what you get here

This is not a blog which opines on current events. It rather uses incidents, books (old and new), links and papers to muse about our social endeavours.
So old posts are as good as new! And lots of useful links!

The Bucegi mountains - the range I see from the front balcony of my mountain house - are almost 120 kms from Bucharest and cannot normally be seen from the capital but some extraordinary weather conditions allowed this pic to be taken from the top of the Intercontinental Hotel in late Feb 2020

Friday, August 21, 2026

ON SOCIALISM

 

The Making of British Socialism Mark Bevir (2011)

Chapter 1 Introduction: Socialism and History 1

Chapter 2 The Victorian Context 22

Part One: The Marxists 43

Chapter 3 Ernest Belfort Bax 45

Chapter 4 Henry Mayers Hyndman 65

Chapter 5 William Morris 85

Chapter 6 The Social Democratic Federation 106

Part Two: The Fabians 129

Chapter 7 Theories of Rent 131

Chapter 8 George Bernard Shaw 152

Chapter 9 Sidney Webb 173

Chapter 10 Permeation and Independent Labor 195

Part Three: The Ethical Socialists 215

Chapter 11 Welfarism, Socialism, and Religion 217

Chapter 12 American Romanticism and British Socialism 235

Chapter 13 Ethical Anarchism 256

Chapter 14 The Labour Church Movement 278

Conclusion

Socialism, Labor, and the State 298

This book has been a long time in the making. I first began working on the history of British socialism in the late 1980s. Back then, Margaret Thatcher’s governments loomed large over my political world. Critics portrayed socialism as a discredited statist ideology. Even socialists sometimes implied that it was an outdated class-based ideology. Yet, I wanted to recapture the diversity of socialism and thereby find inspiration for a radical democratic and transformative politics that rejected market individualism for egalitarian fellowship. I thought British socialists needed a new narrative with which to respond to neoliberalism. One reason this book has been so long in the making is that in the 1990s the Labour Party provided just such a narrative. New Labour presented itself as adhering to historic socialist “ends” while adopting new “means.” The old socialist “means” had allegedly been made irrelevant by the rise of new times. The advancement of socialism now supposedly required supply-side economics, capacity building, and networks and partnerships delivering services. Although I was impressed by the energy and vigor of the New Labour project, its narrative and politics were not what I had had in mind. I got distracted from the history of British socialism by the desire to come to terms with its present.

The reader will find that this book still echoes my early aim of providing a more diverse portrait of socialism. Socialism has never been just about class-based politics and state intervention. It has never been the caricature depicted by Mrs. Thatcher; nor has it been the preserve of the Labour Party and its leaders. On the contrary, British socialism has always included radical democratic, pluralist, and utopian strands. Many socialists have promoted nongovernmental visions of personal and social transformation. They have envisaged more simple and cooperative ways of life.

I hope this book will help to correct widespread misconceptions about the history and nature of socialism. I also hope that it will contribute, even if only ever-so slightly, to attempts to forge more fulfilling ways of living with one another and the natural world of which we are part.

Why You Should be a Socialist Nathan Robinson (2019)

In Part I, we will discuss how examining the world honestly and humanely produces a “socialistic instinct,” one that is frustrated by unnecessary injustices and unsatisfied with popular rationalizations of those injustices. We’ll use that instinct to examine the world and try to understand precisely what features of contemporary political and economic systems are so revolting to the left sensibility. We’ll also clear away some of the tempting myths advanced by defenders of free markets and social hierarchies.

Next, in Part II, I will talk about how that basic moral instinct can help us formulate a particular set of socialist principles—valuing solidarity, equality, and freedom. Then I will look at the long and honorable tradition of socialist thinking, paying particular attention to libertarian socialism and the great socialists of the United States. After that, I’ll talk explicitly about the kind of vision and ambition that these principles produce, laying out some of the utopian ideals that are worth thinking about. Then, we’ll get into some of the frustrating terminological discussions about socialism, democratic socialism, libertarian socialism, social democracy, liberalism, etcetera. (We will try to get this sorted out as quickly as possible, so that everyone can go home early.) Then, we’ll see how conventional political ideas failed, and why the world needs a socialist political response. I’ll explain what a strong left agenda would look like and give some suggestions for strategies to move it forward.

