what you get here

This is not a blog which opines on current events. It rather uses incidents, books (old and new), links and papers to muse about our social endeavours.
So old posts are as good as new! And lots of useful links!

The Bucegi mountains - the range I see from the front balcony of my mountain house - are almost 120 kms from Bucharest and cannot normally be seen from the capital but some extraordinary weather conditions allowed this pic to be taken from the top of the Intercontinental Hotel in late Feb 2020

Sunday, July 23, 2023

In Transit

It was 1999 when I published a book with this title - used as a calling card in Uzbekistan when I started what was to be an 8 year stint in Central Asia, with Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan following after 3 years. It’s a felicitous title since it is about a western “change agent” applying what he had learned about public admin in UK government to a very different environment. The change from a “communist” system to a “capitalist” one was one which noone had really theorised about. The sovietologists who inhabited the ituniversity departments of Soviet Studies soon found use in the new field of “transitology” Many theorists, however, had considered the opposite process, from capitalism to socialism. And still do – so far without convincing electorates although progressives can blame corporate media’s “divertissement” (such a lovely French word!) which has had two profound social effects

  • diverting citizens’ attention with spectacle of scandal and entertainment (Mander; Postman)

  • breeding alienation from their fellow man (jeremy gilbert)


Between 1950 and 1980, we had an effective and balanced system in which each type 
of power – economic (companies/banks etc), political (citizens and workers) and legal/admin/military 
(the state) – balanced the other. None was dominant.
Deindustrialisation, however, destroyed that balance – more specifically it destroyed the power 
which working class people had been able to exercise in that period through votes and unions 
has been undermined. Mintzberg’s Rebalancing Society  captures this argument best.
In its place a thought system developed - justifying corporate greed and the privileging 
(through tax breaks and favourable legislation) of the large international company.
  • All political parties and most media have been captured by that thought system 
which now rules the world
  • People have, as a result, become cynical and apathetic
  • Privatisation is a disaster – inflicting costs on the public and transferring wealth to 
the few
  • Two elements of the “balanced system” (Political and legal power) are now supine 
before the third (corporate and media power). The balance is broken and the dominant power 
ruthless in its exploitation of its new freedom
  • It is very difficult to see a “countervailing power” which would make these corporate elites 
pull back from the disasters they are inflicting on us
  • Social protest is marginalized - not least by the combination of the media and an Orwellian 
“security state” ready to act against “dissidence”
  • But the beliefs which lie at the dark heart of the neo-liberal project need more detailed exposure
as well as its continued efforts to undermine what little is left of state power
  • We need to be willing to express more vehemently the arguments against privatisation - 
existing and proposed
  • to feel less ashamed about arguing for “the commons” and for things like cooperatives and social enterprise (inasmuch as such endeavours are allowed
But the elite - and the media which services their interests - noticed something was 
wrong only when Brexit and Trump triumphed – in 2016. But that was simply the 
point at which the dam broke – the pressure had been building up for much longer.
 If we really want to understand what is going on we have to go much further back – 
not just to the beginning of the new millennium when the first waves of populist anger 
started - but to the 1970s when the post-war consensus started to crumble – as Anthony 
Barnett, for one, most recently argued in his extended essay “Out of the Belly of Hell” (2020)
The demos have been giving the Elites a clear warning – “your social model sucks”. 
We may not like some aspects of what the crowd is saying – for example the need for border 
restrictions….but we ignore its message at our peril. So far I don’t see a very credible Elite 
response. Indeed, the response so far reminds me of nothing less than that of the clever Romans 
who gave the world Bread and Circuses. Governments throughout the world have a common 
way of dealing with serious problems – it starts with denial, moves on to sacrificial lambs, 
official inquiries and bringing in the clowns - and finishes with “panem et circenses”

Thursday, July 20, 2023

OVERHEATED

It’s been a year since I last did a couple of posts (here and here) on climate change but a combination of book downloads on the subject and Europe’s present heatwave is the prompt for another post. The books are first Power – limits and prospects for human survivalby Richard Heinberg which came out in 2021 and then Five Insights for avoiding global collapse by Gaya Herrington which was published in 2022 (and can be read in full by tapping the title)

Heinberg has been writing about our overreliance on fossil fuels for a couple of decades 
but I find his book a bit too glib. Herrington is a much younger writer and starts with an 
explanation of the systems approach - with due tributes to Dona Meadows and her Thinking in Systems book. 

