what you get here

This is not a blog which opines on current events. It rather uses incidents, books (old and new), links and papers to muse about our social endeavours.
So old posts are as good as new! And lots of useful links!

The Bucegi mountains - the range I see from the front balcony of my mountain house - are almost 120 kms from Bucharest and cannot normally be seen from the capital but some extraordinary weather conditions allowed this pic to be taken from the top of the Intercontinental Hotel in late Feb 2020

Saturday, November 23, 2019

My role in the Networking of society

Niall Ferguson is not normally an author whose imperialist histories would interest me but I hadn’t heard of his latest (?) title The Square and the Tower – networks and power from the Freemasons to Facebook (2018) and was intrigued to find out what a historian had to say about networks – particularly when its intro brought back memories of my own involvement in the early days of the “networked society”.

“The Square and the Tower” claims to present “a new historical narrative, in which major changes—dating back to the Age of Discovery and the Reformation, if not earlier—can be understood, in essence, as disruptive challenges to established hierarchies by networks.”
Social networks “have always been much more important in history than most historians, fixated as they have been on hierarchical organizations such as states, have allowed,” and never more so than in modern times.

The first “networked era” followed the introduction of the printing press in Europe in the late fifteenth century.

The intervening period, from the late 1790s until the late 1960s, saw the opposite trend: hierarchical institutions re-established their control and successfully shut down or co-opted networks. The zenith of hierarchically organized power was in fact the mid-twentieth century—the era of totalitarian regimes and total wars.

And, we might add, of large corporations such as General Motors…
The second such era—our own—dates, according to Ferguson, from the 1970s, and the pace of change has accelerated along with new communication technologies. A review in the New York Review of Books tells us that -

Niall Ferguson believes that until recently networks have been neglected by historians, who prefer to study institutions that leave well-preserved and accessible archives. He confesses that he has only recently come to appreciate that his own books “were also books about
networks.”
For many years the British-born financial historian, chronicler of the Rothschild banks, television broadcaster, and prolific journalist had been “casual” in the way he thought about networks. When writing about the career of Sigmund Warburg, he had in his mind’s eye “a vague diagram that connected Warburg to other members of the German-Jewish business elite through various ties of kinship, business and ‘elective affinity.’”

Yet it did not occur to Ferguson to “think in a rigorous way about that network.” He had yet to adopt “formal network analysis.” This book, he writes, “is an attempt to atone for those sins of omission.”

Alvin Toffler’s Future Shock was amazingly prescient in 1970 about what the winds of technical change were about to bring; and Marilyn Ferguson’s The Aquarian Conspiracy (1981) confirmed this. Both books repay close study…..

I had become a community activist in the late 1960s - inspired by Saul Alinsky’s Reveille for Radicals which was, astonishingly, written in 1946 but became a bible for activists during the American War on Poverty of the 1960s.
My elevation in 1971 to the chair of a new social work agency which had been given an important preventive role by the Labour government of 1964-70 gave me a profile at a Scottish level – to which I owed my selection in 1974 to one of the top positions in the new Strathclyde Region covering half of Scotland’s 5 million people.  The “Born to Fail?” report exposing the scale of poverty in the West of Scotland had appeared the previous year - and a few of us managed to make this issue the central strategic one for the massive new Region.

The research project I referred to earlier was managed by a branch of the famous Tavistock Institute (one which, perhaps curiously, deal with operational research) and very much focused on the negotiations which took place as the Region initiated rounds of discussion not only with its own departments such as Police, Education and Social Work but the housing authorities, health boards and even universities and teacher training bodies – in an effort to try to gain support for a new social justice strategy which brought citizen activists together with officials and politicians (and local budgets) to determine a better future .
I’ve described this work in Case Study in Organisational Development and Political Amnesia – and am pleased to say that the Scottish government continues this work to this day…..

