what you get here

This is not a blog which opines on current events. It rather uses incidents, books (old and new), links and papers to muse about our social endeavours.
So old posts are as good as new! And lots of useful links!

The Bucegi mountains - the range I see from the front balcony of my mountain house - are almost 120 kms from Bucharest and cannot normally be seen from the capital but some extraordinary weather conditions allowed this pic to be taken from the top of the Intercontinental Hotel in late Feb 2020
Showing posts sorted by date for query european public space. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query european public space. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Monday, August 24, 2026

ABOUT THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

This is a  blog about the  social sciences 

A History of the Social Sciences in 101 Books ed Cecile Vidal et al (2023)

The purpose driving this work is to reread 101 books, published since the Second World War, that have left their mark on how the social sciences have been built, year after year, in France and around the world. In so doing, we shall encounter countless objects of study, names, tenets, and debates. We shall witness the birth of concepts now central to how we apprehend and intervene in the social world. We shall follow solidly woven lines of thought and look on as others fray and fall apart. From the cultural diagnosis of Theodor W. Adorno to the gender trouble introduced by Judith Butler, from the long time frame of Fernand Braudel’s “Mediterranean” to Randall Collins’s analysis of micro-situations of violence, from Claude Lévi-Strauss’s kinship systems to Anna Tsing’s mushroom growing amid the ruins of capitalism—this book portrays the discontinuous, multifaceted endeavor of the social sciences while showing it to be a pursuit sustained by a common effort and project.

Strikingly, no one has addressed this challenge before. It is as though the social sciences, despite being constituted as such for nearly a century and a half, still struggle to grasp what confers their unity. To portray their development, they have relied on discipline-specific retrospectives and anthologies rather than focusing on how they conjointly drive a movement that is central to contemporary thought. And it is precisely this whole, composed of many different fields, that we seek to capture. For, in addition to being connected by intellectual dynamics, transfers, and debates, these disciplines share a common position vis-à-vis the life sciences and, above all, partake in a common project—adding to the collective reflexivity of contemporary societies and furthering our critiques of ethnocentric bias.

This emancipating project is, to our minds, the crucial element. If the social sciences merit the energies expended on them, it is because they increase our collective capacity to view our societies and their institutions in a denaturalizing light. The movement by which they tirelessly explore the infinite variety of human practices, via the methods and techniques they have devised, is in fact related to their capacity to peel away the veneer of obviousness overlaying our behavior and reveal that a form of necessity, yet equally of arbitrariness, influences our collective organization. This is the emancipating effect of the social sciences—an effect they could not relinquish if they wished to. In studying human life in all its diverse manifestations, the social sciences bring to light its foundations, which, though biologically determined, are fashioned perhaps primarily by sociohistorical forces.

Doing Social Science

Paying tribute to this emancipating effect entails exhibiting the shape it takes in each book presented. It also demands that we address not just a specialist readership but all those who appreciate the social sciences for the knowledge and freedom they bring. But making these books simpler and more accessible does not imply forgoing discussion of their technical dimensions, particularly the place held by the (at times difficult) problems of method in the debates driving the social sciences. Any attempt to erase what makes them more than simple statements about the social world would belie them. Our discussion thus necessarily covers investigation protocols, data-gathering techniques, critical analysis of sources, and tools for comparison and analysis, taking in, as a corollary, the production of concepts and theoretical frameworks. This technical aspect is what “disciplines” each social science, based on established procedures for investigation and reflexivity. These dimensions also relate to the fundamentally collective nature of working in the social sciences (even when the undertaking crystallizes around a name) and to the existence of research communities, whose development and autonomy of judgment undergird advances in knowledge. In addition to focusing on what these books state, it is thus important to further examine how they ground what they say. It is likewise important to pay attention to how each partakes in a series of research debates preceding it, often modifying the parameters and subsequent course of these debates, which amounts to raising the issue of the cumulative nature of knowledge in the social sciences. We have called on some of the leading specialists currently working in France and elsewhere in the various disciplinary fields and objects of study. They go over how the publication of each book represented an event in its field, explain the effects the book produced on scientific debate, and specify where the interest lies today, without immuring each book from the living context of research or enshrining it as a museum piece cut off from any scientific tradition or collective undertaking.

This approach is intended as a dual tribute to the social sciences community. First, in bringing these books and researchers together, we wished to emphasize intergenerational solidarity. From the Second World War through to the present day, each new generation of researchers has received from the preceding one the technical and intellectual training without which they would have been incapable of producing their own works. This solidarity, however, is not merely a matter of acknowledging this legacy: rather, it entails appropriation through critique, carrying the legacy forward by building up a distance from predecessors’ thought and approach, thereby opening up new vistas. Second, by calling on so many authors, we also wished to profess our vision of the social sciences as a unified whole. Such a vision is currently imperiled by the ongoing trend toward specialization, in which researchers in the social sciences are increasingly viewed as mere “experts” on a given question or domain. This reveals the full extent of the changes to research practices over the past seventy years, illustrating how the advent of mass higher education and, more recently, the managerialization of research output have radically altered what it means to be a researcher in the social sciences, affecting career training, the processes of intellectual consecration, investigation practices, the transmission of research techniques, publication modes, and even the very ethos of the researcher and associated professional ideal. But the interdisciplinary solidarity that we hold dear has not disappeared. A hundred or so researchers have recognized our approach as their own, and the existence of this book may be viewed as an act of resistance, an assertive reminder that the social sciences form a unitary endeavor. Further, this book can be seen as proof that such a project still makes sense to many of us, at a time when other approaches to scientific work—promoting the fragmentation of research fields, emphasizing individual strategies and expertise—are being paraded as a universal model. No doubt projects such as ours will garner ever more support in the future, as the need is felt to move beyond the dynamic of hyper-specialization that bleeds all reflexivity dry and turns the social sciences away from their emancipatory project. 

