Tools of manipulation

I’ve often in the past 25 years had to put myself in the shoes of Ministers and senior civil servants to help them develop “road maps” for their reforms….Indeed I would get them to brainstorm about why they thought people behaved the way they did whether as officials, citizens, politicians or businesspeople – and what that might suggest about ways to achieve the desired change.

After all, the projects I’ve led only exist because someone has decided the present state of affairs is no longer acceptable…..so what aspects of whose behaviour are we talking about? And what is it that is most likely to make target groups change their behaviour?

·         Simple instructions?

·         Threats? Incentives?

·         Explanations and understanding?

·         Moral exhortation?

 One result was this table which focuses on the assumptions we make about motives - and then explores the various mechanisms which are available to those trying to change beliefs and behaviour 

The “behavioural turn” - Tools in the change process

Focus of attention	Example of tool	Relevant Tool
1. Understanding	Training Campaigns Functional review	Rational persuasion images Factual analysis
2. Commitment	Leadership Communications Training	Legitimisation; inspiration   Pride
3. Maximising Personal Benefit	Pay increase and bonus Promotion (including political office) Good publicity Winning an award	Monetary calculation ambition Reputation; Psychological Status
4. Minimising Personal Cost	Named as poor performer Demotion Report cards	Psychological (Shame) Monetary Pride
5. Obligation	Law Action plan Family ties	Courts Managerial authority Social pressure
6. Peer influence	Bribery Quality circles	Pressure Support
7. Social influence	Opinion surveys	Feedback from public about service quality

 The explosion of interest in behaviour; In the last decade, the question of changing (other) people’s behaviour has become a central one for government, business and NGOs. Professors Thaler and Cass may have “nudged” interest with their 2008 Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness but it was in fact the UK Cabinet Office which arguably set the ball rolling four years earlier with its Personal Responsibility and changing behaviour – the state of knowledge and its implications for public policy (2004) - an example which was followed with Changing Behaviour – a public policy perspective (Australian Government 2007). 

The Nudge book certainly inspired the Cameron government some 7 years later to set up a Nudge Unit in the Cabinet but the British government had been exploring this issue in its The Use of sanctions and rewards in the public sector (NAO 2008) accompanied by a literature review drafted by Deloitte. Even the House of Lords was not to be outdone – with the voluminous evidence of its Behaviour Change in 2011. And the voluntary sector put down an early marker with its Common Case – the case for working with our cultural values (2010)– which showed more familiarity with the marketing approach than did the economistic and rationalistic assumptions which were embedded in the early British attempts. So the World Bank was rather lagging behind when its Annual Development Report got round to dealing with the issue - in its Mind, Society and Behaviour (2015)

Government normally set up for Failure

Government systems are best known for their failures – and we certainly make the most of it when they happen, whether we are journalists, academics or mere citizens and voters. Books with titles such as “Great Planning Disasters” (1980) or “The Blunders of our Governments” (2013) line our shelves; and reports, post-mortems and articles on specific instances of breakdown and failure are legion. For some reason, the same interest isn’t shown in government success. One reviewer of the second book explained why – 

In our anti-politics culture it may be thought that governments never do anything else but blunder. That is not actually true: a serious academic work could be written examining the things governments got right and lessons learnt there from—but who would buy a book entitled ”The Successes of Our Governments”? Change the title to The Blunders of Our Governments and the readers are there 

There was a period – in the 1970s – when some interest was shown in positive government outcomes. I remember, in particular, “Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy” by Hall, Land, Parker and Webb (1975) with 6 case studies including the struggle for Clean Air, establishment of the Open University and of Health Centres. The authors suggested 3 important perquisites for such success which I have never forgotten - legitimacy, feasibility and support viz that policies require

·         clear and indisputable claims to authority ,

·         a good chance of achieving a successful outcome

·         indications of extensive support 

But the endeavours of government fell out of favour in the 1980s – at least in anglo-saxon territories – with austerity programmes caused by the bailing out of the banks in 2008 being a final challenge for even successful governments.  

It’s only the perseverance of people like Mark Moore and Paul t’Hart which has brought us positive stories of government efforts – with Alan McConnell’s Understanding Policy Success (2010) being an early and important milestone in what is now a burgeoning field 

Useful Further Reading

Reports and Books

Personal Responsibility and changing behaviour – the state of knowledge and its implications for public policy (UK Cabinet Office 2004

Changing Behaviour – a public policy perspective (Australian Government 2007)

Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness; Thaler and Cass (2008).

