get a better tomorrow
Timothy Mitchell (2026)

The aim of this book is to ask how we came to organise collective life on the principle of the impoverishment of the future; explore the development of this principle in the destruction of rivers, the colonising of territories, the expansion of cities, the building of infrastructure, and the burning of carbon; see how lives today are encumbered by the repayment of earlier extractions; and connect this mode of impoverishing the many and enriching the few to the climate crisis. Its aim is also to examine the political and economic language that developed to describe and order these forms of life – terms like capitalism, technology, finance, the economy and its growth – and ask whether they are adequate for making sense of how the impoverishment operates and of our inability to act in the face of climate breakdown.

Rather than seeing capital as a relation to the future, the alibi substitutes an old view of capital as funds that have been saved up from the past, to be loaned to entrepreneurs, typically to invest in the machines or technology required to make more money. In the popular imagination, and many economists’ models, this technical equipment comes to stand for capital itself. The windfalls and interest payments accrued by investors and entrepreneurs can then be described as the reward given to those whose apparent ‘savings’ have been used to grow more wealth – rather than the charge imposed by investment funds and financial institutions that, thanks to their state-guaranteed privileges and protections, organise the command of payments from the future.

In other chapters of this book, we will introduce a number of terms for understanding the place of economics in both facilitating and obfuscating the capture of the future. These include the idea of ‘technopolitics’, meaning an approach to studying politics and political economy that treats technical and material processes not merely as the object of political and economic analysis but as the arrangements through which our politics takes shape; ‘capitalisation’ and ‘economisation’, referring to the ways in which goods and activities are captured and made calculable; the ‘EconoCon’, referring to the production of ‘the economy’, by analogy with Michel Foucault’s reading of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, as a device for ordering desire and managing the future; and ‘oikodicy’, by analogy with the theological concept of ‘theodicy’, for understanding the role of economics in the justification of human suffering.

For now, however, let us stay with the simpler idea of Uber. Despite the evidence to the contrary, economists continue to attribute the extracting of future rents to supposed improvements in technology. In the case of Uber, the firm employed its own economists to describe the increasing command of surplus as a customer benefit. The company’s monopoly provided the private data through which such claims could be made. In setting passenger fares and drivers’ wages, Uber benefited from exclusive control of the information gathered from every ride taken. This enabled the firm to adjust charges according to an algorithm that calculated how low drivers’ wages could be pushed, or how high passenger fares increased, to maximise its own share at every moment. Known as ‘surge pricing’, this evasion of fare regulation and minimum wage payments was promoted as the technological source of new value. The proprietary data from millions of private fare payers was used to construct the argument.

Sunday, July 12, 2026

About Capitalism

 Talking to my Daughter about the Economy Varoufakis (2018)

Besides the works of literature and the poems mentioned in the text, as well as the science-fiction movies without which I find it hard to understand the present, I shall mention four books: Jared Diamond’s Guns, Steel and Germs, which underpins the story in the first chapter that explains the emergence of gross inequities and, ultimately, racist stereotyping; Richard Titmuss’s The Gift Relationship, whose discussion of the blood market underscores ideas first developed in Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation; Robert Heilbroner’s majestic The Worldly Philosophers; and novelist Margaret Atwood’s Payback, which I recommend unreservedly as perhaps the best, and most entertaining, book ever written on debt.

Finally, it would be remiss not to mention the spectre of Karl Marx, the dramaturgy of the ancient Athenian tragedians, John Maynard Keynes’s clinical dissection of the so-called ‘fallacy of composition’ and lastly the irony and insights of Bertolt Brecht. Their stories, theories and obsessions haunt every thought I ever had, including the ones laid down in this book.