Better than a Pantheon

It took an institutional event to trigger the opportunity to profess this unitary and emancipatory vision and to tackle this challenge—namely, the seventieth anniversary in 2017 of the creation of a new department devoted to “economic and social sciences” at the École pratique des hautes études (EPHE). As is widely recognized, the department’s creation in 1947 was of major scientific importance in France at that time. It is equally acknowledged that this was the kernel of the institution that developed and then acquired autonomy in 1975 as the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), where the editors of this book work. This fortuitous occasion to go back over the previous seventy years of the social sciences was the germ whence this book grew.

Our readers will thus better understand why we settled on the period 1947–2017. But we still need to explain how we went about our undertaking—that is, how we selected, chose, and prioritized such and such a book. To tackle this obviously irresoluble problem, the five editors met on numerous occasions in 2016. During these meetings, our group engaged in fierce discussions. Although we had fixed the objective of drawing up a list of 100 or so books published since 1947, new and “indispensable” books kept on coming and asserting their right to be included. It was only very gradually, painfully, that we whittled down our list to 101 titles, rather than 100, which is too neat, too tidy a number. The figure also invites others to continually reopen and enrich this selection and, as far as possible, lessens the impression inherent to this type of project that the works listed are somehow the “best.”

There was never any question in our minds of restricting our selection to an abridged series of canonized authors, supposedly equating to some golden age of the social sciences around the 1960s and 1970s. Rather, it was a matter of following the social sciences as an ongoing endeavor, characterized by its ups and downs, surprises, and fluctuations in intensity. We decided that each year was to be represented, and no author, however influential, was to appear more than once. We also opted to follow these disciplines through to the present day while remaining alert to the difficulties occasioned by lacking the requisite distance to pick our way surely through the most recent output. Lastly, we wished to limit imbalances between disciplines, between French and non-French authors, between men and women, and between historical periods and cultural areas, though our selection is obviously marked by the social conditions of research—mostly male, mostly European and American—during the period under consideration and by our project having been carried out at the heart of a French institution. So, this work is not a little pantheon. It is less monumental and less fettered. Our readers are invited to circulate freely among the books, not to admire them. Nor is it the result of a selection that could be described as objective, as if criteria could exist wholly detached from the sociohistorical situation of those choosing. We have no such radical conception of objectivity. It is clear to our minds that our choices are necessarily situated.

First, our choices are situated in time, for it is necessarily from where our disciplines now stand that we have scrutinized their pasts, looking for works that have come down through the years, standing out as “noteworthy” or “remarkable,” even as “foundational” or “representative” of a current they themselves did not envisage. But rather than engaging with the works of the past from the standpoint of our expectations, we have reconsidered them from theirs—thus arguments that have become selfevident are rehearsed afresh with the novelty they had when formulated.

Second, our selections are situated in space, for our enterprise, conducted in a French research establishment, which assumes a standpoint toward the global history of the social sciences (no doubt a very different one from that our American colleagues would have assumed if asked to draw up such a list). However, we considered the importance attached to the selected titles in places outside France and Europe. Thus, though clearly “situated,” our approach is driven by a constant effort to decenter it in both time and space.

Clashes and Choices

Our overall line led us to embrace a certain number of deliberate choices. The first and main such choice is to adopt the standpoint of the social sciences rather than of a particular discipline. That does not mean championing some flat, bland vision of the social sciences. Rather, we profess a more structured vision, drawing notably on the history of the EPHE economics and social science department and what it owed to the Annales school.1 We are mindful of what Jean-Claude Passeron has called the “epistemological indiscernibility”2 of the three disciplines underpinning the social sciences—history, anthropology, and sociology. Around this base is a constellation of other disciplines with fundamentally different epistemologies—law, linguistics, philosophy, the history of art, literary studies, economics, the cognitive sciences, and so on. The whole interest of their interaction with the three underpinning disciplines springs, of course, from this difference. Admittedly, placing certain disciplines at the center and others on the periphery is in itself controversial. Clearly, the way in which the social sciences figure the relationships between their constitutive fields sparks clashes. Additionally, while these three disciplines are the main force behind the social sciences, it is only conjointly, not singly, that they impart this drive, drawing on the exchanges, theoretical debates, and questionings issuing from the surrounding disciplines grounded in another epistemology and affecting them. One has only to think, for example, of the emblematic role played by linguistics in the 1960s.