Admittedly, thinking in systems can be quite overwhelming sometimes. If everything is connected, where does one start to make any change at all? And how, if it is not as simple as pressing a button? There is a way to still make a difference, but not with force. Influence, rather than strength, is the key to making a lasting impact when working in a system (p11)

We are living in the sixth mass extinction of life on Earth, and partially because of our encroachment into wildlife habitats, 2020 brought us a seemingly sudden pandemic that completely disrupted our already feeble sense of normalcy. What many of us initially thought would be over in a few months, lasted years. And at the time of writing, Russia’s war in Ukraine has us heading into winter with renewed anxieties around geopolitical and energy security. Our world is full of tipping points, counterintuitive conjunctions, and inertia.

Harrington's 5 insights are a bit underwhelming -  
  • Acting as if we are not connected has brought the world to the edge of collapse

  • growth is the cause of society’s problems

  • We need to fundamentally change society’s priorities if we want to avoid significant declines in our current levels of well-being

  • this is urgent

  • the end of the growth objective doesn’t mean the end of progress

But these podcasts will tell you more -

https://open.spotify.com/show/3sNUjJdtw4dsNb5jtkukHq

https://www.thegreatsimplification.com/episode/57-gaya-herrington

https://danske-podcasts.dk/podcast/leadership-and-the-environment/643-gaya-herrington-part-3-five-insights-for-avoid

My fellow blogger Dave Pollard put it nicely in a recent post

Thanks for the inspiration to a number of collapsnik writers who have been musing helpfully on this subject, particularly about personal and collective human agency, about our human propensity to obfuscate and put out of mind truths we don’t want to deal with, and about our inclination for disingenuous wishful thinking — particularly Erik Michaels, Indrajit Samarajiva, Jem Bendell and Tim Morgan.

It’s great to be reading the work of others who appreciate that there are no answers to such predicaments, nothing to feel ashamed about, and no one to blame, and that it’s enough to just try to understand and explain what is happening. I think we owe that much to ourselves, all of us doing our weary best, and I think we owe it, too, to the future inhabitants of this planet, human and/or more-than-human, that will live with the mostly unintended consequences of our efforts and our presence here.

The editorial of the current issue of the New Statesman has responded by reminding us that

Twenty two of the hottest years since records began in 1850 have occurred in the last 23.

Since 1950, the number of floods has increased by a factor of 15 and wildfires by a factor of seven.

In 2003 an estimated 70,000 people died as a result of a European heatwave. Across the world,

five million deaths a year are now linked to abnormally hot and cold temperatures. Climate change

is not only a catastrophe for the generations to come – it is one for us today

For 50 years, scientists have been warning us that we were outstripping planetary boundaries
 - Limits to Growth” came out in 1972 and sketched various scenarios. 
Vested interests fought back and rubbished the scientists – encouraging cynicism and fatalism.
 We can – and do – rationalise our reluctance to change our habits but it’s only in the past decade 
that books started to appear to explore this reluctance.
Last August I recommended some books  -
and this is a quite excellent little article on why we have chosen to ignore the climate crisis https://medium.com/age-of-awareness/a-postmortem-for-survival-on-science-failure-and-action-on-climate-change-35636c79971e

blogpost problems

I had wanted to post today – but blogpost formatting has made it imposible

Untl that's sorted, here's a foretaste of the next post https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kSIFzIeKQMo


Thursday, July 13, 2023

Collective Intelligence – part II

Geoff Mulgan’s basic message can be reduced to bullet points – that we

  • have become too pessimistic about the future

  • have lost our sense of “agency” ie are not prepared to take up arms but have sunk into despair

  • need to use our imagination to envisage different futures

  • should act together to bring some of these about

His approach is perhaps best caught in a paper he delivered to the Progressive Governance Summit of 2021

I live in Luton, a fairly typical post-industrial town in southern England. It thrived in the past making hats, and then cars. Now the largest employer is the airport, and many work in the big Amazon logistics centres nearby. The town is relatively poor, very diverse (roughly a third Muslim), sneered at by wealthy Londoners, but quite content. It usually votes Labour but is also home to an extreme right party and to young jihadis who went to fight in Syria.

My neighbours have little interest in theoretical debates. Only a small minority now have a strong attachment to an ideological tradition in the way that trade unionists at the car plants here did back in the 1970s. Instead, they look at political parties with a sceptical eye and see if they might deliver some improvements to lives that are often hard.