The Use of sanctions and rewards in the public sector (NAO 2008) accompanied by a literature review drafted by Deloitte

Common Case – the case for working with our cultural values (2010)

Behaviour Change (House of Lords (2011)

Finding Frames – new ways to engage the UK public in global poverty (2011)

Nudge, nudge, think, think;by Peter John, Smith and Gerry Stoker (2011)

A Practitioner’s Guide to Nudging; Rotman 2013

Mind, Society and Behaviour (World Development Report; World Bank 2015

Sanctions, Rewards and Learning (IDEA 2016)

Governance and the Law (World Development Report; World Bank 2017)

Influencing Behaviours and Practices to tackle poverty and injustice (Oxfam 2018)

Articles

“Finding the appropriate policy tools” (RG Young 2008)

Wicked Problems and clumsy solutions – the role of leadership; Keith Grint (2008)

 “Nudge, nudge, think, think”; article by John, Smith and Stoker (2009)

The Rational Paradox of Nudge in a world of bounded rationality; Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich (2016). A quite excellent critique

"Not with a bang, but a whimper" - part VI

The previous post ended – as did my little book In Transit – notes on good governance – in 1999, when New Labour’s programme of “modernising” government was just getting underway……I’m still proud of its 20 page summary of the reform experience to that point - which you can read for yourself in chapter 4, pp 70-90 simply by clicking on the hyperlink above….

For some reason, it’s not easy to find much on the internet about the decade that followed – although I remember the Cabinet Unit being fairly prolific in its production of strategy papers. “The Meaning of Modernisation; new labour and public sector reform” gives a good flavour of those frenetic years.

Not forgetting that the point of this series is to explore how on earth we have been persuaded to surrender so much power to managers, I want in this post simply to pose the blunt question of what 40 years of reform experience has given us….A lot of words certainly…but what, as the Americans would ask, has been the “bottom line”?

Chris Pollitt was one of the most respected of European public management scholars and did a fascinating presentation in 2012 of “40 years of public management reform” which you can watch here.  It focuses on the UK experience of national government reform and is quite withering, revealing

·       an absence of clear statements of reform objectives

·       Prescription before diagnosis. 

·       Failure to build a sufficient coalition for reform, so that the reform is seen as just the project of a small elite

·       Launching reforms without ensuring sufficient implementation capacity

·       Lack of interest in evaluation

·       Haste and lack of sustained application

For more on this, see page 34 of the current version of my How did Admin Reform get to be so sexy? This leads back to the article on the administrative reform industry I’ve mentioned previously -

Pollitt noted that there was massive reform action in some (not all) other UK governance sectors, and noted also that, for constitutional reasons, UK governments have more freedom to move than most comparable democratic government systems. For this reason, the UK experience taught some valuable lessons. He attributed the great volume of reform action in part to ‘the rise of the managerial reform community’, with ‘change management experts’ everywhere, in the public service, in the big consultancy firms, and so on. And, compared with other things they might be doing, they and the political leaders they advised saw that ‘reorganization can be undertaken rather quickly’; doing it conferred on them ‘a badge of modernity’, and was a kind of ‘virility symbol’. But it was also a ‘beautifully clear example’ of the lack of any stable, scientific basis ‘for the long-term organizational redesign of complex public services’ 

What the reform designers did not do anywhere near adequately was to consider the consequences of what they were doing. The rate of change – the state of ‘permanent revolution’ – made it impossible to find out which designs worked well and which did not. And the transition costs were minimized if not neglected altogether: as well as the costs of office redesign and so on, they included the disruption of staffing and relationship patterns and routine housekeeping systems that had worked well enough in the past, the loss of organizational memory, and ‘a general loss of faith in stability and an accompanying diminution of willingness fully to commit oneself to a particular organization’.

A few years back, Dutch-Australian academic Paul ‘t Hart compiled his own set of rules for reformers - proposers of reform activity are more likely to achieve some success if they take note of these rules and seek, as far as possible, to follow them. 

What follows paraphrases ‘t Hart’s treatment (you can find the piece on pages 203–210 of Delivering Policy Reform – anchoring significant reforms in turbulent times; ed E Lindquist, S Vincent and J Wanna (2011)

_ Don’t overdo the rhetoric of reform, and concentrate on areas of greatest need.

_ Don’t let a ‘good crisis’ go to waste, for it may provide the best opportunity for serious change.

_ ‘Keep the bottom drawer well stocked’ with developed reform proposals, so that you are ready to run when an opportunity presents itself.

_ You should invest in an ongoing ‘brains trust’ to be constantly thinking about such matters, and don’t ignore knowledge available outside government circles.

_ Be prepared for ‘push-backs’, and find ways of talking meaningfully to reform opponents.

_ Impeccable analysis is crucial to the power to persuade.

_ Know the system you propose to change inside out, so that you are prepared to cope with resistance from within.

_ Give careful attention to implementation and long-term management.

_ Create behavioural incentives to encourage those operating the new or changed system to conform.

_ Be sure to incorporate mechanisms that make the reforms self-sustaining.

Amazing that 40 years can produce such anodyne lessons as this!