And this is a useful summary of what the book is trying to say - Talking to My Daughter About the Economy: A Brief History of Capitalism” is a book written 
by Yanis Varoufakis, an economist and former Greek finance minister. The book aims to
explain complex economic concepts in a simple and accessible manner, targeting a general
audience, including the author’s daughter.
In the book, Varoufakis provides an engaging and insightful overview of the history of
capitalism, tracing its origins and evolution from ancient times to the modern era.
He delves into the key economic ideas and theories that have shaped the world we live in,
including the role of markets, money, and finance.
Varoufakis also highlights the inherent flaws and inequalities within the capitalist system
and discusses how these issues have contributed to various economic crises throughout history.
He addresses contemporary challenges, such as the increasing wealth gap and the impact of
globalization, offering his perspectives on potential solutions and alternatives for a more
equitable economic future.
Overall, “Talking to My Daughter About the Economy” presents a captivating and approachable
exploration of the complex world of economics, making it accessible to readers who may not
have a background in the subject while encouraging critical thinking about the current economic
system and its implications for society.
Key concepts and ideas.
  1. Capitalism’s Historical Development: The book provides a historical overview of how 
    capitalism evolved over time. It traces its roots back to ancient civilizations,
    through feudalism and mercantilism, to the industrial revolution and the emergence
    of modern capitalist societies.
  2. The Role of Markets and Money: Varoufakis explains the significance of markets in 
    capitalist economies as mechanisms for the exchange of goods and services.
    He also discusses the importance of money as a means of facilitating these exchanges
    and its role in shaping economic activities.
  3. Invisible Hand and Self-Interest: The book explores Adam Smith’s concept of the 
    “invisible hand,” the idea that individuals pursuing their self-interest in a
    competitive market can unintentionally benefit society as a whole.
  4. The Division of Labour and Productivity: Varoufakis discusses how the division of 
    labor and specialization in capitalist economies have contributed to increased productivity
    and economic growth.
  5. Capital and Surplus Value: The author delves into the concept of capital and how surplus 
    value is generated in capitalist systems through the exploitation of labor, often leading
    to income inequality.
  6. The Great Depression and Economic Crises: The book examines historical economic crises, 
    including the Great Depression of the 1930s, to illustrate the inherent instabilities
    and vulnerabilities of capitalist economies.
  7. Globalization and Financialization: Varoufakis explores the impacts of globalization and 
    financialization on economies worldwide, emphasizing how these processes have transformed
    the nature of capitalism in recent decades.
  8. Income Inequality and Wealth Concentration: The book addresses the growing issue of income 
    inequality and the concentration of wealth among a small segment of the population, which
    can have detrimental effects on social cohesion and economic stability.
  9. The Role of Governments: The author discusses the role of governments in managing 
    capitalist economies, including their responsibilities for regulation, social welfare,
    and addressing market failures.
  10. Alternatives and Proposals: Throughout the book, Varoufakis presents alternative economic 
    ideas and policies that aim to address the shortcomings of capitalism and promote a fairer
    and more sustainable economic system.
  11. Economic Democracy: One of the core themes is the notion of “economic democracy,” which 
    involves giving citizens a more direct say in economic decisions that affect their lives,
    rather than leaving these choices exclusively to market forces and corporations.
  12. Social Responsibility and Solidarity: The book promotes the idea of fostering a sense of 
    social responsibility and solidarity among individuals and societies, aiming for a more
    compassionate and just economic order.
Overall, “Talking to My Daughter About the Economy” presents a comprehensive exploration 
of capitalism and its historical development, offering readers an engaging and thought
-provoking perspective on the complex world of economics and its impact on society.
The Destiny of Civilisation – finance capitalism, industrial capitalism
or socialism
Michael Hudson
(2022)

Michael’s decision to shift to economics was dramatic. One evening, af­ter moving to New York planning to publish the works of Schenker, George Lukacs and others, he had dinner with Terence McCarthy, an Irish com­munist and translator of Karl Marx’s Theories of Surplus Value. The con­versation turned to how changes in water levels caused crop failures in the United States that led to an autumnal drain of money from the stock and bond market, and hence to periodic financial crises. In Michael’s words, “to me, these interconnections between production, finance and the over­all economy’s systemic relationships were so beautiful, so aesthetic in their unfolding—like musical counterpoint leading to modulation to a higher overtone key—that I decided on the spot to become an economist.” Ever since, he says, he has been able to achieve in his economic writing what he could not have created in music.

Michael’s first training followed his acceptance of the condition Terence McCarthy set to mentor him: that he would read all the works in the bib­liography of Marx’s Theories of Surplus Value. So while taking his graduate degrees and working for Wall Street banks, Michael also worked part-time for the publisher Augustus Kelley to recommend and write introductions to reprints of economic classics. In the process, he acquired a library of books by economists missing from the “normal” history of economic thought.

Childhood and teenage experience—in an adversarial position

Michael’s disposition certainly has a lot to do with his family and social background during his formative years. He was born in March 1939 in Minneapolis, Minnesota, into a family of labor activists. Of all the cities in the world, Minneapolis had the strongest Trotskyist influence. Michael’s father, Carlos Hudson, had worked with Leon Trotsky in Mexico and had been one of the leaders of the great Minneapolis general strike of 1934 as editor of the Northwest Organizer. His father loved Huckleberry Finn, and Michael was called “Huck” by family and friends. But since his father’s par­ty name was Jack Ranger, Michael as a boy also was nicknamed “The son of the Lone Ranger.”