They want to know whether there is a plausible route to good jobs – ideally higher paid and more secure. They want some care for old age. They want to be safe from crime. They are quite green though in a more amorphous way than in the big cities. They are patriotic. Although the town has many migrants – from Pakistan, Poland and the Middle East – they’re generally sceptical about the virtues of more migration. They voted for Brexit (unlike my metropolitan friends I was surprised the Brexit vote wasn’t higher). Most are fairly socially conservative but have also been swept up in the shifts of values of recent decades. They watch politics, if at all, partly as entertainment.

They are natural voters for progressive parties. But their allegiance is thin. Many like Boris Johnson even when they disagree with him. He seems authentic even in his dishonesties. And they appreciate his willingness to adopt a host of leftwing policies – regional equality, infrastructure spending, carbon neutrality. He has no real vision of the future. But neither do the other main parties.

The paper mentions the pride we take in the achievements of the Progressive Tradition and tries to identify the key elements of that tradition

  • Belief in unrealised potential

  • security as a precondition for the good life

  • peace – whether bullies at work or avoidance of conflict with other countries

  • being “part of nature” – which is one I would question and replace with a belief in progress which he elaborates thus -

…….a conviction that things can be better, that we have the power to shape our world and should not just accept the status quo as somehow natural. That means a belief that

  • ahead of us lies the possibility of longer and happier lives, of an end to oppression, exploitation and inequality.

  • we can, together, solve our most pressing problems. That we can unite divided and fractured societies and not take new divisions as inevitable.

That is the heart of the progressive promise, and often gets lost in compromise, everyday administration, the tyranny of the incremental. It’s vital to return to it and it provides the fuel for radicalism.

So, welfare policies have to address the new risks, not just the familiar ones of unemployment or physical ill-health: addressing needs for care in old age, mental as well as physical health, the needs of a precarious workforce for portable benefits. They need to offer practical answers to housing shortage and household debt, mobility and the governance of data. Many of these concern how we think about the economy. The traditional issues of economic policy – product markets, competition, macro policy, industrial policy – all matter, and it’s right to address the core DNA of capitalism, developing alternative ownership models (commons, mutuals, social enterprises and co-ops) and new accountability for firms.

But to be adequate to our times our economics has to be much broader, attentive to how the economy interacts with home life and family, ecosystems and communities. This was all squeezed out by the pragmatism of the 2000s and 2010s and left a gaping hole in our programmes, leaving parties as managers not mobilisers; curators of the status quo not transformers. Recent surveys show that half the population in many countries, including Germany, the US and UK, and 70% in France, believe the economic system needs “major changes” or “needs to be completely reformed”.

While on the subject of AI, I also liked the introduction to Algorithmic Reason – the new government of self and other; by C Aradau and T Blanke (2022)

This book has been a journey of several years, which has spanned multiple disciplines in the social sciences, humanities, and computing. It took us several years to make sense of how disciplines and approaches diverge in their diagnoses of what is at stake with big data, algorithms, machine learning, or artificial intelligence. Tracing the sinuous contours of different debates across disciplines has been an arduous, at times disorienting, but also rewarding task. It has required getting to grips with varied concepts and methods and attending to how words carry not just different meanings but work differently across disciplinary and intradisciplinary practices. This journey was partly made possible by the fact that both of us had previously traversed disciplines and worked with the ambiguities and tensions between these: Claudia from English and French to political science and then international relations; Tobias from political philosophy to computer science and then digital humanities. Our rather eclectic trajectories can perhaps explain the theoretical and methodological eclecticism of the book. Yet, this is not an eclecticism of ‘anything goes’, but one that has been fostered by controversies and contestations we have followed and by the commitment to take seriously actors who enter these dissensual scenes, whether engineers or activists, scientists or workers.

Other Useful Papers

The Case for exploratory social sciences; Mulgan 2021

Imagination Unleashed – democratising the knowledge economy; Unger, Mulgan 2019

Compendium of Innovation Methods (Nesta 2019)

Social Innivation – what it is, why it matters and how it can be accelerated

Mulgan et al 2007

How to run a city like Amazon and other fables ed M Graham et al (2019)

Wednesday, July 12, 2023

Have we lost our Collective Intelligence?

