Some 15 years ago I had a rather bad experience of China which I retold here. I had won the position of Team Leader of a 4 year EC project in the country which seemed to consist of having a lot of European experts visit the country for a week or so but was so depressed that I threw the towel in after the first month. But the experience did allow me to draft a 70 page paper on Chinese Administrative Reforms which was updated recently and an explanatory note Lost in Beijing – loneliness of a long-distance consultant. One of the factors which attracted me to the country was the writings of a Canadian political scientist, one Daniel Bell – particularly his 2008 book China’s New Confucianism – politics and everyday life in a changing society.
The Commfucianist is a 2024 article about him which seems rather biased but which I excerpt for its very partiality
In
the West too Bell’s star has waned. Granted, his books find a
committed publisher in Princeton University Press. Bell is also the
founding editor of the Princeton-China Series.
It
is in the world beyond the academy where interest has slackened. Not
long ago Bell’s op eds in the New York Times, The Financial Times,
the Wall Street Journal, Le Monde, The Guardian, and Huffington Post,
found avid readers, hungry to learn where China was heading. Today,
these outlets are less welcoming.
Editors
who once feted Bell now ignore him, not because Bell is less
challenging to Western prejudices but because he challenges them more
in a bleaker time. When China was an object of Western wonder, Bell’s
deciphering of the Middle Kingdom earned him
admiration and respect. Now that China is an object of
Western detestation, Bell’s Sinophilia is considered perverse
The
China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy
(2015) is Bell’s most impressive book. Carefully argued and
copiously documented, it combines rigor with audacity.
“China Model” is not Bell’s
coinage. Since the early 1980s, it has referred to the combination of
market capitalism and state authoritarianism said to characterize the
post-Mao reformist era. Bell finds this usage too generic: it could
just as well apply to many Middle Eastern or African states. To
capture China’s true specificity, says Bell, “China Model” is
best viewed as “democracy at the bottom, experimentation in the
middle, and meritocracy at the top,” a uniquely graded system of
governance. The model, Bell adds, is to be viewed as a reality, which
the PRC approximates to a significant degree, and as a work in
progress, an ideal to which the CCP aspires or claims to aspire.
Evidently, it is also Daniel Bell’s preferred political system.
Bell
begins not by singing China’s praises but by cataloguing the West’s
problems, particularly those of the USA, the leading Western
democracy. Bell will show that “the ideal of one person, one vote”
is seriously flawed and that “electoral democracies do not
necessarily perform better than political meritocracies according to
widely shared standards of good government”
His
appraisal of electoral democracy is damning. It is not merely
deficient. It is “tyrannical.” The term is central to Chapter 1.
Consider the “tyranny of the majority,” the worry of J.S. Mill.
Most voters lack the relevant information about politics to act
rationally. They are ignorant of the latest findings in science and
social science and, unlike scientists, who “value intellectual
honesty” (CM, 28), the multitude is shifty and perverse. It has
neither the desire, the capacity, nor even the time to read “articles
and books designed to be helpful” (CM, 30). Furthermore, it
demonstrates little “communicative talent and emotional
intelligence” (CM, 35). A “tyranny of the wealthy minority”
(CM, 42) is no better. Doners, lobbyists, and special interests in
general block change beneficial to society as a whole. The upshot is
stagnant wages and worsening life-chances for workers. And not
content with raw power, the affluent complacently justify their
position by claiming that anyone with sufficient talent and energy
can rise to the top. Systemic impediments (class, regional,
educational) to scaling the ladder are blithely ignored. Callous and
self-regarding, segregated by its gated lifestyle from everyday
concerns, the wealthy minority is not even competent, evidenced by
the West’s “major financial and economic crises” (CM, 45). The
benighted majority return in a different guise when Bell describes
the “tyranny of the voting community,” meaning, the total sum of
citizens and residents eligible to vote.
A
voting community is not only insensitive to the welfare of “future
generations” (global warming threatens them) and “foreigners”
(whose interests are not “represented”; CM, 46). It is also
feckless and temperamental. By contrast, China is far better
positioned to plan for the future. After all, “the same party will
likely still be in power several decades from now” and, hence, will
be more “likely to stick to its long-term commitments” than
fawning Western politicians (CM, 53).
The
West’s final shortcoming Bell calls the “tyranny of competitive
individualists” (CM, 54). Western democracies are notorious for
“negative campaigning” and “identity politics” both of which
polarize the populace and make “compromise a dirty
word.” The most hallowed aspects of voting make matters worse.
Having
desacralized Western politics, Bell proceeds to vaunt the excellences
of its rival. His point of departure is the CCP’s success in
alleviating the poverty of millions of its citizens since the early
1980s and advancing their life-chances more generally.