A second deliberate choice, which is important to us, is to honor a particular form of scholarship—namely, books published under the author’s (or authors’) name. Changes currently favor the article and, to a lesser extent, chapter in a joint volume from a conference or colloquium. For its part, the world of publishing encourages social science researchers to produce brief essays, textbooks, and other “contributions.” All these formats have their merits, meeting the requirements of different publics while adding to the production and raising the profile of the social sciences. But historically, the publication of books has assuredly been central to building the social sciences, and it is the main means by which they have forged their reputation with the general public. Our choice to privilege books as the preeminent form of scholarly output explains why a certain number of important works—particularly articles—do not figure on our list, and nor do specific journal issues, dictionaries, or encyclopedias. This place granted to books does not issue solely from one of the essential differences between the social sciences and the natural sciences (in which the seminal format is the article). It also expresses the tie linking them—from the outset —to the world of the literature.3 The social sciences have an irreducibly hermeneutic and narrative dimension that stems not solely from their object of study (human activities and their historical transformations) but also from the type of labor they require, which entails framing reality as an enigma, seeking to “speak true.” This demands, or should demand, that none shirk the task of voicing and being mindful of the issues involved in describing and categorizing reality. Here once again, not everyone will agree. Within our little editorial group, for that matter, the literary question gave rise to lively debates—and the place accorded to matters of form, the feeling that the “essay” is an inherently dignified genre, or the belief that the effort involved in writing is central to all thinking, did not always emerge victorious. Claiming that one format of scholarly output has primacy, or denouncing how it is treated by our epoch, necessarily figures among the issues at stake in clashes within the highly diverse world of research and could not transpire in a different light.

Which History of the Social Sciences?

In offering a renewed, updated, and internationalized perspective on the major (together with some lesser known) works in the repository of knowledge built up by the social sciences, the panorama we sketch allows us to gauge changes in these sciences, together with the directions in which they have evolved. This book assumes these constraints and, thanks to its collaborative nature, is strongly placed to set out these discontinuities and attendant effects of convergence and densification, thus highlighting the major lines of change. One of the lines of change—perhaps the most flagrant, and in no way a discovery, but with a notable inflection over the decades studied here—is the curve traced by structuralist thought, from its emergence just after the Second World War through its domination in the 1960s, followed by its supposed decline. Did the social sciences, under the aegis of the idea of structure, manage to demonstrate their unity to themselves and triumph awhile, before researchers, naturally given to critique, set about dismantling this unifying belief? Some such nostalgic and disillusioned vision is hawked in accounts that abridge the social sciences to what they are held to have been in the 1960s—some “golden age” corresponding to that of their “great names.” But the path we follow allows us to see things differently and to recognize in the very critique of structuralism (commencing in the 1970s and flourishing as of the 1980s), in its reappraisals and rereadings, a renewed expression of the unity of the social sciences. This critical movement borrows from one discipline to the next such similar schema (emphasizing agency, refusing totalizations, paying attention to situational constraints, etc.), makes methodological recommendations that so frequently converge, and operates on such a scale that we are fully entitled to view the phase on which the social sciences embarked thirty or so years ago in a different light. This view is no longer based on the idea of decline or crisis—characterized by dispersal, fragmentation, and powerlessness even—but on the conviction that this phase exhibits a multiform yet common effort to move beyond the limits of the structuralist enterprise and to take further the goal of denaturing the social world. Starting in the 1990s, on most university campuses around the world involved in teaching and practicing the social sciences, the common language across disciplines tended to center on the idea of “social constructs,” which emerged as the most significant marker of these sciences’ contribution to public debate. From there, we may trace a second evolution, relating to the importance acquired by feminist studies, together with colonial, subaltern, and postcolonial studies. Feminist studies appeared in the late 1940s, and the others surfaced during the 1950s. It was only during the 1970s and the 1980s, however, that they genuinely took off in English-speaking academia.

It took a while for them to reach France, where they were received critically. Yet here, too—though admittedly in the central disciplines of the social sciences rather than in the fields organized into “studies”—they sparked renewed interest in matters of sex, gender, colonization, empire, and domination, steering research in the social sciences toward rehabilitating the “agency” of the dominated. In this case, no doubt more than others, the social sciences show how they are united around a common project to increase reflexivity within societies: In enabling subjects to denaturalize traditional relations of domination, the transformations to these societies gave feminist, subaltern, and postcolonial arguments an everexpanding audience and reach. In return, social science methods have been profoundly modified: confronting hitherto unsuspected practical difficulties, they now seek to better “symmetrize” the point of view of the dominant and the dominated and to avoid importing the prejudices of the dominant enswathed within their conceptualizations and research procedures.

Let us mention one final evolution, which arguably lies at the heart of how we experience the contemporary world: the change in how the social sciences apprehend humanity as a whole and the limits of our planet. Here, it is the questioning of the nation-state that is the crucial element. Constructivist thought once again played a prime role here, making it possible to flush out the overly naturalizing aspects in the conceptions that the social sciences (often unconsciously) favor for apprehending such entities as “nations,” “societies,” and “ethnic groups.” Hence the effort to “deconstruct” these notions and conceive of the realities they overlay as performances rather than as givens. Hence, too, the devising of innovative instruments, primarily methodological, to successfully vary the scales of analysis for apprehending phenomena and for thinking of social activities in terms of “networks,” without being hidebound by the preexisting blueprint afforded by social groups and borders. This is the viewpoint from which to understand the singular importance that, since the 2000s, the social sciences have attached to the dynamics of capitalism, the loss of state sovereignty, the failures in regulating (and thinking about) the ecological crisis, and the depletion of natural resources—all of which require us to extricate our analysis from a viewpoint centered on nation-states. Here, once again, the social sciences show how they are connected to evolutions in the societies within which they develop. By taking globalization as their object and conceiving of their task within this movement, they summon us to be mindful of the sociohistorical conditions engendering them and assert their genuinely political role.