Networks have primarily been of interest to sociologists – with sociometrics mapping the influence of key individuals in systems and Manuel Castells being the guru of the subject with his writing about “the network society”. But economists such as Paul Ormerod have also been active – with his Positive Linking – how networks are revolutionising your world (2011)
Although the management of change became very popular in the 1980s and 1990s – as you can see from this Annotated Bibliography for change agents I did on the subject - it was 2000 before a little book The Tipping Point by journalist Malcolm Gladwell made everyone fully appreciate the significance of networks and the different roles played in the diffusion of fashionable products or ideas….You can read the book in full here

In the next post, I’ll have a look at how other intellectual disciplines such as political science have tried to deal with the idea of networks

Sunday, November 17, 2019

More surveillance - less capitalism

Shoshana Zuboff is a highly respected academic who has been investigating the effects of information technology on the worlds of work and, latterly, of our social being for at least 30 years – from a sociological/ethnographic perspective.
Her first book In the Age of the Smart Machine – the future of work and power (1988) made such an impact on me that I can actually remember where I read it (in my Glasgow office) all of 30 years ago.
The future of work had become an  issue of deep concern since Charles Handy’s book of that title, published in 1984 -  the year which gave many the opportunity to reflect on how  Orwell’s “1984” had panned out, compared, for example, with Huxley’s Brave New World - although it was the following year before the phrase “the surveillance society” was coined. And almost a decade later before we saw a proper study -  The Electronic Society – the rise of surveillance society; David Lyon (1994)

Zuboff’s next book was published in 2002, written with her husband J Maxmin (a progressive CEO of an engineering company) and carried the title The Support Economy – why corporations are failing individuals and the next version of capitalism (2002) whose purpose she explains here

So her new, large, sprawling and highly-acclaimed book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism – the fight for a human future at the new frontier of power completes a trilogy of books on this subject. She may not have invented the phrase “surveillance capitalism” (John Bellamy Foster had an important article with that title in July 2014) – but she has, in recent years, become one of the key “go-to” academics for journalists wanting to understand the sort of world being created by companies such as Google, Facebook and Amazon.

And the picture she paints is a pretty devastating one – all the more powerful because her patient note-taking exposes the business practices of companies which are highly secretive. Zuboff outlines, for example, six astonishing principles which Google famously let slip on one occasion to justify its strategy.

·       “We claim human experience as raw material free for the taking. On the basis of this claim, we can ignore considerations of individuals’ rights, interests, awareness, or comprehension.
·       On the basis of our claim, we assert the right to take an individual’s experience for translation into behavioural data.
·       Our right to take, based on our claim of free raw material, confers the right to own the behavioural data derived from human experience.
·       Our rights to take and to own confer the right to know what the data disclose.
·       Our rights to take, to own, and to know confer the right to decide how we use our knowledge.
·       Our rights to take, to own, to know, and to decide confer our rights to the conditions that preserve our rights to take, to own, to know, and to decide”
(p179)

I’ve said enough, I think, to indicate that I have a very high respect for this academic who has devoted 30 years of her life to a painstaking analysis of the nature and effects of the new technologies.
But be warned that this latest book of hers suffers from several large flaws –
-       It is extraordinarily badly-written
-       It completely lacks a framework to warrant the claim in the title to be about “capitalism”

It’s never easy to prove bad writing but readers are helped when they can clearly see the subject and object of a sentence ie who does what to whom. Writing is bad when sentences are cluttered by long qualifying diversions; adjectives piled on one another; and unusual words introduced. Zuboff is guilty of all three.   
Her 525 pages of actual text could have been easily reduced in half with judicious editing – of the sort which Steven Pinker suggests in The Sense of Style – a thinking person’s guide to writing in the 21st century which I explored in this 2014 post

Even more serious is the charge made by this political economics blogger that the book lacks proper scholarship. The post refers to the book’s longest (at 22 pages) review – by enfant terrible Efgeny Morozov but concentrates its argument on an exposition of why scholarship is important -

Academic writing works on a formula. There are a certain number of things you have to do in order to prove that your work is legitimate and worthy of attention.
- You have to show how you connect with the larger, ongoing conversation in your area of interest.
- You have to present your evidence carefully.
- You have to show the framework you used to conduct your analysis.