When Michael was three years old, Carlos Hudson was jailed under the Smith Act as one of the Minneapolis 17. Carlos remarked that his year in prison was the happiest time of his life, being assigned to the library, where he collected a long list of proverbs that Michael reproduced on his blog in June 2017. Reading “Dad’s Many Proverbs,” one might come to see not only how J is for Junk Economics came to be structured, but also where Michael’s remarkable sense of humor and witty comments can be traced.

When he was growing up in Chicago, visitors to his house included former German colleagues of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and members of the Third International when Lenin was still alive and in pow­er. There was almost constant discussion of socialist doctrine and tactics in the meetings convened in his home. When Michael was 14 years old, in the University of Chicago’s high school, he was called a fascist by Stalinists and a communist by fascists. He told me, “I was very happy being in an adversarial position, yet also the reasonable voice avoiding ideology. I liked being hated by the right-wing because it made me a lot of friends and I re­cruited many members into the socialist youth groups in Chicago.”

Getting more confident and stronger when put in an adversarial position probably has been one of the key traits of his life. Michael has never accept­ed the world as it is, with its frauds, hypocrisy and injustice. Yet it has taken more than self-confidence and a strong spine to become the great econo­mist that he is today. One reason for his brilliance and uniqueness is that he has not been swayed by his academic training in the unrealistic theories of the economics schools in the universities that justify rather than critically challenge the status quo. Michael has developed his analytic ideas through his real-life work experience in many countries, combined with his deep understanding of the history of economic thought.

Wall Street bank experience—countering ideology

While employed by Wall Street banks as a statistical economist to under­stand how the financialized economy works, Michael studied for a Master’s and then a PhD degree in economics at New York University. According to him, most teachers in the master’s program at NYU were part-time. The relatively few full-time academics had no experience working in a bank or corporation; their worldview came from textbooks. Michael fortunately found out for himself how the banks worked, starting as a statistical ana­lyst for the Savings Bank Trust for three years, and then as balance-of-pay­ments economist for the Chase Manhattan Bank from 1964 to 1967.

Initially, Michael’s job was to trace how savings were recycled into new mortgage loans by New York’s savings banks. His research showed that most deposits grew not by new saving, but simply by the accrual of div­idends at compound interest. This exponential growth was recycled into new mortgage loans to buyers of real estate, seeking ever larger debt/eq­uity ratios in order to dispose of the surplus finance capital. He saw that commercial banks did not lend money to finance new industrial capital investment, but only lent against existing assets, seeking above all to turn their profits or rents into a flow of interest payments. In short, rents were for paying interest. And increasingly today, so are wages, because payments on bank loans, mortgage loans, student debt and credit-card debt eat away at the disposable income of most families. This is the monthly “nut” that households pay to the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) sector off the top of their paychecks.

Later, at Chase Manhattan, Michael compiled statistics to trace how the export earnings of foreign countries were captured into paying debt service. He also traced statistically how U.S. oil companies made profits by “transfer pricing,” selling crude oil production cheaply to tax-free “non-countries” such as Liberia or Panama that used U.S. currency. The oil was then re-sold to refineries in Europe and the USA at a mark-up so high that oil compa­nies had no profits to report, and hence paid no income tax anywhere on their international and domestic operations. To U.S. policy makers, this exploitation was a success story. In 1966 the oil industry had copies of Mi­chael’s report placed on the desk of every senator and representative, and obtained special favoritism as a result of the sector’s strong contribution to the U.S. balance of payments during the Vietnam War years.

The conflict between this reality and academic orthodoxy struck him in 1968 when he had to retake the money-and-banking part of his PhD orals, because his answers were based on his real-world monetary and financial experience, which was at odds with the Chicago School monetarism and vulgarized Keynesian liberalism that had become the academic norm. That was an era when textbooks still taught of helicopters dropping money on the economy—not acknowledging the principle that Michael has made at many monetary conferences ever since: the central bank’s helicopter only flies over Wall Street. Money from this helicopter is lent out to buyers of real estate, stocks and bonds (and to corporate raiders), with little being spent on goods and services. So the effect is asset-price inflation—which Michael has shown leads to debt deflation as homeowners need to borrow higher and higher mortgage loans to afford the debt-inflated cost of hous­ing, leaving them with less to spend on real goods and services. This now-obvious linkage between rising housing costs and debt de­flation was deemed heresy in the 1960s. Mainstream economists thought that as families became wealthier homeowners, they would have more to spend—ignoring the debt dimension of how homes were bought on credit that steadily pushed up the cost of obtaining housing. The Finance, Insur­ance and Real Estate (FIRE) sector was (and still is) treated as if its rentier income should be added to the economy’s output instead of siphoning it off.