Cyril Lemieux, Laurent Berger, Marielle Macé, Gildas Salmon, and Cécile Vidal

Saturday, July 18, 2026

A BRECHT POEM, SOME THOUGHTS ON DEMOCRACY and on JOURNALISM

PLEASURES

The first look out of the window in the morning The old book found again Enthusiastic faces Snow, the change of the seasons The newspaper The dog Dialectics Taking showers, swimming Old music Comfortable shoes Taking things in New music Writing, planting Travelling Singing Being friendly. Brecht (Last Poems) p448 from Willett and Mannheim’s Bertolt Brecht Poems 1913-1956 (1976)
I would add “the smell of grass after rain” – having gone out to the balcony on my
mountain house in Sirnea and being struck by the smell of grass after a squal.
Perhaps I should draft a poem in the Brechtian style?
I’m not sure why I’ve taken to making a list of the books I’ve been downloading
– I should obviously try rather to do a more thematic list – for example on
democratic, journalistic and environmental issues.
Geoff Eley is a good place to start – eg one of his books on democracy and the
Left - Forging Democracy Geoff Eley (2002)

Between the later 1970s and early 1990s Europe’s political landscape was radically rearranged. The 1989 revolutions removed the Eastern European socialist bloc, and the Soviet Union dissolved. Through an equally drastic capitalist restructuring, Western Europe was transformed. Whereas socialist parties recaptured government across Europe during the later 1990s, moreover, these were no longer the same socialist parties as before. Profoundly deradicalized, they were separating rapidly from the political cultures and social histories that had sustained them during a previous century of struggle. Communist parties, consistently the labor movements’ most militant wings, had almost entirely disappeared. No one talked any longer of abolishing capitalism, of regulating its dysfunctions and excesses, or even of modifying its most egregiously destructive social effects.

For a decade after 1989, the space for imagining alternatives narrowed to virtually nothing. But from another perspective new forces had been energizing the Left. If labor movements rested on the proud and lasting achievements built from the outcomes of the Second World War but now being dismantled, younger generations rode the excitements of 1968. The synergy of student radicalism, countercultural exuberance, and industrial militancy jolted Europe’s political cultures into quite new directions. Partly these new energies flowed through the existing parties, but partly they fashioned their own political space. Feminism was certainly the most important of these emergent movements, forcing wholesale reappraisal of everything politics contained. But radical ecology also arrived, linking grassroots activism, communitarian experiment, and extra-parliamentary mobilization in unexpected ways. By 1980, a remarkable transnational peace movement was getting off the ground. A variety of alternative lifestyle movements captured many imaginations. The first signs of a new and lasting political presence bringing these developments together, Green parties, appeared on the scene.

In the writings of historians, sociologists and social theorists, cultural critics, and political commentators of all kinds, as well as in the Left’s own variegated discourse, an enormous challenge to accustomed assumptions was generated during the last quarter of the twentieth century. The crisis of socialism during the 1980s not only compelled the rethinking of the boundaries and meanings of the Left, the needs of democracy, and the very nature of politics itself but also forced historians into taking the same questions back to the past. Contemporary feminism’s lasting if unfinished achievement, for example, has been to insist on the need to refashion our most basic understandings in the light of gender, the histories of sexuality, and all the specificities of women’s societal place. More recently, inspired partly by the much longer salience of such questions in the United States and partly by practical explosions of racialized conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s, a similar examination of race and ethnicity has begun. Many other facets of identity joined a growing profusion of invigorating political debates.

In the process, the earlier centrality of class, as both social history and political category, dissolved. While class remained an unavoidable reality of social and political action for the Left in the twenty-first century, the earlier centering of politics around the traditional imagery of the male worker in industry had to be systematically rethought. Conceived in one era, therefore, this book was completed in another. I began writing in a Europe of labor movements and socialist parties, of strong public sectors and viable welfare states, and of class-centered politics and actually existing socialisms. Though their original inspiration was flawed and the Soviet example was by then damaged almost beyond recall, Communist parties in the West remained carriers of a distinctive militancy.

In the public sphere, rhetorics of revolution, class consciousness, and socialist transformation still claimed a place. With Socialists riding the democratic transitions triumphantly to power in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, Polish Solidarnosc tearing open the cobwebbed political cultures of Eastern Europe, and French Socialists forming their first postwar government, things seemed on the move. The years 1979–81 were for socialists an encouraging and even an inspiring time.

This gap between optimism and its ending, between the organized strengths of an already formed tradition and the emergent potentials for its succession, is crucial to the purposes of my book. I’ve written it to capture the drama of a still-continuing contemporary transition. To do so required both a detailed accounting of the past and a bold reconstruction of the present because both the achievements and the foreshortenings of the old remain vital to the shaping of the new. Although the century after the 1860s claims the larger share of the book, accordingly, the lines of the later twentieth-century argument are always inscribed earlier on. In that sense, I would argue, history can both impede the present and set it free. Moreover, beginning in the 1860s, my account moves forward through a series of pan-European revolutionary conjunctures, from the settlements accompanying the two world wars through the dramas of 1968 to the latest restructuring of 1989–92.