Missing these steps is a signal that there are very likely problems with the work in question, but the steps are also important in their own right: they’re necessary in order to construct a sound argument, and not just a lawyer’s brief.
“The Age of Surveillance Capitalism” has problems on all three accounts. Taken together, they help to explain, or maybe contextualize, the blind spots that Morozov noted in his essay.

The post is worth reading in detail since it suggests that Zuboff’s book commits four serious sins against good scholarship –
-       Exaggerated claims to novelty
-       Absence of relevant literature references - particularly on "capitalism"!! A failing on which readers know I'm a bit of a pedant
-       Unclear framework
-       hyperbole

Certainly the 130 pages of detailed bibliographical references Zuboff offers simply alienates the average reader. What the book is crying out for is a short, annotated literature review…

Reviews of the Book (including interviews)
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/20/shoshana-zuboff-age-of-surveillance-capitalism-google-facebook; the Guardian’s IT correspondent explains the significance of the book and asks the author 10 questions
https://newleftreview.org/issues/II121/articles/rob-lucas-the-surveillance-business - a clear 10 page review (apart from the last couple of pages) which usefully shows how Zuboff’s perception of capitalism has dramatically changed over the past 30 years
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/04/09/bigger-brother-surveillance-capitalism/ which makes my point about the book’s appalling style and jargon but forgives it for the emphasis it gives to power
https://bryanalexander.org/tag/zuboff/ book club assessment of most chapters
https://twit.tv/shows/triangulation/episodes/380 – hour long interview with editor of IT journal which allows Zuboff to explain the book
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jacc.13051; helpful 10 pages summary of the key arguments presented in the book. Probably the most thorough and readable review – if a bit uncritical
https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/13238/8503; great interview with the people from the Canadian Surveillance Centre people which helps us understand why Zuboff crafted the book the way she did.
https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/13126/8502; a short critical review of the book which considers it adds little to what we already knew. Bit too academic and envious….
http://mediatheoryjournal.org/review-shoshana-zuboffs-the-age-of-surveillance-capitalism-by-william-morgan/; an academic communications journal offers a typically tortuously-written assessment which makes little sense
https://thebaffler.com/latest/capitalisms-new-clothes-morozov; the field’s enfant terrible puts the book in context and explores its gaps (20 pages)
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/thieves-of-experience-how-google-and-facebook-corrupted-capitalism/; a very clear and jargon-free analysis (which also notes the stylistic infelicities) from one of the field’s specialists
http://www.michaeljkramer.net/fall-2016-course-the-computerized-society/; useful to see the list of recommended reading for a course on the “US digitised culture”
https://thoughtmaybe.com/topic/surveillance/; a documentary site shares its videos on the surveillance theme.
https://prospect.org/power/how-neoliberal-policy-shaped-internet-surveillance-monopoly/ good overview of key issues
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/17/google-workers-rights-coding-chrome-unions

Sunday, October 27, 2019

For new readers

The clocks went back an hour during the night – as they did ten years ago as I was starting this blog which then bore the name of “Carpathian Musings”.
Blogs are unusual in beginning …. with the author’s latest thoughts – random and unsystematised.
But we are used to books having a clear logic to their structure – which is why, a few years back, I decided to produce an annual version of the posts. The masthead, after all, clearly states that 
“old posts are as good as new” 

and that readers should not expect the blog to offer “instant opinions on current events”    

Four years ago I started the habit of doing a bit of prior editing of the year’s posts for their annual edition; and last year they had more of a thematic structure…..for the first time, they departed (a bit) from their usual chronological order. And this more obviously seems this year a good idea - since there have been so many posts about Brexit…..I will therefore be working on that in the next few weeks.

In the meantime, however, I offer the present version of the 2019 posts as they currently stand – all 220 pages - starting in January. 
For new readers, this will show you what you have been missing!
I still have to think of a title….

