The latest Nobel prize for Economics (actually only a Swedish bank award) is causing ructions. It has been won by Daren Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson for their trilogy Why Nations Fail – the origins of power, prosperity and poverty (2012); The Narrow Corridor – how nations struggle for liberty (2019) and Power and Progress – our thousand year struggle over technology and prosperity (2023)
Michael Roberts asseses their value annually and offers what is certainly
the most exhaustive treatment of the issue –
The work for which they received the $1m prize is for research that purports to
show that those countries that achieve prosperity and end poverty are those
that adopt ‘democracy’ (and by that is meant Western-style liberal democracy
where people can speak out (mostly), can vote for officials every so often and
expect the law to protect their lives and property (hopefully). Societies that are
controlled by elites without any democratic accountability are ‘extractive’ of
resources, do not respect property and value and so over time do not prosper.
In a series of papers applying some empirical analysis (ie correlating democracy
(as defined) with levels of prosperity), the Nobel winners claim to show this.
Indeed, the Nobel winners argue that colonisation of the Global South
in the 18th and 19th centuries could be ‘inclusive’ and so turn the
likes of North America into prosperous nations (forgetting the
indigenous population) or ‘extractive’ and so keep countries in dire
poverty (Africa). It all depends. Such is the theory. Two problems, however, First, if growth and prosperity go hand in hand with‘democracy’ and the likes of the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam are considered
to have elites that are ‘extractive’ or undemocratic, how do our Nobellists
explain their undoubted economic performance? Apparently, it is explained
by the fact they started out poor and had a lot of ‘catching up’ to do, but
soon their extractive character will catch up with them and China’s hyper
growth will run out of steam. Perhaps now? Second, is it correct to say that revolutions or political reforms arenecessary to set things on the path to prosperity? Well, there may be
some truth in that: would Russia in the early 20th century be where it istoday without the 1917 revolution or China be where it is in 2024 without
the revolution of 1949. But our Nobellists do not present us with those
examples: theirs are getting the vote in Britain in the 19th century orindependence for the American colonies in the 1770s.
Richard Wolff’s video commentary on the Nobel prize-winners on X
sounds a marvellously humorous and succinct note A decade or so agoAcemoglu
and Johnson shared their insights in
an interesting article
We pointed out that three broad clusters of long-run economic and
political institutions are possible. In the first (
Absent Leviathan
),
the state is weak, while societal collective action and various norms
are strong and constrain political hierarchy. In the second
(
Despotic Leviathan
), the state is strong; it crushes and further
impairs an already weak society. In the third (
Shackled Leviathan
),
there is a balance between the state’s and society’s capacities,
which enables their coevolution toward greater strength and also
undergirds a very different type of state—simultaneously powerful
and still accountable and responsive to society.
Economic modernization is almost impossible under the Absent
Leviathan. It is possible under the Despotic Leviathan, and under
some circumstances it can proceed rather rapidly. But it will not
bring democracy or accountable behavior by rulers and bureaucrats.
The positive feedback between political institutions and economic
development is only a feature of the Shackled Leviathan.
As a result, economic changes in, say, South Korea will have
fundamentally different implications than when the same changes
happen in China. These insights, though formulated in a different way
and yielding different implications than in the previous literature,
are nevertheless related to some classic arguments in political theory.
Machiavelli [1961 (1532), p. 67] proposed similar ideas more than
500 years ago, identifying a related trichotomy:
“The people are everywhere anxious not to be dominated or oppressed
by the nobles, and the nobles are out to dominate and to oppress the
people. These opposed ambitions bring about one of three results:
a principality, a free city, or anarchy.”
We are, of course, not the first ones to think about the role of culture
in politics. Although cultural factors are not part of many of the
seminal frameworks of political science—for example, Tilly’s (1990)
theory of the emergence of states; Moore’s (1966) theory of
capitalism, fascism, and communism; or more orthodox Marxist
frameworks for understanding political and economic change—
they have featured in important contributions. Huntington (1996)
places a heavy emphasis on culture in his work on civilizations.
Culture has also played a critical role in the modern literature on
nationalism and identity (Anderson 1983, Laitin 1998, Horowitz 2000,
Gellner 2009) and in the literature about the impact of religion on
politics (Laitin 1986; Kalyvas 1996; GrzymaĆaBusse 2012, 2015).
Putnam’s (1993) theory of good democratic governance,
building on Banfield’s (1958) insights, also includes a central role
for cultural factors. Finally, Almond & Verba’s (1963) seminal work
merges culture and political behavior in understanding the support
for democracy.
The rest of the article is organized as follows.
The next section introduces our conceptual framework and highlights
the interplay between politics and culture. It is followed by three
sections that apply this framework to illustrative cases of Despotic,
Absent, and Shackled Leviathans, starting with the Chinese case.
We then distill some of the lessons from these case studies and
reevaluate modernization theory. The concluding section suggests
directions for future work.
FURTHER READING
Interview with James Robinson (2024)
Noah Smith’s view of the fracas (2024)
A 68 page article on the role of culture on institutions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2023)
Leviathans in CEEC countries 2019
A World Bank presentation about “
The Shackled Leviathan
:
(probably 2018)
The Nobel Factor – the prize in economics, social democracy and the market factor
A Offner and G Soederberg (2016)