This book is written from great passion and great regret. It has taken me two long decades. Its writing was shaped and buffeted by a huge amount of contemporary change. It has required a willingness to rethink and surrender some valued assumptions and deeply cherished beliefs. Nonetheless, even allowing for the narratives of knowingness and consistency we like to construct for our intellectual biographies, the main lines of argument remain in many ways consistent with my thinking in the mid-1980s, though I’m sure I understand the implications far better now. It was on one of my returns to England in the spring of 1984, reentering the unique contemplative space of the railway journey (also a thing of the past) and reeling from the brutalized public atmosphere surrounding the miners’ strike, that I knew the world had changed.

I can still weep for all the loss this entailed, for the wasted sacrifices and poor decisions, for the unsung everyday heroism as well as the more obvious courageous acts, for the crimes perpetrated in the name of virtue as well as those committed against it, for the gaps between promise and achievement, for the movements, communities, and cultures built painstakingly across generations whose bases are now gone. From my vantage point at the close of the twentieth century, there were many times when this seemed a painful book to be writing. It required a lot of letting go. However, it is decidedly not an epitaph or an exercise in nostalgia. It is written from the conviction that history matters, particularly when some vital stories get mistold. That struggle of memory against forgetting has become something of a commonplace of contemporary writing, but is no less empowering for that. During the 1990s new amnesias brought some essential histories under erasure. The history of the Left has been the struggle for democracy against systems of inequality that limit and distort, attack and repress, and sometimes seek even to liquidate human potential altogether.

Moreover, this is a history certainly not completed. If my book concentrates in its first three parts on the building of one kind of movement for the conduct of that struggle, the class-centered politics of the socialist tradition, then it seeks to hold that tradition’s omissions and foreshortenings clearly in view. The book’s final part then outlines the potentials from which a new politics of the Left can be made. In that sense, it looks to the future.

And then on to journalism – with a great biography of one of the greatest 
journalists of the 20th century, Claud Cockburn Believe Nothing Until It’s
Officially Denied – Claud Cockburn and invention of guerilla journalism
by
Patrick Cockburn (2024), his son. The great man himself wrote a trilogy of
memoirs on which I have only two -
In Time of Trouble – an autobiography Claud Cockburn (1957) Crossing the Line Claud Cockburn (1959)
And then, the environment, with a powerful little book from the author of
Extinction Rebellion
Common Sense of the 21st Century Roger Hallam (2019)
And, as a final bonus a subject dear to my heart – the social sciences

The History of Social Sciences ed Roger Backhouse and Philippe Fontaine (2010)

Sunday, June 28, 2026

Seven More

Five years ago I posted about “Future Politics” by James Susskind to which I now return Future Politics - living together in a world transformed by tech (2018)

Politics in the twentieth century was dominated by a central question: how much of our collective life should be determined by the state, and what should be left to the market and civil society? For the generation now approaching political maturity, the debate will be different: to what extent should our lives be directed and controlled by powerful digital systems—and on what terms? This question is at the heart of Future Politics.

In the next few decades, it is predicted, we’ll develop computing systems of astonishing capability, some of which will rival and surpass humans across a wide range of functions, even without achieving an ‘intelligence’ like ours. Before long, these systems will cease to resemble computers. They’ll be embedded in the physical world, hidden in structures and objects that we never used to regard as technology. More and more information about human beings—what we do, where we go, what we think, what we say, how we feel—will be captured and recorded as data, then sorted, stored, and processed digitally. In the long run, the distinctions between human and machine, online and offline, virtual and real, will fade into the background. This transformation will bring some great benefits for civilization.

Our lives will be enriched by new ways of playing, working, travelling, shopping, learning, creating, expressing ourselves, staying in touch, meeting strangers, coordinating action, keeping fit, and finding meaning. In the long run, we may be able to augment our minds and bodies beyond recognition, freeing ourselves from the limitations of our human biology.

At the same time, however, some technologies will come to hold great power over us. Some will be able to force us to behave a certain way, like (to take a basic example) self-driving vehicles that simply refuse to drive over the speed limit. Others will be powerful because of the information they gather about us. Merely knowing we are being watched makes us less likely to do things perceived as shameful, sinful, or wrong. Still other technologies will filter what we see of the world, prescribing what we know, shaping the way we think, influencing how we feel, and thereby determining how we act.

Those who control these technologies will increasingly control the rest of us. They’ll have power, meaning they’ll have a stable and wideranging capacity to get us to do things of significance that we wouldn’t otherwise do. Increasingly, they’ll set the limits of our liberty, decreeing what may be done and what is forbidden. They’ll determine the future of democracy, causing it to flourish or decay. And their algorithms will decide vital questions of social justice, allocating social goods and sorting us into hierarchies of status and esteem.

The upshot is that political authorities—generally states—will have more instruments of control at their disposal than ever before, and big tech firms will also come to enjoy power on a scale that dwarfs any other economic entity in modern times. To cope with these new challenges, we’ll need a radical upgrade of our political ideas. The great English philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote in his Autobiography of 1873 that, ‘no great improvements in the lot of mankind are possible, until a great change takes place in the fundamental constitution of their modes of thought.’ It is time for the next great change.