Saturday, October 26, 2019

A Rare example of inter-disciplinarity

Readers know how distasteful I find the ever-increasing narrowness of academic disciplines. The very second post this year's blog posed a question which has bothered me for years –  

Why so little energy seems to be spent attempting to get consensus on the way forward for the deficiencies which have been so visible over the past decade in the economic system which we know, variously, as “globalization” or, increasingly, as “capitalism”.
The UN had its fingers burned when, in 2009, it organized the first and only Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis. The G77 group of 130 developing countries tried to insert text that mandated a major role for the UN in dealing with the crisis and backed a comprehensive set of reforms, but northern countries including the US and the EU played a blocking game. Joseph Stiglitz was the author of what remained a Preliminary Report

That post praised the Club of Rome for having the courage to produce Come On! Capitalism, short-termism, population and the destruction of the planet; (Club of Rome 2018) -  superbly summarized in this article in the fascinating Cadmus journal. And went on to say that I understood the reluctance of professionals to get engaged in such work – knowing how aggressively they would be accused of “leftism”, “populism”… and even greater crimes….

I am, of course, aware of The Great Transition Initiative which encourages individuals to comment on a monthly question and paper. It’s perhaps only nerds that me who read it – but at least it is reaching out to form a network…
The Next System is also a good source of well-written material - project of the US Democracy Collaborative. It had an initial report – The Next System Report – political possibilities for the 21st Century (2015) and references to good community practice in various parts of the world. It has since followed up with a series of worthwhile papers.

But, thanks to the current issue of the journal Political Quarterly, I have just learned of a very worthwhile endeavour called The International Panel for Social Progress (IPSP) - a bottom–up initiative launched by a group of researchers from different disciplines, whose first congress was held in 2015 in Istanbul.
While its basic structure and operational principles are similar to those of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), its remit is rather different. The aim of the IPSP is to

‘harness the competence of hundreds of experts about social issues’ and ‘to deliver a report addressed to all social actors, movements, organizations, politicians and decision-makers, in order to provide them with the best expertise on questions that bear on social change’.

It may not offer an agenda for change - but it does something which is actually even more important - it offers an impartial and wide-ranging picture of social, economic and technical trends as you are likely to get from any other single source. 
The IPSP is not the first panel to analyse social and economic issues of pressing relevance. Various international organisations regularly monitor, for example, labour market conditions (ILO), or the dynamics of inequality and poverty (World Bank), or social inclusion, across the globe (UN Sustainable Goals). But the IPSP

does not just talk the talk when it comes to interdisciplinarity, it actually provides a shining example of what social scientists can do when they pool their skills, freely crossing disciplinary boundaries and combining quantitative analysis and qualitative approaches.

You can download and read the Executive Summary as well as each chapter here -

Part I deals with socio-economic transformations, focusing on economic inequalities, growth and environmental issues, urbanisation, capitalist institutions of markets, corporations and finance, labour, concluding with a reflection on how economic organization determines wellbeing and social justice. Here is its chapter on social trends

Part II focusses on political issues, analyzing the current trends in democracy and the rule of law, the forms and resolutions of situations of violence and conflicts, the mixed efficacy of supranational institutions and organisations, as well as the multiple forms of global governance, and the important role for democracy of media and communications. It concludes with a chapter on the challenges to democracy raised by inequalities, and the various ways in which democracy can be rejuvenated.

Part III is devoted to transformations in cultures and values, focussing on cultural trends linked to ‘modernisation’ and its pit-falls, as well as globalisation, the complex relationship between religions and social progress, the promises and challenges in ongoing transformations in family structures and norms, trends and policy issues regarding health and life–death issues, the ways in which education can contribute to social progress  and finally, the important values of solidarity and belonging.

The report offers a refreshingly balanced view of the state of social progress and the perspectives for change. It embraces neither a ‘doom and gloom’ perspective, nor neoliberal optimism. Societies do face significant problems, and the report hides none of them: inequalities are reaching unprecedented levels; in large parts of the world human development shows no signs of improvement; corporations are becoming increasingly powerful; automation leads to the disappearance of good jobs in a number of sectors; low-intensity violent conflicts show no sign of decrease throughout the world; liberal democracies are facing major challenges.

