Can low expectations be mobilised?

The last three posts have been a preface to the second look I wanted to take at a detailed case-study I had written some 25 years ago about the most important programme I have ever been involved with – Strathclyde Region’s “Social Strategy for the Eighties”. The full story of the strategy is here – and a short version here. Strathclyde Region controlled key public services for half of Scotland’s population and had 100,000 professional staff. The strategy -

·         took some 18 months to prepare,

·         went through a continuous learning process eg “SS for the 80s”, “SS for the 90s”

·         lasted the 22 years’ life of the Region and

·         was continued by the new system of Scottish government which assumed power in 1999 

M involvement lasted 16 years – from 1974 when I became one of what was jokingly called “the gang of four” which led the Region in its first spell in office until I left the country to pursue a new career as an international consultant. 

The shocking 1973 “Born to Fail?” report  identified the West of Scotland as a UK leader in “multiple deprivation” and a few of us – instead of acting defensively - saw this as an opportunity to ensure that the new Region acted innovatively. An initial deprivation strategy was further developed over the winter of 1981 at a series of community conferences attended by 1000 activists which reviewed the actions taken to date by the Region and just before the May 1982 elections gave the subsequent report a fresh legitimacy

It was printed as an attractive (little red) booklet (complete with poems!) and widely distributed, as was a shorter version in the internal staff Bulletin. The Region's free Newspaper distributed to every household - and more selective monthly "Digest" sent to all Community groups - were both intensively used in the years to come to explain the details of the work. Workshops were held in a variety of public and professional settings over the following years to get the key messages across.  And these were simple - if challenging - 

            "The existing inequalities in service allocation did not happen by accident: they are mediated through the administrative machine by generally well-intentioned professionals and administrators practising apparently fair and neutral principles. To tackle these inequalities therefore requires more than a general expression of content handed over, in traditional style, for implementation. It demands the alteration of structures and the working assumptions".

 

            "What we were asking our staff to do in 1976 was to accept that fairly simple things were needed from them in the first instance; not massive spending but just a commitment, firstly to those who lived in the APTs; secondly to attempting new relationships both with their colleagues in other Departments and with residents. We were also asking for imagination and courage in encouraging staff to bring forward proposals for better practice despite the discouragement we knew they would encounter from the rules, traditions and prejudices which seem deeply engrained in certain departments"

 

            "The majority of staff are discouraged from joint work with councillors, other professionals and residents in APTs by the way the traditional departmental system of local government works. Career advance depends on one's work as a professional or manager in a particular department - and not on the collaborative ventures emphasised in this and the 1976 document. That is the crucial issue which must now be faced and resolved. Exhortations and good intentions are no longer enough" 

I was pretty happy with the detailed analysis of the experience I had prepared in the mid 1990s with the benefit not only of the distance brought by my having left the country but of a short sabbatical I had been given then by the Urban Studies group of Glasgow University. But the model of change used was perhaps not as clear as it might be - with a brief references to Kurt Lewin's freezing/refreezing approach and only the briefest of references to a piece I’d written in a major article in 1977 entitled Community Development – its administrative and political challenge. This actually gave a sense of the thinking which drove us - arguing that 

Our society is hardly what one would call a participatory democracy. The term that is used - "representative" democracy - is official recognition of the fact that "the people" do not take political decisions but have rather surrendered that power to one tor several) small elites - subject to  infrequent checks. Such checks are, of course, a rather weak base on which to rest claims for democracy⁴ and more emphasis is therefore given to the freedom of expression and organisation whereby pressure groups articulate a variety of interests. Those who defend the consequent operation of the political process argue that we have, in effect a political market place in which valid or strongly supported ideas survive and are absorbed into new policies. They further argue that every viewpoint or interest has a more or less equal chance of finding expression and recognition. This is the political theory of pluralism.⁵

 

Community development is an expression of unhappiness with this view of the operation of the policy process. At its most extreme - in some theories of com­munity action - it argues that the whole process is a gigantic confidence trick. In its more liberal version it merely wants to strengthen the voice of certain inarticulate members of society.