Once again a video has inspired a post – this time a conversation with Geoff Mulgan about his latest book “Another World is Possible - How to Reignite Social and Political Imagination (2022). Geoff Mulgan is a professor of collective intelligence and a Knight of the realm; a former CEO of Nesta and DEMOS think tank; Director of the government’s Strategy Unit and Head of Policy in the Prime Minister’s office. He is also the author of many books, including Big Mind – how collective intelligence can change our world (2018) which I’ve just started to read and which argues that -

... the world has made great strides in improving health and has accumulated an extraordinary amount of knowledge about it, yet still has a long way to go in orchestrating that knowledge to best effect.

Similar patterns can be found in many fields, from politics and business to personal life: unprecedented access to data, information, and opinions, but less obvious progress in using this information to guide better decisions. We benefit from a cornucopia of goods unimaginable to past generations, yet still too often spend money we haven’t earned to buy things we don’t need to impress people we don’t like. P13

For institutions, the rising importance of conscious collective intelligence is no less challenging, and demands a different view of boundaries and roles. Every organization needs to become more aware of how it observes, analyses, remembers, and creates, and then how it learns from action: correcting errors, sometimes creating new categories when the old ones don’t work, and sometimes developing entirely new ways of thinking.

Every organization has to find the right position between the silence and the noise: the silence of the old hierarchies in which no one dared to challenge or warn, and the noisy cacophony of a world of networks flooded by an infinity of voices. That space in between becomes meaningful only when organizations learn how to select and cluster with the right levels of granularity— simple enough but not simplistic; clear but not crude; focused but not to the extent of myopia. Few of our dominant institutions are adept at thinking in these ways. Businesses have the biggest incentives to act more intelligently, and invest heavily in hardware and software of all kinds. But whole sectors repeatedly make big mistakes, misread their environments, and harvest only a fraction of the know- how that’s available in their employees and customers.


Mulgan had rehearsed some of his arguments in a 2020 paper called The Imaginary Crisis and in this great interview a couple of years ago

One of the reasons I became interested in imagination recently was because perhaps 
there was a missing piece in the theories of change. In the past, one of the things which 
allowed change was people thinking ahead to a better possible society or utopia. And my 
worry is that that kind of imagination has almost disappeared.

Why is that?
People can picture a much worse world, with climate change, ecological catastrophe, robots 
taking over the world, populous demagogues. But very few people can give an articulate account 
of how the world might be better socially. What might our health care look like? Our primary 
schools, our libraries, our parliaments. And part of the reason is that the institutions which 
should be working on this imagination have largely vacated that space - political parties, 
universities, think tanks all for slightly different reasons. This has become part of a pathology 
of our time.

You have a very mixed background, working in government with Tony Blair, founding and 
running big think tanks like Demos and Nesta, teaching at university. What is your personal 
ambition in all of this?
I spent half of my career as an activist, from the grassroots upwards, starting at the age of 
14. I used to organize marches and pickets and I remained involved in community organizing 
and social entrepreneurship trying to find solutions from the bottom up. And I have spent 
the other half of my life working from the top down, with governments around the world, 
the European Commission or UN now. To some extent, nearly all change has to involve some 
alliance of the top down and the bottom up, the powerless and the powerful. I sometimes 
call them the bees and the trees – the people with the ideas and the big institutions with 
power. And, uh, money.

Where do you get your energy and optimism from?
I get some optimism from having seen how often you can transform things completely. 
The great lesson I have learned or relearned, again and again, is that we overestimate how much can change short term. But equally, most people underestimate how much can change over one, two or three decades. There is nothing worse than an unrealistic fatalism because it undermines the energy, the capacity to do the practical changes – which of course won't solve climate change in 2022, but actually over 20, 30 years. We will completely transform our economy and society.
How much of your job is to try to design options for the future?

One of the institutions that you want to challenge and change is the university – for 
THE NEW INSTITUTE you wrote a fascinating paper on what you call “exploratory 
social sciences.” Can you explain your argument?
I mainly focus on social sciences, it is a very different story for engineering and the other 
sciences. But in the social sciences, the fundamental question for an academic is: how much 
of your job is to understand the present and the past, and how much of your job is to try 
to design options for the future? Now in the 19th century, in the early days of social science,
 it was assumed you did both. The London School of Economics for example was very much 
formed as a place for academics to work on designing future health systems, welfare states 
et cetera – not just to write books and analyze what had gone wrong. Over the last 50 or 
60 years, academics have become quite fearful of designing the future. It is almost career 
threatening.