Economic historian—delving into the origins of money and debt

Michael’s experience on Wall Street inspired him to set about investigating the origins of money and replacing the individualistic theories of its ori­gin with a more realistic and historically based explanation. His technical articles and monographs are now accepted as documenting how money originated, not in barter among individuals, but as a means of palatial ac­counting in Bronze Age Mesopotamia, above all to denominate debts owed to the palace, temples and other creditors in grain and silver as common denominators whose units were set as having equal value for fiscal pay­ments to the palace.

Michael also has shown that instead of interest being invented by in­dividuals lending cattle or grain to reflect productivity rates (as Austrian theory imagines), early interest rates were set by the palaces or other civic authorities simply on the basis of ease of accounting, in terms of the local system of fractions—60ths in Mesopotamia and Egypt, decimals in Egypt and Greece, and the 12-based duodecimal system in Rome (1 troy ounce on the pound per year), increasingly decimalized into 1 percent per month. Finally, he has applied this historical analysis to modern times by show­ing that throughout history, debts have grown at compound interest faster than the economy is able to pay, leading to foreclosures and economic po­larization if the debts are not cancelled. Indeed, for this reason, personal debts were cancelled when new rulers took the throne in Sumer, Babylonia, Egypt and their neighboring lands, in contrast to Greek and Roman oligar­chic opposition to debt cancellation and imposition of pro-creditor laws.

Michael’s insights into the workings of modern financialized rent-seeking economies, both within the United States and globally, have prompted him to conduct years of research not only into the origins of money and account­ing, but into the origins of labor and how it was paid, the origins of land tenure and taxation, and the origins and history of debt. This analysis has led to his well-known proposition that “debts that can’t be paid, won’t be paid,” and to his advocacy that unpayable debts should be cancelled, and can be cancelled without causing economic disruption—and indeed that without doing so, economies will polarize and crash.

At the World Social Forums, I had marched with tens of thousands of participants, including Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein, with a banner whose slogan “Don’t owe, won’t pay” demanded cancellation of debts for impoverished countries of the Global South. However, I some­times wondered if the slogan was chanted by many from a political posi­tion without a deep understanding of how the debts were generated. The slogan would be meek if it were only a political position to express the distress of the indebted countries and peoples, without an appreciation of why and how the debts should be cancelled.

Michael’s advocacy of debt cancellation does not come from a simplis­tic political position, though certainly the proposition itself is profoundly political. The proposition comes from his insider knowledge of the oper­ation of banks, oil companies, the government and even the military. This experience informed his understanding of the domestic and global politics of the United States, and of the financial dynamics of debt and the long history of debt cancellation in antiquity. Exempt from academic dogma­tism and left-wing infantilism, Michael’s economic theories are based on decades of pragmatic statistical and historical inquiry, backed by his earlier training in cultural history as well as his comprehensive reading of Marx’s economic works.

Staunch critic of U.S. Super Imperialism

Working for the accounting firm Arthur Anderson, Michael spent a year analyzing the U.S. balance of payments. His statistics showed that the en­tire payments deficit resulted from military spending on the Vietnam War and elsewhere. Seeking ways to finance that military deficit led the U.S. Government to ameliorate the worsening balance-of-payments deficit by asking U.S. banks to set up branches in offshore banking centers to attract the world’s criminal capital, from drug dealings to kleptocratic embezzle­ment (the world’s new “neoliberal” sectors). This outgrowth of oil-indus­try “flags of convenience” has led to today’s crisis of tax enclaves enabling the world’s wealthy individuals and corporations to avoid taxation and file fictitious economic statistics. Michael has exposed this in numerous intro­ductions to books and in interviews in documentary films.

Michael’s understanding of how the global economy under U.S. hege­mony worked enabled him to forecast in Ramparts in 1968 that the USA would have to go off gold, which it indeed did in August 1971. Explaining how ending the gold standard had inaugurated the U.S. Treasury-bill stan­dard that obliged foreign governments to finance the U.S. balance-of-pay­ments and domestic budget deficits, his first book, Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (1972), gained him international recognition and has been translated into many languages. He had hoped to help countries resist the system of dollarization that has enabled the United States to obtain a free ride for its foreign military spending and takeover of other economies. But from the very beginning, the U.S. Government used the book as a how-to-do-it manual. Michael was quickly employed by Herman Kahn’s Hudson Institute to explain to the White House and the Department of Defense how the new international financial order worked.