Reading, or even approaching, a scientific report consisting of three volumes, with a total of 850 pages and written by a panel of more than 260 authors, certainly looks like adaunting task. One is tempted to give up without even trying. And yet, such a first impression would be misleading. Not only is this an important contribution summarizing an impressive intellectual endeavour, it is also a genuinely interesting and engaging read.

Friday, October 25, 2019

The “Light” that Failed

Communism was, of course, for that special generation of Western intellectuals from the 1930s-1950s “the God that failed” and there is indeed an entire book with that name, published in 1949, with contributions from Arthur Koestler, Andre Gide, Richard Crossman and Stephen Spender.
The last post may have borne the same title – but the God in this case who has disappointed the region in which I live – at least according to the title of “the long read” in yesterday’s The Guardian - is not Communism but Liberalism.
It was, typically, a long post which took some time to reach its point since I found Krastev and Holmes’ 2018 article Explaining Eastern Europe – imitation and its discontents a much more satisfactory analysis than the Guardian “long read” with which I had started the post.

Let me therefore try to summarise what I found the three most original and important points of that analysis – and remember I have lived in the countries concerned for the entire 30 years period (apart from the first year – and the 7 years I spent in central Asia).
I will then explore briefly the question whether Liberalism has indeed failed the wider region.

- 1. The newer members of the EU feel their inferior status. When, a couple of years ago, a friend used the term “colonial”, I resisted it but I now realise he was right both literally (in a scale of economic takeover which is nothing short of exploitative) and in the extent to which they have had to comply with EU legislation. As a consultant I was very aware of the utter insensitivity of my colleagues with their perceptions of “best practice” – in which the EU systems were as much as fault as the individual arrogances….I don’t think outsiders can begin to understand how much this has hurt proud and well-educated people    

The imitator’s life inescapably produces feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, dependency, lost identity, and involuntary insincerity. Indeed, the futile struggle to create a truly credible copy of an idealized model involves a never-ending torment of self-criticism if not self-contempt.

What makes imitation so irksome is not only the implicit assumption that the mimic is somehow morally and humanly inferior to the model. It also entails the assumption that central and eastern Europe’s copycat nations accept the West’s right to evaluate their success or failure at living up to Western standards.

- 2. Krastev and Holmes, secondly, explore what the expectations were in the beginning, emphasising the importance of the word “Normality” – and how these have changed….

If, in the immediate aftermath of 1989, ‘normality’ was understood largely in political terms (free elections, separation of powers, private property, and the right to travel), during the last decade normality has increasingly come to be interpreted in cultural terms of identity – racial and sexual and of multiculturalism. 
As a result, Central and East Europeans are becoming mistrustful and resentful of norms coming from the West. Ironically, eastern Europe is now starting to view itself as the last bastion of genuine European values.

There’s a parallel (of a sort) with the Brits who feel that they joined in 1973 a “Common Market” or economic union which, as the European Union, has developed into something very different…

- 3. A Very different “Open society”. Perhaps no phrase has changed its meaning within a decade as greatly as this one

In 1989, the open society meant a promise of freedom, above all a freedom to do what had been previously forbidden, namely to travel to the West. 
Today, openness to the world, for large swaths of the central and eastern European electorate, connotes not freedom but danger: immigrant invasion, depopulation (by scale of emigration of their country’s qualified young professionals), and loss of national sovereignty.