Why is that?
Some of this has to do with the rise of positivism and quantification, the in many ways quite 
welcome rise of attention to data, to empirical analysis, to looking at the facts. In many ways,
 this has been good. It has made for a much more rigorous understanding of the present 
and the past – but it squeezed out creativity and visions for an alternative future.

A scepticism vis-à-vis utopia or world-building?
There certainly was a disappointment with the grand ideological projects of the last century, 
which led a whole wave of intellectuals to move into critique rather than creative construction. 
It's a much safer place to be critiquing all that is wrong with capitalism rather than trying 
to propose alternatives to it. I believe there is a need to recover a bit of that older tradition 
of social science but align it to the best tools we have now, data and models and experiments 
– and learn methods from design and the arts and other fields, which do creativity as a matter 
of course.

Economics has been in many ways the leading social science of the last decades, and it 
has often pretended to be more than that, more like a hard science. What is your take on that?
Weirdly, economics has taken almost no methods from any other fields, including from business,
 in terms of its own creativity. There is a real intellectual narrow-mindedness, a lack of curiosity, 
lack of hunger at a time when creativity methods are so widely used in everything from 
film and design for products and services. My hope is that we will see university centers of 
exploratory social science, which try to be as good at rigor as they are at imagination. 
We have this paradoxical situation where the people with the deepest knowledge are not 
doing the creativity and vice versa – and hopefully THE NEW INSTITUTE can be part of 
changing that.
We need some really bold, radical thinking in this century

What is the politics in all of this? Traditionally, the left was aligned with the future, 
the right with preserving the status quo. This has shifted, in surprising ways, hasn’t it?
Traditionally, the conservative right was skeptical of any designs for the future because 
by definition what exists has been tried through history. For a time, that changed, left and 
right swapped places. A lot of conservatives became almost more utopian than the left. 
They pictured a future run by markets, supported by technologies, with a slightly crazed 
enthusiasm. In the last 20 years, they have returned back to a much more traditional conservative 
position, with nostalgic pictures of race and community and manufacturing-based economies.

And the left?
The left is still in a rather fearful state – a political fear of being exposed by having 
genuinely novel, genuinely challenging ideas. You are much more likely to make it as a public 
intellectual by reviving old ideas rather than coming up with new ones. Which is pretty disappointing.
 Because we need some really bold, radical thinking in this century if we are going to cope 
with climate change, with AI, with the threats to democracy. And our intellectuals are not 
serving us that well.

You explore a few tools and methods in your paper to get to that point where the 
new can happen: experimentation, complexity thinking, design. How can we unleash 
our societal imagination?
Extension is an example, you can use it for almost any phenomenon – like re-imagining your 
local library or childcare. Then you go through a series of transformations. What would 
happen if you extended one aspect of it radically, the way that we have extended ideas of 
rights to cover everything from animals to transgender. There is also inversion: What happens 
if the farmers become bankers or patients become doctors? Or grafting: You take an idea 
from a very different field and try and apply it to your library or your childcare.

What is the next step?
That is just the starting point. Then the deep knowledge comes in. You have to think about 
building your world, your designs, and see how plausible they are, what might be an evolutionary 
route for them. The challenge is to find a balance between the willingness to leap ahead 
and jump beyond what is realistic now to what might be possible in 20 years. And not to 
fall prey to what I call unrealistic realism.

What does that mean?
It is striking that many academic disciplines are very good at explaining why change won't 
happen. And when it does come, they have no way of explaining why it did happen because 
they hold on to their unrealistic realism. And at the same time avoiding fantasy, illusion, 
ideas which have absolutely no plausible prospect of ever happening. I would like to see in 
universities cross-disciplinary teams becoming good at creating these alternative worlds, 
interrogating them, seeing what their implications are, what their economic base might be, 
the legitimacy of them.

Imagination as practice.
Every society needs some sense of where it might be headed in the future in order to be 
healthy, just as we do as individuals. We need some shared pictures of where we could be 
headed 30, 50, 70 years into the future, pictures which aren't only ecological disasters 
or technological determinist triumphs. That's the missing space in our collective imaginaries 
which we really need to address. Because the downside is that all sorts of other dark forces 
may fill that space instead.