The success of Michael’s books led many Wall Street and Canadian fi­nancial institutions to retain him as a consultant forecasting interest rates and currency exchange rates. The Canadian government invited him as fi­nancial advisor to develop the balance-of-payments dimension of what has become Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), showing that Canada did not need foreign loans to finance its provincial and other domestic spending. His book describing why Canada did not need foreign borrowing for its provinces and companies to spend domestically, Canada in the New Mone­tary Order (1978), showed that when Canada borrowed abroad, the central bank still had to create domestic money in any case to be spent locally as a counterpart to the foreign currency inflow. Hardly by surprise, this led to passionate attacks by Canada’s banks seeking to profiteer by indebting the economy through their loan underwriting. But it also led to further con­tracts with Canada’s State Department and Science Council.

In the late 1970s, Michael was invited by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) to become economic advisor on North-South debt and trade. He warned of the coming Latin American debt defaults, which indeed began in 1982 with Mexico. He subsequently has served as economic advisor to numerous governments, agencies and political parties from Latvia to Greece. He has argued for national protec­tionism and capital controls to resist free-trade imperialism, for domestic money creation to finance domestic spending on less inflationary terms than borrowing foreign currency, and for the need to tax and limit rentier gains in real estate and finance.

Academic and theoretical contributions

Michael has worked within academia on sustained intellectual inquiry. For many years he was on the economics faculty of the University of Mis­souri at Kansas City (UMKC), which became the center of MMT in the early 2000s with Randall Wray, Stephanie Kelton and Bill Black. He was Economic Research Director at the Riga Graduate School of Law (RGSL), where he became Chief of the Committee of Experts for the Renewal Task Force Latvia (rtfl.lv). As for his most well-known academic inquiry, that into the history of debt and money, he was appointed a research fellow in Babylonian economics at the Peabody Museum of Archeology and Eth­nology at Harvard University, where he organized a colloquium every few years from 1994 onward. The five volumes of conference colloquia that he has co-edited have rewritten the economic history of the ancient Near East and classical antiquity.

These colloquia were on privatization, land tenure and real estate own­ership (which were found to be based on fiscal liability), debt cancellation and economic renewal, the origins of money and accounting, and the or­igins of labor services (discovered to have arisen to work on public infra­structure and to work off personal debts). The findings of these colloquia and their members refute previous libertarian individualistic theorizing on economic origins, and have now become the new orthodoxy among Assyr­iologists, Egyptologists and anthropologists, most notably Michael’s friend David Graeber, who wrote his book Debt: The First Five Thousand Years, largely to popularize Michael’s approach. The essential focus of the colloquium volumes is on how money, inter­est-bearing debt and land tenure were innovated in the palaces and temples of the ancient Near East, and on how the privatization of money and credit led to the polarization in ownership of land and other wealth in the hands of private oligarchies from classical antiquity to today’s Western economies.

As one of the few economists who predicted the 2008 crash, Michael published one of his most important theoretical papers in 2006: “Saving, Asset-Price Inflation, and Debt-Induced Deflation.”1

1. In L. Randall Wray and Matthew Forstater, eds., Money, Financial Instability and Stabi­lization Policy (Cheltenham: 2006), pp. 104-24.It accurately explained how the exponential expansion of credit created corresponding debt that would lead to the impending financial crash and its aftermath. On Septem­ber 8, 2009, Dirk Bezemer wrote an article “Why some economists could see it coming” in the Financial Times, which stated that “Michael Hudson of the University of Missouri wrote in 2006 that ‘debt deflation will shrink the ‘real’ economy, drive down real wages, and push our debt-ridden economy into Japan-style stagnation or worse.’ Importantly, these and other analysts not only foresaw and timed the end of the credit boom, but also perceived this would inevitably produce recession in the US.” That article included the set of charts that helped make Michael famous for his explanation of why financial crises are endemic and lead to secular stagnation:

Today, with the world in deep financial crisis, Michael has reiterated his proposition that unpayable or odious debts should be cancelled, and indeed must be cancelled in order to avoid a global austerity crisis and economic polarization stemming from chronic debt deflation. One point of clarifica­tion here. The United States has become the world’s biggest debtor, mainly as a byproduct of the fact that most international debts are denominated in dollars. This poses a basic question: Which debts should be wiped out?

Michael urges that the debts of overindebted households and impover­ished countries in the Global South should be written down, but that one debt should not be cancelled: the official foreign debt of the U.S. Govern­ment. The United States has run up this official foreign debt—like its do­mestic Treasury debt—without expecting ever to actually pay it off. It has no intention of imposing on itself the austerity that it and the IMF demand of other debtor countries. This asymmetry, along with the U.S. sponsorship of today’s New Cold War, has led leading dollar-holding nations such as China and Russia to begin de-dollarizing their economies. This signals the fracturing of the world economy that Michael predicted in his 1977 Global Fracture. The United States is forcing other countries to choose between accepting a dollarized and militarized rentier austerity, or going their own way by creating mixed public/private growth-oriented economies.