We rarely hear the voice of ordinary people in this sort of geo-political analysis but
Aftershock – a journey into Eastern Europe’s Forgotten Dreams 2017) is based on interviews with people the author, young American journalist John Feffer, met in the early 90s and then, 25 years later, went back to interview. The interviews can actually be accessed here   

But let me return to the question of whether it is Liberalism that has failed the central and eastern Europeans…..
It has become quite fashionable to argue against liberalism – I first noticed this some five years ago and the trend has intensified recently with books such as “Why Liberalism Failed

My argument in the 90s was that it was neo-liberalism which was the false god – with bodies like the World Bank pushing for the minimal state
Certainly “conditionality” was always a demeaning relationship for a country to have with bodies such as the EU, the IMF and the World Bank but I have to say I saw it at the time as a not unreasonable process - and was therefore struck with this section of the Krastev and Holmes article -

Thus the rise of authoritarian chauvinism and xenophobia in Central and Eastern Europe has its roots not in political theory, but in political psychology. It reflects a deep-seated disgust at the post-1989 “imitation imperative,” with all its demeaning and humiliating implications. [End Page 118]
The origins of the region’s current illiberalism are emotional and pre-ideological, rooted in rebellion at the humiliations that must necessarily accompany a project requiring acknowledgment of a foreign culture as superior to one’s own. Illiberalism in a strictly theoretical sense, then, is largely a cover story. It lends a patina of intellectual respectability to a desire, widely shared at a visceral level, to shake off the colonial dependency implicit in the very project of Westernization.

This is indeed a fascinating argument – if not quite an attack on Liberalism in itself. Its focus on psychology actually reminds me of the Romanian tutor, Zevedei BarbuI had at University in 1963/64 who had written “Democracy and Dictatorship – their psychology and patterns of life” (1956) a book whose three parts were entitled “The psychology of Democracy”, “The psychology of Nazism” and “The psychology of communism” respectively. This must have made use of Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality (1950) one of the first of a stream of books produced in the immediate post-war period to try to make sense of the power of the totalitarian model eg Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and JT Talmon’s The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy(1952). They were all required reading on the small Political Sociology class I took under Barbu who had defected in 1948 from the Romanian Legation in London (despite being an avowed communist who spent a couple of years in prison for the cause). He was a great teacher – it was he who introduced me to Weber, Durkheim and Tonnies – let alone Michels and Pareto – all of whose insights still resonate with me.

It’s an interesting reflection on our individualistic and egocentric times which have seen such a huge expansion in psychological book titles that such political psychology seems to have disappeared?
Except they haven’t – but they’ve morphed their focus into studies of left and right voting behaviour if Haidt’s “The Righteous Mind” and Lakoff’s “Moral Politics” are anything to go by.
Rather different from studies of the authoritarian personality!
Or, indeed, from the writings of Daniel Bell, Christopher Lasch or Richard Sennett about whom I wrote recently

background reading
1989 at 30; an interesting 30 page essay which focuses a bit too much on the earlier period
A recent (and rare) global history of the area
A famous English historian living in California offers useful insights on a younger one let loose in central europe
interview with Krastev -

Thursday, October 24, 2019

The God that failed – in central Europe

In just a couple of weeks it will be the 30th anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall – with the precise date of any single country’s “liberation” from communism varying according to local events. Here in Romania it will be partly the Timisoara protests of early December but you can actually witness for yourself the dramatic collapse of the regime two and half minutes into this video of the supportive demonstration of 21 December 1989 which had been organised for Ceausescu. The trial and summary execution of the Ceausescu couple on 24 December stirs uneasy memories in the country.

What celebrations there are in the region as a whole will be somewhat muted – with at least one academic conference taking place in Prague in mid-December with a range of topics for discussion.
The trigger for today’s post was an excerpt from one of what may be an avalanche of books about the extent to which the past 30 years have realised (or not) the hopes and fears of the citizens of central and eastern Europe.
The new book is called The Light that Failed – a reckoning and has two highly qualified authors – Ivan Krastev, a high-profile Bulgarian political scientist based in Vienna and his own Think Tank in Sofia, and Stephen Holmes, professor political science and law and specialist in liberalism and post-communism their arguments got a preview in an article in last year's "Journal of Democracy"
This excerpt is a useful intro -