There is, I would suggest, a relatively simple way to test the claims of those who argue that there is little scope for improve­ment in the operation of our democratic process and that any deficiencies are attributable to the faults of individuals rather than to the system. It involves looking at how new policies emerge.

The policy process

A key question is: How does government hear and act upon the signals from below? How do "problems" get on the political "agenda"? Does the political and administrative process influence the type of problem picked up by government or the form in which it is presented?' The assumption of our society, good "liberals" that most of us essentially are, is that

·    the channels relating governors to governed are neutral and

·         the opportunity to articulate grievances and have these defined (if they are significant enough) as "problems" requiring action from authority is evenly distributed throughout society.

 

This is what needs to be examined critically - the concept of grievance and the process by which government responds to grievances.

"Problems" emerge because individuals or groups feel dissatisfied and articulate and organise that dissatisfaction in an influential way which makes it difficult for government to resist.

"Grievance" or "dissatisfaction" is not. however, a simple concept - it arises when a judgement is made that events fall short of what one has reason to expect. Grievance is a function of expectations and performance - both of which are relative and vary from individual to individual - or. more significantly, from group to group

Problems hadn't until then been defined by local people - professionally-dominated agendas were rather imposed on them in a variety of more or less subtle ways. The Region's community development staff were, in a sense, the shock-troops to help make the pluralist system work again (that was also evident in the "enterprise" rhetoric of community business).

Theories of Change

 The last post had two purposes –

·         to explore seven tools which governments have used in efforts to alter the behaviour of both citizens and organisations (public and commercial).

·         to remind us that some preliminary efforts in the 1970s to identify the factors which accounted for some successful  government initiatives of the 1960s had subsequently floundered in the 1980s - as Thatcherism, privatisation and neo-liberalism downgraded government in favour of what was little more than the downright worship of markets. New Labour may, in the new millennium, have brought back a few government programmes (such as Sure Start) but basically retained its faith in competition, globalisation and the market. 

The global financial meltdown of 2008 took the gloss off all that – and it was not altogether surprising that Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness by Thaler and Cass became a best-seller in the same year. This was a long overdue recognition that governments could also be effective   

Huge amounts of money, of course, are spent - and thousands of lobbyists employed – to persuade us otherwise; to keep us constantly supplied with stories of government waste and ineptitude. And most academics, it must be said, are happy to go along with this. Which is why I finished the post by paying tribute to the perseverance of people like Mark Moore, Paul du Gay and Paul t’Hart who are amongst the very few academics who have chosen to focus their efforts on trying to understand the preconditions for positive government efforts. 

What I want to do in this post is to try to describe the theories of change I’ve found most useful in the 50 years I’ve been lucky enough to have the chance to practice leadership – initially political, then project management and, in retirement, more distant and reflective. 

From “the Pincer Movement” to celebration of opportunism

When I was lucky enough to find myself in a position of strategic leadership in a new and large organisation in the mid 1970s, we used what I called the “pincer approach” to set up reform structures at both a political and community level. The organisational culture was, of course, one of classic bureaucracy – but, from its very start, some of us made sure that it had to contend with the unruly forces of political idealism and community power. The regional body concerned was responsible for such local government functions as education, social work, transport, water and strategic planning for two and half million people; and employed 100,000 staff but very little has been written about it. You’ll find the full story of the strategy here – and a short version here. 

Thirty years later. I was doing a lot of training sessions in the Presidential Academies of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan and developed there what I called the “opportunistic” or “windows of opportunity” theory of change against what I started to call “impervious regimes” ie so confident of the lack of challenge to their rule that they had become impervious to their citizens. Initially I expressed it like this - 

• “Windows of opportunity present themselves - from outside the organization, in crises, pressure from below

• reformers have to be technically prepared, inspire confidence – and able to seize and direct the opportunity

• Others have to have a reason to follow

• the new ways of behaving have to be formalized in new structures. 