He
adds that the CCP enjoys considerable legitimacy at home.
What explains China’s great success?
Bell detects it in the CCP’s refinement of China’s long
meritocratic tradition, especially as this affects the selection of
leaders. The resonance with Confucianism is clear. Comparable to the
great scholarsages of yore, the new literati combine intelligence and
virtue if
caged within the bars of a monopolistic party.
I
began this essay by relating Bell’s odyssey to Confucianism and to
China. I close it by emphasizing what must be increasingly obvious to
Bell, a decent and honest man. Marxists, Sinicized or otherwise, are
creedal monopolists. They do not share doctrine. It cannot be over
emphasized that Chinese Marxism is at root a European import, stamped
by Leninism which in turn was influenced by the French Revolution of
1789 and the European uprisings of 1848. This explains the presence
in PRC constitutions of such foreign concepts as democracy,
democratic centralism, dictatorship, and rights. Confucianism and
Leninism are incompatible. The first is a philosophy, the fruit of a
great and ancient civilization. The second is the ideology of a
Leninist “combat party.” The
CCP is the antithesis of all that Confucians valued. Indoctrination
is not humanist self-cultivation. Propaganda is not wisdom, nor is
training and technique the same as education and culture. A Party
preoccupied with shoring up its legitimacy no more resembles
Confucius’ passion for righteousness than
mass conformity resembles his idea of harmony. No Leninist
organization has never prioritized benevolence, goodness, human
heartedness—the cardinal jen—over control and domination. Or been
a beacon of moral example. And how can a Party at war with
truthfulness, that effaces its own history to hide its crimes, that
describes the quest for factual exactitude as “historical
nihilism,” be a vehicle of virtue? It follows that the Party’s
relationship to Confucianism is superficial, opportunistic, and
conditional, and that this is true no matter how often President Xi
visits Shandong or blesses the opening of another museum devoted to
China’s past, always curated à la mode. The Party takes the plant
and spits out the pith. It much prefers political theorist Wang
Huning, a brilliant Marxist tactician, raised in the bruising
environment of power politics, to the unworldly seer of Montréal. Confucian
hierarchy is congenial but only so long as the Party constitutes its
pinnacle and occupies its descending rungs. Ritual and form—the
Confucian li—are welcome too, but only so long as
they pay deference to Party conventions. Confucianism will retain its
value to the CCP provided it is useful for legitimating Party rule.
Nor will the youngest generation rue Confucianism’s demise, at
least according to opinion survey research.
To
this point, Bell has tried to marry Confucianism with Marxism and the
Maoist “mass line”. More recently he has taken to calling himself
a “progressive conservative” who aims to graft feminism and LGBTQ
onto the Party shoot. This
hybrid—we might think of it as Commfucianism—is doubtless
sincere. It is also no threat at all to the CCP. For now, the Party
is content to expropriate China’s great humanist philosophy, and
happy enough to have a famous Westerner in its camp. It will be
reassured to read Bell describe himself as a “servant of the
Chinese state.” He
could have said, metaphorically, that he was a servant of learning or
of the university community. He could have said that he was a
university official or a civil servant. That he did not say these
things suggests to me that the real threat to Bell is not from the
Party but from Bell himself, to his coherence as a thinker and his
integrity as a critic.
The article is by one Peter Baehr and compares Bell with another Sinologist
Simon Leys which I find strange since Leys spent only a few years in the country
and had to adopt a nom de plume to avoid being declared persona non grata
whereas Bell has spent most of his life in the country (apart from brief spells at
Oxford and Princeton)
In
The
Dean of Shandong – confessions of a minor bureaucrat
(2023), Bell describes the evolution of his political-moral beliefs.
The subject of his doctoral
thesis at Oxford was Communitarianism, a political philosophy with
which he was at that time enamored. Communitarians argue that the
sovereign individual of liberalism is a fiction. Human beings are not
self-actualizing monads. They are social to their core. Born into an
already pre-formed society, with a history and a culture, the infant
becomes a human person through being immersed in group life and group
symbols. Family, neighborhood, and association are the soil of human
development and the cement of society.
A
life that pursues freedom, self-realization, and pleasure above all
other goals is not only corrosive of solidarity; it is impoverished
and self-destructive. Material satisfaction is as transient as
fashion. Egoism is frustrated by other egos. Factionalism is
self-cancelling. A meaningful life unfurls in the company of and for
others. It requires cooperation, compromise, care, and durable
commitments. And because the self is a social phenomenon, it follows
that we have obligations to
the society that nurtures and protects us.
Recommended
Reading
Chinese Shadows Simon Leys (1977)
The Hall of Uselessness – collected essays Simon Leys (2011)
Simon Leys – navigator between worlds Philippe Paquet (2015)