For socialism

For us on the Global U team, it has been a great privilege and honor to be learning from Michael, face to face. He was invited to give lectures in Hong Kong and Macau in November 2019, during which he had a dialogue with Wen Tiejun on economic and financial issues in China. During the Seventh and Eighth South-South Forums on Sustainability in 2020 and 2021, he had further discussions with Wen Tiejun. Michael has a particular concern for China’s development, as he feels that China is the leading exception to the U.S.-based neoliberal economic model, not taking the destructive ad­vice of the IMF and World Bank. He has argued that China’s economy can be resilient if it organizes its real estate, debt and tax system to avoid the rentier financialization process that is destroying the West.

In September 2020, while we were chatting online, I sounded the idea that Michael give a lecture series for Global U. Michael accepted on the spot. I emailed him a proposal of 10 topics, and within five hours he came back with a detailed outline. The lectures were delivered weekly in Septem­ber-December 2020. Rewriting these lectures to create the current book took another few months.

I sometimes wonder whether Michael would have had second thoughts if he had known that his spontaneous acceptance of my request would take ten months of his time. But fortunately for readers, this became a blessed opportunity to access his central ideas and be guided to his dozen books. The videoed lectures, subtitled in Chinese and divided into 70 episodes, were screened in April-August 2021 in China. The first episode has been watched by over 188,000 viewers, with 30,000 viewers on average for the remaining episodes. The English-subtitled lectures are available on www.michael-hudson.com. What readers now hold in their hand, the book writ­ten on the basis of these lectures, presents Michael’s dissection of the burn­ing global issues of today, and his explanation of how the industrial capi­talism analyzed in the 19th century by Marx and other classical economists has turned into finance capitalism based on debt and rent extraction. This financialized system is polarizing the Western economies and threatening their collapse in a wave of foreclosures and new privatizations by a finan­cial oligarchy.

Most important are Michael’s proposed alternatives for de-dollarization and de-privatization to avoid global debt deflation and New Cold War im­perialism. Indeed, if civilization is to avoid the destiny of destruction, if humanity is to have a future, socialism is the only way—and that is what Michael has passionately argued in this book.

Lau Kin Chi

Director, Executive Team, Global University for Sustainability Coordina­tor, Programme on Cultures of Sustainability, Centre for Cultural

The Bubble and Beyond – fictitious capital, debt deflation and global crisis Michael Hudson (2012)

Payback – debt and the shadow side of wealth Margaret Atwood (2008)

Monday, July 6, 2026

THE SIX INVERSIONS

This is a useful post from Josh Hunt about what he calls "the great British inversion

The British state can still do some things quickly. It can stand up a furlough scheme in a
fortnight. What it can no longer do is build, plan, or reform at anything like the speed the
new era demands. The evidence is not contested, it is simply tolerated. No major reservoir has been completed in England since the early 1990s, in a country
whose population has grown by ten million since. Grid connections are quoted in years
and sometimes in decades, in a country proposing the largest electrification in its history.
Our last nuclear plant has been under construction longer than the entire Victorian railway
boom took to connect every major city in Britain. The planning application for a single
road crossing of the Thames has cost more than Norway spends building actual tunnels.
These are not anecdotes. They are the operating speed of the system. The deeper problem is that the system’s design assumptions match the old era exactly.
Annual budgets for compounding decadal pressures. Departmental silos for problems
that cross every department. A Treasury that prices everything at this year’s cost and
nothing at this generation’s. Political incentives with a four-year horizon facing inversions
with a forty-year one. The machine is not broken. It is doing what it was built to do,
superbly, for a world that has ended. History offers a clear, uncomfortable lesson about how machines like this get rebuilt.
They get rebuilt in crisis. The 1832 Reform Act passed under fear of revolution.
The Edwardian welfare state was born from the national panic when half the Boer War
recruits were too malnourished to fight. Beveridge required total war. The 1976 IMF crisis
forced in a fortnight what a decade of argument had not. The pattern repeats abroad:
Sweden and Finland built the most disciplined fiscal frameworks in Europe in the rubble
of their early-1990s banking collapses. Foresight is rarer, but it exists, and its examples are the most important data points in
this article. Singapore planned its water independence and its housing system across
half a century. Ireland in 1987, broke and bleeding emigrants, struck a social partnership
that held across governments and turned the country around inside a generation.
Estonia built a digital state from a standing start because it had no legacy machine to
defend. The common ingredients are worth stating: an honestly named emergency,
a coalition wider than one party, and mechanisms deliberately placed beyond the each of the annual political auction. Crisis reform works, but it buys the same destination at a vastly higher price, paid in
unemployment, disorder and lost decades. Foresight is cheaper. It is also, on the historical
record, much rarer. The whole argument of this article is that Britain still has the choice,
and that the window in which it has the choice is the next decade, not the next generation. VI. Britain on current trend Let me be concrete about where the current trend goes, using only published projections.
None of this is prophecy. All of it is what the official numbers say happens if nothing changes. Britain in 2036. A population of around 71 million that has stopped growing naturally and

  now shrinks in three of its four nations. One person in five of pensionable age.