And then developed a more detailed formulation which put more emphasis on the individual, moral responsibility –

“Most of the time our systems seem impervious to change – but always (and suddenly) an opportunity arises. Those who care about the future of their society, prepare for these “windows of opportunity”. And the preparation is about analysis, mobilisation and trust.

·         It is about us caring enough about our organisation and society to speak out about the need for change.

·         It is about taking the trouble to think and read about ways to improve things – and

·         To help create and run networks of such change.

·         And it is about establishing a personal reputation for probity and good judgement 

·         that people will follow your lead when that window of opportunity arises”.

 Contagion and networks?

I am not a fan of Malcolm Gladwell but his popularisations have included the important notion of the Tipping Point (2010)  where he suggested that there were three key factors which determine whether an idea or fashion will “tip” into wide-scale popularity

·         the Law of the Few,

·         the Stickiness Factor, and

·         the Power of Context. 

The “Law of the Few” proposes that a few key types of people must champion an idea, concept, or product before it can reach the tipping point. Gladwell describes these key types as –

·         Connectors,

·         Mavens, and

·         Salesmen. 

(And a maven – in case you didn’t know - is a trusted expert in a particular field, who seeks to pass knowledge on to others. The word maven comes from the Hebrew, via Yiddish, and means one who understands, based on an accumulation of knowledge). 

If individuals representing all three of these groups endorse and advocate a new idea, it is much more likely that it will tip into exponential success.

The other 2 concepts are, frankly, not so well dealt with – and we need to go the wider literature of change management and social marketing to get the whole picture. 

A Final Point

Effective change doesn’t come from the “ya-boo yo-yo” system of adversarial power blocs of the UK and USA – it comes from a combination of sustained dialogue; coalitions of change; and grassroots activism and protest. And, often, it starts with an experiment – rather than a grand programme…Take, for example, what is now being called the Dutch model for neighbourhood care – started by Buurtzorg a few years back which is now inspiring people everywhere. That is a worker cooperative model… which, quite rightly, figures in Frederic Laloux’s  Reinventing Organisations. 

Further Reading; Annotated bibliogaphy for change agents" it may be a bit dated, but it’s still a useful resource for those who want to change the system of which they’re part.

Best explanation of ”theory of change” and annotated bibliography

To be continued

Tools of manipulation

I’ve often in the past 25 years had to put myself in the shoes of Ministers and senior civil servants to help them develop “road maps” for their reforms….Indeed I would get them to brainstorm about why they thought people behaved the way they did whether as officials, citizens, politicians or businesspeople – and what that might suggest about ways to achieve the desired change.

After all, the projects I’ve led only exist because someone has decided the present state of affairs is no longer acceptable…..so what aspects of whose behaviour are we talking about? And what is it that is most likely to make target groups change their behaviour?

·         Simple instructions?

·         Threats? Incentives?

·         Explanations and understanding?

·         Moral exhortation?

 One result was this table which focuses on the assumptions we make about motives - and then explores the various mechanisms which are available to those trying to change beliefs and behaviour 

The “behavioural turn” - Tools in the change process

Focus of attention	Example of tool	Relevant Tool
1. Understanding	Training Campaigns Functional review	Rational persuasion images Factual analysis
2. Commitment	Leadership Communications Training	Legitimisation; inspiration   Pride
3. Maximising Personal Benefit	Pay increase and bonus Promotion (including political office) Good publicity Winning an award	Monetary calculation ambition Reputation; Psychological Status
4. Minimising Personal Cost	Named as poor performer Demotion Report cards	Psychological (Shame) Monetary Pride
5. Obligation	Law Action plan Family ties	Courts Managerial authority Social pressure
6. Peer influence	Bribery Quality circles	Pressure Support
7. Social influence	Opinion surveys	Feedback from public about service quality

 The explosion of interest in behaviour; In the last decade, the question of changing (other) people’s behaviour has become a central one for government, business and NGOs. Professors Thaler and Cass may have “nudged” interest with their 2008 Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness but it was in fact the UK Cabinet Office which arguably set the ball rolling four years earlier with its Personal Responsibility and changing behaviour – the state of knowledge and its implications for public policy (2004) - an example which was followed with Changing Behaviour – a public policy perspective (Australian Government 2007). 