Stealing Horses to Great Applause – the origins of the first world war 
reconsidered
Paul Schroeder (2025)
With a preface by the great Perry Anderson, this text promises much The Decisionist Imagination – sovereignty, social science and democracy in the
20
th Century
ed Daniel Bessner and Nicholas Guilhot (2018)
An unusual take on the making of decisions
Yesterday – the UK from Thatcher to Covid Brian Harrison (2026) 1100 pp
Some Afterthoughts How far, then, was the UK in decline between 1990 and 2020?
We must first summarize the conclusions so far reached, in roughly their order of
discussion in the previous subsection (Current Realities). Because the Church of
England was never disestablished, it had long been integral to the UK’s stability.
With the loss of faith since the 1960s, however, its political role slowly became
primarily ceremonial, declining only to the extent that the state declined.
Opposition to birth control was among the controversial interwar religious
standpoints, but thereafter other issues seemed more important, the controversy
cooled and both standpoints succumbed before sexuality’s secularization.
The UK’s relative economic decline was inevitable to the extent that less developed
societies were bound to catch up, but it is absolute decline that brings trouble,
and in the nation as a whole,
this was averted. Not everywhere, though:
economic growth was very patchy, both by region and by type of manufacture
or service. Science-based industries flourished in several parts of the UK,
and the North Sea witnessed remarkable advances in turbine manufacture,
wind power and extraction of oil and gas; there were also simultaneous and
related advances in environmental consciousness.

In education there was expansion and innovation at every level, spurred on by international comparison, and led by world-beating schools and universities. Although computerization in the UK was early and widespread, its record in computer manufacture was disappointing. In its media aspects, however, the UK was notably resourceful and recreation boomed and diversified after 1990, as never before. Behind all this lay a party-political situation whose stability required controversy to be publicly aired—political stability being in itself an economic asset. By 1990 the Wall’s fall had dampened Marxian fires: riots thereafter were mostly consumerist, and were contained. Containment was not cost free if only because of the UK’s relative enthusiasm for removing delinquents from the workforce into imprisoned work-free idleness. Helpful to the economy, however, was the move of both Labour and Conservatives after 1979 towards the centre, while the adversarial party system maximized opportunities for public debate. The worldwide credit crunch of 2007 was serious, however, and the UK was relatively slow to recover from it.

In international relations the UK’s world influence was probably at its peak in the 1880s, rather than in 1918 when the empire’s land-mass was at its peak. Henceforth the UK was a ‘satisfied power’ in need of alliances, and despite being on the winning side in 1945, diminishingly convincing as a ‘great power’. There followed decades of unsuccessful face-saving formulae and more frequent attempts to deny failure. By the 1970s the UK’s former international status was beyond recall, and it was a sign of the UK’s ongoing decline that so much was made of the Falklands victory in 1982. Having joined the EEC in 1973 in the hope that membership would revive the UK’s status, British governments seemed determined to minimize the benefits of joining, and on leaving the EU in 2020 the UK seemed only to sink further.

As for the empire/Commonwealth, it had originated in a powerful combination of idealism, commercial energy and wishful thinking. The twentieth-century prevalence of the third and waning of the first and second help to explain the empire/Commonwealth’s decline. Missionaries, in their idealistic and moralistic fervour, had helped to advance colonial frontiers, but their denominational diversity, with each component fervently held, could only erode faith by fostering irreligious relativism.

In 1989 K. O. Morgan’s preface to the first edition of his The People’s Peace (1990) saw the period 1945–90 as possessing ‘a unity of its own’. Not a situation prevailing between 1990 and 2020. In domestic politics these years include the long middle period (1997–2010) of Labour government, bounded at each end by periods of Conservative-dominated government, so no integrating theme there. Alternatively these years co ld be identified as a period of reflection and digestion, whereby the long-term implications of Thatcherism, especially within the British labour movement, were at last grasped. The difficulty in choosing this uniting theme, however, is that Thatcher’s impact has not yet ended. Or the period could be seen as a peaceful interval between two periods of ‘cold war’, beginning with the fall of the wall and ending with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine; but again, the end of Putin is not yet in sight. Some will complain, however, that there is more to life than politics. Besides, independent nations do not need to be fixated upon arbitrary international rankings—still less did it depend upon rankings based on military or power-political criteria. The decades between 1990 and 2020 have not acquired any distinct label, nor should they: a decade, or even three decades, are arbitrary periods, and if they have any distinctive feature, the label can be detected or confected only in retrospect.

Politicians at any level tend to make exaggerated claims for what they can achieve—claims that are pumped up during general elections, and even verge on chauvinism. ‘I want Britain to be seen as the best’, Major told Conservatives in March 1992, ‘not only in our eyes, but in the eyes of others. First and first again—a world leader—that is where I want us to be, and to stay’. On 30 September 1997 Blair described ‘our goal’ as being ‘to make Britain the best educated and skilled country in the world, a nation, not of a few talents, but of all the talents’. The two-party system carries with it the drawback of encouraging rebuttal rather than empathy. Wise politicians, however, do not exaggerate their powers and still less do they take national setbacks personally. Foreign Secretary Hague was portrayed in 2012 as ‘intoxicated by the aroma of office’: finding some regime ‘unacceptable’, he is ignored, stamps his foot on the world stage, but ‘only stubs his toe’. Not even Palmerston in his Victorian prime could get away with such conduct, and was at least accountable to an evangelical and nonconformist conscience, whereas in present-day UK politics there is no such conscience, nor have we a Cobden to rise up from the back benches to offer the necessary corrective. The UK today in the international arena may, however, see merits in Cobden’s mid-Victorian hallmark: combining empathy with example-setting. Heath, assuming a decidedly Cobdenite stance, reminded parliament in 1993 of the link between success at home and influence abroad: when the UK tells other countries what to do, ‘people politely ask, “What about Northern Ireland?”’ and specify recent terrorist incidents ‘on our own doorstep’. Ashdown in 1998 thought that what became the Good Friday agreement would make Blair more credible in pursuing his wider diplomatic ambitions.