Hundreds more primary schools closed; the university sector contracting as the

small cohorts arrive. The NHS, if its own plan is delivered, employing one working

person in eleven, with the wider care economy absorbing something approaching

one in seven. Debt interest still a top-four spending programme. Defence spending

rising toward 3.5% of GDP under treaty obligation, every pound of it competing

with care. Taxes at or beyond the post-war record. The gilt market pricing all of it,

hour by hour, through lenders with no particular attachment to Britain.

Britain in 2046. The 1960s baby boom fully inside the care system, the over-85 population
having roughly doubled, drawing on a workforce that has been flat or shrinking for a
decade. Workers per pensioner heading toward the OBR’s long-run figure of 2.7, and on
the honest count, workers actually in work per pensioner, materially lower. The state pension
alone costing nearly 8% of GDP. The OBR’s current-policy debt path passing 150% of GDP
on its way to a number nobody intends to reach, which means the correction, voluntary or
imposed, has happened somewhere in between. The honest way to read those two paragraphs is not as a prediction that they occur. It is
as a measurement of the gap between the trajectory and anything survivable, which is to  
say, a measurement of the scale of reform that is coming one way or the other.
That scale is the point. Nothing in any party’s current programme is within an order of
magnitude of it.
VII. The case against this point of view Now, I know what some will say, and the objections deserve better than a paragraph each,
because some of them are partly right.
Declinism is Britain’s oldest cottage industry. True. The 1890s panicked about
national efficiency and then won two world wars. The 1970s sick man joined the single
market and boomed. The base rate for British doom predictions is poor, and I hold this
objection seriously. But notice what rescued Britain each time: a growing population,
cheap energy, an expanding world order, and fiscal room to manoeuvre.
The rescues came from exactly the assumptions that have now inverted. Past declinism
was wrong about a country with tailwinds. The question is what the same country does
in headwinds, and that question has no historical answer yet. Immigration solves the demographics. It has, so far, genuinely. Without it the workforce
would already be shrinking. But three things bound the strategy. Migrants age too,
so the fix must be perpetually renewed at growing scale. The political tolerance has
collapsed, with net migration already down two-thirds from its peak. And the deepest
bound: fertility is falling everywhere. The countries we recruit from are on the same curve,
a generation behind. Importing working-age people is borrowing against other nations’
demographic futures, and the global lender is closing. AI is the productivity dividend that pays for all of it. Possibly. It is the one genuine
wildcard in this article, and intellectual honesty requires saying that a sustained AI-driven
productivity boom is the single scenario in which the fiscal arithmetic repairs itself.
But weigh the shape of the dividend against the shape of the need. The productivity gains
arrive in cognitive services, which is where the tax base lives, and the demonstrated effect
of automation on care, the actual binding constraint, is so far nil. A dividend that displaces
our taxpayers whilst leaving your costs untouched is a strange kind of rescue. I would
gladly be wrong about this. Fewer people is fine, even good. Per head, perhaps, eventually, and the environmental
case is real. Japan remains safe, clean and cohesive. But Japan entered its decline with
net assets abroad, an industrial export machine, and government debt held almost entirely
by its own citizens. Britain enters its decline as a net debtor, importing food and energy,
owing money to foreigners and hedge funds. The same demography, with the opposite
balance sheet. Services specialisation is an asset in any world order. The surplus is real and growing,
and it is the best card in our hand. But a services surplus buys goods only whilst the world
stays open, and it employs the workers most exposed to the technology. An asset, yes.
A foundation, no. Each objection, examined, does the same thing. It extends the timetable. None of them
changes the destination. That, in the end, is my answer to the optimists: you may be right
about the decade. The argument of this article is about the direction. VIII. Governing the inversion So what would a country that took all this seriously actually do? Not a manifesto. A sketch
of the categories, with one worked example, because the point of the article is the shape
of the response, not its every line item. First, it would measure the new era. You cannot govern what your instruments cannot
see. Publish an annual intergenerational account alongside the Budget, as New Zealand’s
Treasury does, so that every Parliament sees the forty-year cost of its four-year decisions.
Report the effective dependency ratio, workers actually working per pensioner, not the
flattering official one. Count the care economy, paid and unpaid, as the national infrastructure
it is. Second, it would take the compounding decisions out of the annual auction.  The most successful adaptations abroad share one design: automatic stabilisers placed
beyond yearly politics. Sweden’s pension system contains a brake that adjusts payouts
to demographic and economic reality without requiring any politician to commit career
suicide. Denmark and the Netherlands index the pension age to longevity by formula.