In the first years after 1989, liberalism was generally associated with the ideals of individual opportunity, freedom to move and to travel, unpunished dissent, access to justice and government responsiveness to public demands.
By 2010, the central and eastern European versions of liberalism had been indelibly tainted by two decades of rising social inequality, pervasive corruption and the morally arbitrary redistribution of public property into the hands of small number of people. The economic crisis of 2008 had bred a deep distrust of business elites and the casino capitalism that, writ large, almost destroyed the world financial order
……
Focusing on the corruption and deviousness of illiberal governments in the region will not help us understand the sources of popular support for national populist parties. The origins of populism are undoubtedly complex. But they partly lie in the humiliations associated with the uphill struggle to become, at best, an inferior copy of a superior model.
Discontent with the “transition to democracy” in the post-communist years was also inflamed by visiting foreign “evaluators” who had little grasp of local realities. These experiences combined to produce a nativist reaction in the region, a reassertion of “authentic” national traditions allegedly suffocated by ill-fitting western forms. The post-national liberalism associated with EU enlargement allowed aspiring populists to claim exclusive ownership of national traditions and national identity.
The wave of anti-liberalism sweeping over central Europe today reflects widespread popular resentment at the perceived slights to national and personal dignity that this palpably sincere reform-by-imitation project entailed……

Almost a year ago I had a series of posts which tried to do justice to feelings in Romania after almost 30 years

- the so-called “revolution” of 1989 was nothing of the sort – just a takeover by the old-guard masquerading in the costumes of the market economy and democracy
- Which, after 30 years, has incubated a new anomie – with the “mass” and “social” media dominating people’s minds
- So-called “European integration” has destroyed Romanian agriculture and industry - and drained the country of 4 million talented young Romanians
- After 30 years, there is not a single part of the system – economic, political, religious, cultural, voluntary – which offers any real prospect of positive change
- Even Brussels seems to have written the country off
- The country is locked into a paralysis of suspicion, distrust, consumerism, apathy, anomie
- No one is calling for a new start – let alone demonstrating the potential for realistic alliances

But I think Krastev and Holmes are right to emphasise the psychological aspects of the humiliation involved in having to copy a foreign model. This is actually better explained in an article of theirs earlier this year in the Eurozine journal.

The process was called by different names – democratization, liberalization, enlargement, convergence, integration, Europeanization – but the goal pursued by post-communist reformers was simple. They wished their countries to become ‘normal’, which meant like the West. This involved importing liberal-democratic institutions, applying western political and economic recipes, and publicly endorsing western values. Imitation was widely understood to be the shortest pathway to freedom and prosperity.
Pursuing economic and political reform by imitating a foreign model, however, turned out to have steeper moral and psychological downsides than many had originally expected.
The imitator’s life inescapably produces feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, dependency, lost identity, and involuntary insincerity. Indeed, the futile struggle to create a truly credible copy of an idealized model involves a never-ending torment of self-criticism if not self-contempt.

What makes imitation so irksome is not only the implicit assumption that the mimic is somehow morally and humanly inferior to the model. It also entails the assumption that central and eastern Europe’s copycat nations accept the West’s right to evaluate their success or failure at living up to Western standards.
In this sense, imitation comes to feel like a loss of sovereignty.
Thus, the rise of authoritarian chauvinism and xenophobia in central and eastern Europe has its roots not in political theory, but in political psychology. It reflects a deep-seated disgust at the post-1989 ‘imitation imperative’, with all its demeaning and humiliating implications.

And Krastev and Holmes’ Eurozine article goes on make a second crucial point of huge cultural significance –

In the eyes of conservative Poles in the days of the Cold War, western societies were normal because, unlike communist systems, they cherished tradition and believed in God. Then suddenly Poles discovered that western ‘normality’ today means secularism, multiculturalism and gay marriage. Should we be surprised that Poles and their neighbours felt ‘cheated’ when they found out that the society they wanted to imitate had disappeared, washed away by the swift currents of modernization?

If, in the immediate aftermath of 1989, ‘normality’ was understood largely in political terms (free elections, separation of powers, private property, and the right to travel), during the last decade normality has increasingly come to be interpreted in cultural terms. As a result, Central and East Europeans are becoming mistrustful and resentful of norms coming from the West. Ironically, as we shall see below, eastern Europe is now starting to view itself as the last bastion of genuine European values.