In Part III, I will deal with alternatives and criticisms. I’ll explain why conservatism is cruel and liberalism is oblivious. I’ll respond to common critiques of the left, examining why they all fail and everyone should reject them. I will conclude with a rousing call to arms for the new generation of democratic socialists who will make life better for billions of people around the world.

The Richer, the Poorer – how New Labour enriched the few and failed the poor 
Stewart Lansley
(2021)

This book examines the multiple and changing mechanisms that link

wealth and poverty. These links have shifted in line with the model of capitalism in place, the strength of democratic structures and societal pressure, the restraints imposed on the owners of capital and the lengths to which business and financial elites have been prepared to go to preserve their wealth, power and privileges. Through much of the nineteenth century, wealth was synonymous with political power. Britain was a near- plutocracy, a society run by and mostly for the richest sections of society who were able to firewall their wealth and status. Some concessions on working conditions and welfare were granted, if only because of fear of the consequences of inaction. The dominant philosophy – a belief in individual liberty, free markets and limited democracy – showed little concern with the lot of the governed. Ricardo’s distribution question was to be settled by the outcome of the play of market forces. The question of help for the losers from economic change was considered by mainstream thinking to be a matter of conscience and of private benevolence.

The great personal wealth boom of the nineteenth century was built largely off the back of a cheap and weakly organised labour force. Unrestrained industrial capitalism, eventually tempered by the rise of trade unions, new pressure groups and investment in social infrastructure, did deliver improvements in average living standards, but this was an uneven path. Social progress for most was slow and hard fought, and lagged behind the economic gains enjoyed by the financial, landowning and professional classes. 

In Praise of Social Democracy Political Quarterly Roy Hattersley (2012)

Both prominent Bevanites (most notably Dick Crossman) and leading Bennites (including Benn himself) argued that it was better to wait in opposition for the inevitable crisis of capitalism at which point socialism would triumph than to abandon core principles in a desperate attempt to accommodate the average voter in a more affluent society.

A by-product of that view is the fraudulent claim by left-wing Labour that they alone are the keepers of the party’s soul.

Ironically, New Labour reflected the mirror image of that view. Its adherents also argue that a choice has to be made between principle and power and that, since Opposition equates to impotence, it is necessary to compromise in order to win office. One of New Labour’s defining characteristics was the willingness to jettison ‘unelectable’ principles and policies in order to get into power. This was the clear assumption after Blair became the Labour Leader in 1994, and the position was given considerable force by the party suffering the indignity of being out of power for so long. Once in government, the Labour party continued to act in a way which suggested that there was no justification in seeking to move decisively leftwards in the face of immovable public opinion, globalisation and a right-wing media—that there was no alternative to a very cautious centre/centre left policy stance. The general election defeat of 1992 was offered as evidence that the electorate would never consider voting in sufficient numbers for an overtly social democratic policy platform and some even became critical of John Smith’s alleged belief that ‘one more push’ would see the Labour party returned to office at the next general election. Once in power, New Labour redistributed by stealth while claiming not to be concerned about the proliferation of the ‘filthy rich’ and—mistaking or being unaware of Michael Young’s analysis—thought that meritocracy was a condition devoutly to be wished. The moral was clear. A party led by a Prime Minister who, on television, could not bring himself even to regret the widening gap between rich and poor, would never dare to mount a real attack on poverty.

In the Labour party the fatalism of left and right coincide. The conflict between power and principle is deemed to be fundamental. The party cannot have both. Labour could either pursue power or defend its ideological purity. And New Labour believed, or claimed to believe, that the victory of 1997 confirmed that necessity of accepting the abandonment of principles which it called ‘reality’. Anyone who has read Robert Worcester’s Explaining Labour’s Landslide realises that the Tory defeat was inevitable in 1997.