Britain instead re-fights every parameter, every year, in public, and loses. A serious country
would legislate the formulas once, honestly, and let arithmetic do what courage cannot. Third, it would rebuild the energy foundation as the first-order national project, on
the simple ground that energy is the economy and everything else in this article sits
downstream of its price. That means treating grid connections, nuclear delivery and
the planning system as a single national-security programme with wartime priority,
because the alternative, attempting history’s largest electrification at the developed
world’s highest power prices, is not a plan. It is a queue. Fourth, it would govern the care economy as a system rather than a staffing problem, which brings me to the worked example, because it shows what inversion-native policy actually looks like. Consider the multi-generational household. For two centuries the whole drift of housing,
welfare and planning policy assumed dispersal: the young move away, the old age alone,
and the state and market fill the widening gap between them. In the old era of abundant
workers and cheap money, that was affordable. In the new era it is the single most
expensive assumption Britain holds.
Because look at what one household arrangement does to the arithmetic of three different
inversions at once. The grandmother in the annexe receives much of her care as a
byproduct of household life rather than consuming a paid carer’s shift, easing the
second inversion. The same grandmother provides the childcare that releases her
daughter into the workforce, easing the first, and on the international evidence, families
with grandparents nearby find it easier to have the children they already wanted, easing
it at the source. The household needs one larger home rather than two or three small
ones, which changes the shape of housing demand rather than simply adding to it.
No new workforce is hired. No new tax is raised. The largest care provider in Britain
is already the family, five million unpaid carers strong, providing a second NHS for free.
The policy task is not to build something new. It is to stop punishing the thing that is
already holding the system up. And we do punish it, comprehensively. Council tax surcharges on annexes. Stamp duty
structured against combining households. Benefit rules that treat sharing a roof as a
fraud risk. A planning system in which a granny flat is a battle. California liberalised
accessory dwellings by right and watched tens of thousands appear in a few years.
Britain could do the same within a Parliament, at a fiscal cost of approximately nothing,
and it would be the first policy in decades designed for the country we are becoming
rather than the one we were. I offer it not as a panacea but as a proof of category. Inversion-native policy exists.
It tends to be cheap, because it works with the new grain rather than against it. There
are equivalents waiting in every domain: Buurtzorg-style self-managing care teams
that deliver more care per worker by removing the management layer rather than
adding robots; defence procurement that buys magazines of munitions rather than
museum pieces; a migration policy honest that it is a bridge with a closing far end,
and priced accordingly. Fifth, and hardest, it would tell the truth about the era, because every successful
adaptation in the historical record began with a country being levelled with. Ireland in
1987 was told it was broke. Singapore was told it could be extinguished. The national
efficiency panic of 1906 began with the publication of one honest, horrifying
recruitment statistic. The precondition for foresight is a shared, named emergency.
Britain’s emergency does not yet have a name. This article’s wager is that naming it,
the Inversion, accurately and without partisan blame, is the first act of governing it. IX. The choice Let me end where I began, with the threshold we cross this year. A nation that buries more people than it christens is not necessarily a nation in decline.
Japan is proof that it can be orderly, even graceful. But it is, unarguably, a different kind
of nation, running on different arithmetic, and it cannot be governed by the habits of the
old kind. Every inversion in this article will be managed eventually. Care will find its
workers or its substitutes. The debt will find its buyers or its restructuring. The energy will
be rebuilt or rationed. The defence will be funded or abandoned. The only open question,
and it is the largest question in British public life even though it appears in no manifesto,
is whether these adaptations are designed or suffered. Whether they arrive by foresight,
on our terms, over decades, or by crisis, on the market’s terms, in months. History says crisis. History is usually right. But not always. There is a version of this
country that treats the Inversion the way it once treated the threat of invasion, as a fact
that reorganises everything, that dissolves the luxury of the old quarrels, that makes the
impossible reforms merely necessary. A country that measures the new era honestly,
automates its hardest decisions, rebuilds its energy foundation, houses its generations
together, and tells itself the truth. We used to be that country in our worst moments.
The task now is to become it in time. The old era did not end with a bang. It ended in a
maternity ward, quietly, on an ordinary day, sometime around now. The new era began
the same way. Nobody noticed. That part, at least, we can still fix.
And the highly recommended Novara site offers this discussion about
how the UK can’t build anything