Governments must always make national security their first priority, but intelligently mobilizing soft power and collective security can in the long term outmanoeuvre populist sabre-rattling. In 1960 the sociologist Michael Young saw ‘no necessary connection between power and greatness’: nations could be ranked in possession of weapons, he wrote, but also in art, intellect and social concern. Young would have gone further, favouring a stouter British backing for the UN: ‘we could find a pride and purpose, not as the smallest of the Great Powers but as the greatest of the Small Powers, in helping to lead the world towards the renunciation of national sovereignty’. Self-advertisement is difficult to reconcile with an allegedly British modesty and understatement, but the UK with its world-beating universities and its world-pervasive language has potentially strong foundations. Hugh Seton-Watson in 1977 held up France as a model: lacking after 1815 ‘the military, industrial or manpower resources of a firstrate power’, the worldwide cultural missions of the French made their language ‘the instrument of civilized men all over the world’. Here, too, the UK is in a strong position.

When Joseph Chamberlain was seeking in 1903 to overturn Cobden’s achievement by promoting protection through tariff reform, he claimed that ‘the day of small kingdoms with their petty jealousies has passed. The future is with the great empires, and there is no greater empire than the British Empire’. Twenty-first century perspectives beg to differ. Among the few benefits of possessing nuclear weapons is their capacity to ‘freeze’ the status of declining countries, thus causing small countries to proliferate. ‘The hydrogen bomb is a great leveller’, said Julian Amery: ‘It cancels out the disparity between population and big areas of territory and smaller ones’.

The histories of Switzerland, the Netherlands and Scandinavia show that significant world influence requires neither the bomb, nor even a large landmass. The UK’s world influence reached its height well before preoccupation with the empire’s land-mass attained its ultimate extent, and we—more readily than many Victorians—acknowledge that formal annexation carries many burdens in its train, and that collective self-defence can be more effective than grandiose patriotic pretension. Smallness does have its advantages.

Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times Alison McQueen (2018)

A consideration of how sound this concept is – with amazing documentation

The Return of the Great Powers Brendan Simms (2026)