The distinctive feature of Ed Miliband’s leadership campaign, and ultimately the reason why he was elected, was his clear belief that power and principle could go together. His message was that Labour should have confidence in its ideology and that the promotion of social democratic aims and values is essential to securing victory. New Labour lost because it was not ideological enough. It was never intellectually confident and never, while in office, seriously sought to reshape public opinion. Before 2007 many of Gordon Brown’s supporters believed that the Labour government would be more radical once he became Leader. Apart from a short-lived honeymoon period in the first few months of his premiership, the Labour party appeared to lack any sense of ideological direction for most of his time in power. The likelihood is that he possessed one of the attributes that led to Miliband’s victory in Labour’s leadership election. He believed, but he did not dare. Ed Miliband laid claim to be part of a different tradition within the Labour party: the certainty that the pursuit of power and the commitment to social democratic ideals go together. Arguably such a stance was the one held by Hugh Gaitskell as Leader of the Labour party between 1955 and 1963, where he sought to respond to changing economic and social conditions of the day while, at the same time, setting out a clear ideological vision centred on a commitment to equality.

Tony Crosland became the intellectual exponent of that view. He was said to be on the ‘right’ of the Labour party because he supported the Atlantic Alliance, endorsed (with limited enthusiasm) what was then the Common Market and refused to believe that socialism was synonymous public ownership. But, not only was he the most consistent advocate of greater equality in Labour’s history, he was one of the fiercest critics of the Wilson government of 1964–70 for its lack of radicalism in its economic policy and the most effective critic of the imposition of austerity in response to the ‘IMF Crisis’ of 1976. Indeed, he refused to be associated with the ‘right’ of the party in the 1970s, believing that they were far too willing to compromise, and instead perceiving himself to be a ‘centrist’ in terms of Labour’s ideological spectrum.

Moreover, we claim that only the state can do certain things fairly. In this we mean that the pursuit of equality is only possible with a central state committed to the establishment of a national minimum welfare standard. In some cases there may actually be more welfare as a result of devolution and decentralisation. However, it is also conceivable that some wealthier communities once empowered to provide local services would seek to reduce welfare provision and standards in their area thus creating more inequality. Only a central state committed to equality could intervene to avoid such inequalities occurring, but in making such interventions the autonomy of local communities is undermined. The priority attached to equality is justified since it is one consequence of having greater equality that individuals can then participate as active citizens. It is not just ‘community’ which is important to social democrats, but the type of community.

There are several recent examples of economic and welfare policy where there has been evidence of too little state intervention rather than too much. The challenge of an increasingly elderly population is likely to require more state intervention not less. Moreover, despite the problems of the single currency, the domestic economies of France and Germany have been better able to respond to the challenge of the banking crisis as their governments have ensured that they have a more secure manufacturing base than rival economies like that of Britain which were over-reliant on banking and so were particularly exposed to the collapse of financial services.

Support for the minimal state is, in part, a product of the belief that the unrestricted market is invariably the best way to guarantee efficiency and encourage growth. We agree that a market—in much of the economy—is an essential feature of a free and prosperous society. But evidence confirms that the market is not the best way to improve the performance, or allocate resources within, the public services and those privatised industries which were once, in the words of the 1950s’ legislation, ‘managed on behalf of the people’. New Labour promoted the internal market in the health service to the undoubted detriment of the provision for some patients.

The Potters Bar train crash resulted from the neglect of railway maintenance—a typical example of unjustifiable market cost cutting. Social democrats believe the market is often, but not always, the best way to regulate the economy. The creation of a strong and just society relies on an active central state and in current conditions there would be popular support for more economic intervention based on clear social democratic principles. When a child dies of neglect or parent brutality, cattle are threatened by the outbreak of foot and mouth disease, rivers flood or unemployment dramatically rises, the cry goes up for the state to do more.

No comments:

Post a Comment