In order to reconcile the idea of ‘normal’ (meaning what is widespread at home) with what is normatively obligatory in the countries they aim to imitate, eastern Europeans consciously or unconsciously have begun to ‘normalize’ the model countries, arguing that what is widespread in the East is also prevalent in the West, even though westerners hypocritically pretend that their societies are different. Eastern Europeans often relieve their normative dissonance – say, between paying bribes to survive in the East and fighting corruption to be accepted in the West – by concluding that the West is really just as corrupt as the East, but westerners are simply in denial and hiding the truth.

There is a third and even more powerful reason why the Eurozine article tells the story better. And that is because it emphasises that recent events have utterly transformed our emotional response to the phrase “open society” -

The dominant storyline of the illiberal counterrevolution in central and eastern Europe is encapsulated in the inversion of the meaning of the idea of an ‘open society’. In 1989, the open society meant a promise of freedom, above all a freedom to do what had been previously forbidden, namely to travel to the West. Today, openness to the world, for large swaths of the central and eastern European electorate, connotes not freedom but danger: immigrant invasion, depopulation, and loss of national sovereignty.

The refugee crisis of 2015 brought the region’s brewing revolt against individualism and universalism to a head. What central and eastern Europeans realized in the course of the refugee crisis was that, in our connected but unequal world, migration is the most revolutionary revolution of them all. The twentieth-century revolt of the masses is a thing of the past. We are now facing a twenty-first-century revolt of the migrants. Undertaken anarchically, not by organized revolutionary parties but by millions of disconnected individuals and families, this revolt faces no collective-action problems. It is inspired not by ideologically coloured pictures of a radiant, imaginary future, but by glossy photos of life on the other side of the border.

Hungary and Poland seem at the moment the only countries to be pursuing a strong agenda of illiberalism which have transgressed EU standards of Rule of Law – although both Bulgarian and Romanian judicial systems remain under the aegis an annual cooperation and verification system which has indeed just reported.
But the combination of an ageing population, low birth rates and an unending stream of emigration is arguably the source of demographic panic in central and eastern Europe.

Anxiety about immigration is fomented by a fear that supposedly unassimilable foreigners will enter the country, dilute national identity and weaken national cohesion. This fear, in turn, is fuelled by a largely unspoken preoccupation with demographic collapse. In the period 1989–2017, Latvia haemorrhaged 27% of its population, Lithuania 22.5%, and Bulgaria almost 21%. In Romania, 3.4 million people, a vast majority of them younger than 40, left the country after it joined the EU in 2007.
More central and eastern Europeans left their countries for western Europe as a result of the 2008-9 financial crises than all the refugees that came there as the result of the war in Syria.

The extent of post-1989 emigration from eastern and central Europe, awakening fears of national disappearance, helps explain the deeply hostile reaction across the region to the refugee crisis of 2015-16, even though very few refugees have relocated to the countries of the region. We might even hypothesise that anti-immigration politics in a region essentially without immigrants is an example of what some psychologists call displacement – a defence mechanism by which, in this case, minds unconsciously blot out a wholly unacceptable threat and replace it with one still serious but conceivably easier to manage. Hysteria about non-existent immigrants about to overrun the country represents the substitution of an illusory danger (immigration) for the real danger (depopulation and demographic collapse) that cannot speak its name……..

To protect this besieged majority’s fragile dominance from the insidious alliance of Brussels and Africa, the argument goes, Europeans need to replace the watery individualism and universalism foisted on them by liberals with a muscular identity politics or group particularism of their own. 

This is the logic with which Orbán and the leader of PiS in Poland, Jarosław Kaczyński, have tried to inflame the inner xenophobic nationalism of their countrymen. The ultimate revenge of the central and eastern European populists against western liberalism is not merely to reject the idea of imitating the west, but to invert it. We are the real Europeans, Orbán and Kaczyński repeatedly claim, and if the west wants to save itself, it will have to imitate the east.