Futures of Socialism Colm Murphy (2023)
Murphy starts in iconoclastic form by tracing the origins of left discourse about
globalisation to the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) developed by the
Labour left in the 1970s and early 1980s (this explains the unusual starting year
of 1973 in the book’s date range – when Labour’s annual conference famously
first adopted a programme heavily influenced by the AES). As Murphy points out
, a key premise of the AES, based on bitter reflection on the 1960s Labour
government, was that the rise of multinational corporations and international
finance had hollowed out the power of individual states to secure full employment,
narrow inequality and boost economic growth. The remedies that the left
prescribed for this malaise were obviously very different from what became
New Labour’s economic strategy. Roughly speaking, the left sought to increase
the state’s power to control the British economy through measures such as
increased public ownership (especially of financial institutions), planning
agreements with private enterprise and import controls.
But the underlying economic analysis – that the post-1945 model of economic
management was no longer viable amid a globalising capitalism – was essentially
very similar to the rhetoric rolled out by Blair and Gordon Brown much later.
Murphy demonstrates that one wing of the Labour left, led by Stuart Holland
(the key theorist of the AES), did eventually lose confidence in a strategy
based on socialism in one country. Instead, Holland and his colleagues invested
considerable intellectual energy during the 1980s in arguing for a more
interventionist economic strategy at a European level.
This too flowed into the formation of a modernised Labour vision that firmly
distanced itself from the Euroscepticism that was common currency on the
British left in the 1970s. Murphy is clear that the Labour leadership’s
entanglement with the discourse of globalisation after c.1994 drew on
influences besides the AES (he mentions the writings of figures such as
Anthony Giddens and David Held as one alternative source).
But he argues that an important reason that internal critics found it hard
to push back against the Blair/Brown account of globalisation was that
they had already signed up to the idea that a traditional social-democratic
economic strategy had been ruled out by the rise of giant corporations and
fleet-footed global capital flows. A wide cross-section of the party had been
primed by the preceding twenty years of internal debate to accept that
‘globalisation’ required Labour to retool its economic policy.
Murphy makes a similar observation with respect to ideas about the
decentralisation of economic and political power. During the 1970s and
1980s a very large number of political actors on the left and centre of British
politics became convinced that the model of centralised state-driven socialism
associated with Labour’s heyday in power in the 1940s was out of step with
modern Britain. Political formations as various as the New Left, leading trade
unionists, disillusioned Labour revisionists, left-led Labour councils,
Scottish and Welsh nationalists, the Liberal Party and the emergent SDP
all agreed that there needed to be greater economic and political empowerment
below the level of the UK state. Initially this was often framed in socialist terms
as the extension of economic democracy through worker participation in
industrial decisionmaking and trade unionists taking seats on company boards.
But these ideas quickly widened (or perhaps moderated) to include passing
power on to consumer and community groups, local councils (with Ken
Livingstone’s Greater London Council as a model) and co-operatives.
At a theoretical level, these decentralising tendencies were forged into what
Murphy dubs the ‘neo-corporatism’ advocated by David Marquand and Paul Hirst.
Marquand and Hirst envisaged a British economy that looked a lot more like the
West German social-market model, by combining federal constitutionalism with
a more collaborative and long-term industrial culture. All of this was premised
on the assumption that Labour’s traditional political vision was too top-down
and statist and thus out of step with a less deferential, more individualist society.
This was said to be the vulnerability in Labour’s earlier model of socialism that
Thatcherism had exploited, by offering a right-wing vision of individual economic
empowerment that widened private property ownership and increased disposable
incomes through direct tax cuts (a point that had been presciently made by
Stuart Hall even before the Thatcher government was elected in his
famous 1979 Marxism Today essay ‘The Great Moving Right Show’).
But it was ultimately constitutional rather than economic decentralisation
that achieved more traction within the Labour leadership in the 1990s.
John Smith’s victory over Bryan Gould in the 1993 Labour leadership election
was one important moment here. Murphy shows that Gould had been a key
advocate of a form of economic modernisation that drew on ideas about
diffusing economic power, whereas Smith was more engaged by
modernising Britain’s democracy.
A second key moment was Blair’s dalliance with the ideas of Will Hutton in 1996.
Hutton’s The State We’re In (1995) was a brilliant popularisation of the
neo-corporatism espoused by Marquand and Hirst, which caught the political
zeitgeist as the Conservatives imploded, ultimately selling a remarkable
250,000 copies. But the small circle that controlled Labour’s economic policy
was reluctant to sign up to Hutton’s wide-ranging economic vision,
which Brown and Ed Balls regarded as a dangerous hostage to electoral
fortune (and an attempt by Blair to loosen their control over economic strategy).
Murphy shows that, instead, a discourse of constitutional reform, somewhat
influenced by the work of Charter 88, emerged to fill the space where debates
about economic democracy and corporate governance might otherwise have
gone. Murphy’s point is not to downplay the significance of constitutional reform.
On the contrary, he (rightly) thinks that we should view this period of debate
on the constitution within Labour, and the watered-down version of reform
that was enacted after 1997, as a historic episode of political reform.
Thanks to the massed ranks of the leftist intelligentsia mobilised through
Charter 88; the Scottish Constitutional Convention; and a generic left-wing
rhetoric that disparaged the Thatcher government for pushing through radical
reforms ‘undemocratically’, Labour’s account of modernisation encompassed
constitutional changes such as devolution, incorporation of the ECHR into
domestic law, freedom of information and (limited) House of Lords reform.
This was despite the lack of enthusiasm for these measures among Blair
and other key figures in the PLP. As Murphy notes, this demonstrates both
the success of Charter 88 and others in forcing the Labour leadership to
adopt a set of measures that they were fundamentally ambivalent about,
but also shows why, in the end, there was little appetite in Labour high
command to go any further in deepening and rationalising these individual
reforms into one overall coherent package of constitutional change.
In that case, we might ask, how should we characterise Labour’s
economic strategy by 1997? Surely that was neoliberal?
Again, Murphy complicates the picture. He points out that Labour had long
thought of its economic policy as aimed at modernising the British economy
through state intervention on the supply side. This was, after all, the
central political pitch of Harold Wilson in the 1960s and again of Neil
Kinnock in the 1980s: that a Labour government was better suited than
the Conservatives to drive investment into British science and industry
and to use the state to adapt Britain’s economy to new technologies
and methods of production. The real innovation in Labour’s economic
worldview, Murphy shows, was that during the 1990s supply side
modernisation was conceptualised as less about revitalising the
manufacturing sector and more about increasing investment in education,
training and infrastructure. This was the rise of ideas about a
‘knowledge-based economy’ or ‘human capital’, influenced by American
New Keynesian economists such as Robert Reich (in his earlier, New
Democrat guise) and Lawrence Summers (who had taught Ed Balls at
Harvard). These ideas – which legitimised public investment in education
and training as a means of boosting economic growth – intersected with
the growing awareness among Labour policy-makers that the British
economy was now increasingly dominated by service-sector employment
and thus had become ‘deindustrialised’.
For one group within the party, it was essentially the greatest peacetime
government in history (or perhaps should be ranked equal with the 1945
government), led by one (or perhaps two) of the best politicians Labour
ever produced. For another group, it was a moral disgrace that sold out
Labour’s basic principles, led by a shifty opportunist with only the
shallowest connection to Labour’s traditions.
Futures of Socialism makes a powerful intervention in this discussion
because it shows that Labour needs a more rational debate about what
the party got right after 1997 and what it got wrong, not to mention a
more detailed appreciation of how the social and economic context has
changed since 2010. It is arguable that a discussion along those lines
took place among Democrats in the US, for example, after 2016.
Shocked by the victory of Trump, the Biden administration came into
office determined to build on the Obama years but also to take some
more strongly left-leaning stances on economic and social policy.
Labour should follow suit. There is no better starting point for politicians,
commentators and academics who want to contribute to the debate on
Labour’s past and future than Colm Murphy’s book. Ben Jackson