Did Transition have to be so corrupt?

 “When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.' Alice in Wonderland

Discussions about “rule of law” and of “corruption” are never easy – since (like “populism” or “neo-liberalism”) it’s not at all clear what the terms mean. There’s a fragility about the words which tend to convey simply our feelings about the relevant issues - positive about the first term and negative about the others. 

When I arrived, all of 30 years ago, in the post-communist world, an early bit of homework I had to do was in the new field of “transitology” which was occupied by the academics of the Soviet and Eastern European Studies University departments whose previous focus had been watching the Kremlin power-plays. They did at least have the contextual understanding of the different countries of the Soviet bloc - although the only experience people could draw on about the transition from authoritarianism to liberal democracy was actually to be found in Portugal, Spain and Latin America – with Philippe Schmitter’s “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule – prospects for Democracy” published in 1986 being much studied after the Wall fell and “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe” by Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan becoming the new map in 1996.

And it was 1998 before the first exclusive studies of the transition progress being made in central and eastern Europe namely Jon Elster and Claus Offe’s famous “Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea” and David Stark’s Postsocialist Pathways – transforming politics and property 

But this was the precise point that the EC took the decision that the central European states who had applied for EU membership could – despite (or because of?) their 45 years’ experience of communism - be treated seriously as potential members. Of course, conditionality was strongly applied – in other words, the countries were required to demonstrate their compliance with the requirements of membership – meaning in particular rule of law and competition. I was in Romania at the time writing  In Transit – notes on good governance (1999)  which captures well my perceptions at the time – about the scale of the challenge facing these countries; about transitology; and about the lessons I felt Britain had learned about its reform efforts. It's a fairly unique book since very few other westerners had actually moved to the Region or were trying to capture key messages to convey to the reformists in ex-communist countries

And in due course, some 6-7 years later, 8 of the countries were admitted – with Bulgaria and Romania following in 2007. Once they had become members of the club, of course, the new states could - and did - relax. My blog started in 2009 when I was alternating between Bulgaria and Romania and able to get a sense of “progress” – such as it was. There’s more English-language material available about Romania which has therefore been the subject of more posts – perhaps the most interesting and insightful (if pessimistic) being one entitled When will it ever change? which 

- reminded readers of Ralf Dahrendorf’s Reflections on the Revolution in our time in which he had made the optimistic prediction that it might take 15-20 years for those countries to create the rule of law but two generations to have a fully functioning civil society.  

- and of Head of European Delegation in Romania, Karen Fogg’s giving all consultants a note about Robert Putnam’s book on Italian democracy which had made the point that Italy’s south was trapped in a two-century old culture

- quoted excerpts from a rare pamphlet written  by Sorin Ionitsa on Poor Policy Making in Weak States (2006) which indicated the strength of old ties in his home country of Romania

- made the obvious point that Dahrendorf had been overly optimistic in 1990/91 when he talked of one or two generations being necessary for a democratic culture to take hold in central europe 

I had actually planned to use this post to discuss some excellent new material on anti-corruption which has just been published but, for some reason, my thoughts kept pulling me back to the transitology debate – of which, incidentally, one hears very little these days. The result is a rather confused post which doesn’t do justice to either the transition issue or to anti-corruption - and will therefore require a follow-up. 

Let me finish the post with what I consider the best analysis of all the huge literature on anti-by corruption – and it’s by a Romanian, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, who was commissioned by Norway in 2010 to survey the field and give recommendations. The result – Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption (2011) - has some very helpful diagrams and tables although it can, on occasion, be a bit abstruse - 

 What is presented in most anti-corruption literature as a principal-agent problem is in fact a collective action problem, since societies reach a sub-optimal equilibrium of poor governance with an insufficient domestic agency pushing for change.

The report argues that the question “what causes corruption” is therefore absurd. Particularism exists by default, since people tend to share in a particular way, most notably with their closest kin and not with everyone else. Modern states are based on universal citizenship, which entails fair treatment of every citizen by the government. But there are very few states that have thus far succeeded in moving from the natural state to this ideal of modernity. The question should change from “what causes corruption” to “what makes particularism evolve into universalism”. What determines a change in the equilibrium?

Her report suggested that societies could be distinguished by their commitment to three very different sets of values

-       Universalism; where the state treats its citizens impartially

-       Neopatrimonialism; which have single rulers who treat the state as their ‘own’ patrimony.

-       Competitive particularism; which hold elections and have freedoms and competing political parties but have similar non-universal allocation systems, including patronage, nepotism, and favours

and then went on to draw 10 lessons from the global experience of which these are perhaps the most important

Lesson number one is that, the battlefield upon which this war is lost or won remains national. Case studies of historical and contemporary achievers show that although external constraints played a large role in inducing disequilibrium in particularistic countries and triggering change, a transformation has to be reflected in a new equilibrium of power at the society level for it to be both profound and sustainable.

 

Lesson number two is therefore that the transition from corrupt regimes to a regime where ethical universalism is the norm is a political and not a technical-legal process. There is no global success case of anti-corruption as promoted by the international anti-corruption community. Successful countries followed paths of their own. Fighting corruption in societies where particularism is the norm is similar to inducing a regime change: this requires a broad basis of participation to succeed and it is highly unrealistic to expect this to happen in such a short interval of time and with non-political instruments.

The main actors should be broad national coalitions, and the main role of the international community is to support them in becoming both broad and powerful. All good governance programs should be designed to promote this political approach: audits, controls and reviews should be entrusted to ‘losers’ and draw on natural competition to fight favouritism and privilege granting. No country can change without domestic collective action, which is both representative and sustainable over time.

 

The media, political oppositions and civil society should not be seen as non-permanent guests taking part in consultations on legal drafts but as main permanent actors in the process of anti-corruption and holding decisive seats in all institutions promoting ethical universalism. Which windows of opportunities to use, which actors are more interested in changing the rules of the game and how to sequence the change depends on the diagnosis of each society and cannot be solved by a one-size-fits-all solution. 

Other relevant posts

https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2017/04/why-transition-will-last-hundred-years.html

https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2017/07/when-will-it-ever-change.html

https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2018/01/roman-romania.html

https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2018/11/plus-ca-changeplus-cest-la-meme-chose.html

https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2019/06/whatever-happened-to-good-governance.html

https://nomadron.blogspot.com/2020/09/crowds-and-power-in-sofia-and-bucharest_18.html