The Nudge book certainly inspired the Cameron government some 7 years later to set up a Nudge Unit in the Cabinet but the British government had been exploring this issue in its The Use of sanctions and rewards in the public sector (NAO 2008) accompanied by a literature review drafted by Deloitte. Even the House of Lords was not to be outdone – with the voluminous evidence of its Behaviour Change in 2011. And the voluntary sector put down an early marker with its Common Case – the case for working with our cultural values (2010)– which showed more familiarity with the marketing approach than did the economistic and rationalistic assumptions which were embedded in the early British attempts. So the World Bank was rather lagging behind when its Annual Development Report got round to dealing with the issue - in its Mind, Society and Behaviour (2015)

Government normally set up for Failure

Government systems are best known for their failures – and we certainly make the most of it when they happen, whether we are journalists, academics or mere citizens and voters. Books with titles such as “Great Planning Disasters” (1980) or “The Blunders of our Governments” (2013) line our shelves; and reports, post-mortems and articles on specific instances of breakdown and failure are legion. For some reason, the same interest isn’t shown in government success. One reviewer of the second book explained why – 

In our anti-politics culture it may be thought that governments never do anything else but blunder. That is not actually true: a serious academic work could be written examining the things governments got right and lessons learnt there from—but who would buy a book entitled ”The Successes of Our Governments”? Change the title to The Blunders of Our Governments and the readers are there 

There was a period – in the 1970s – when some interest was shown in positive government outcomes. I remember, in particular, “Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy” by Hall, Land, Parker and Webb (1975) with 6 case studies including the struggle for Clean Air, establishment of the Open University and of Health Centres. The authors suggested 3 important perquisites for such success which I have never forgotten - legitimacy, feasibility and support viz that policies require

·         clear and indisputable claims to authority ,

·         a good chance of achieving a successful outcome

·         indications of extensive support 

But the endeavours of government fell out of favour in the 1980s – at least in anglo-saxon territories – with austerity programmes caused by the bailing out of the banks in 2008 being a final challenge for even successful governments.  

It’s only the perseverance of people like Mark Moore and Paul t’Hart which has brought us positive stories of government efforts – with Alan McConnell’s Understanding Policy Success (2010) being an early and important milestone in what is now a burgeoning field 

Useful Further Reading

Reports and Books

Personal Responsibility and changing behaviour – the state of knowledge and its implications for public policy (UK Cabinet Office 2004

Changing Behaviour – a public policy perspective (Australian Government 2007)

Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness; Thaler and Cass (2008).

The Use of sanctions and rewards in the public sector (NAO 2008) accompanied by a literature review drafted by Deloitte

Common Case – the case for working with our cultural values (2010)

Behaviour Change (House of Lords (2011)

Finding Frames – new ways to engage the UK public in global poverty (2011)

Nudge, nudge, think, think;by Peter John, Smith and Gerry Stoker (2011)

A Practitioner’s Guide to Nudging; Rotman 2013

Mind, Society and Behaviour (World Development Report; World Bank 2015

Sanctions, Rewards and Learning (IDEA 2016)

Governance and the Law (World Development Report; World Bank 2017)

Influencing Behaviours and Practices to tackle poverty and injustice (Oxfam 2018)

Articles

“Finding the appropriate policy tools” (RG Young 2008)

Wicked Problems and clumsy solutions – the role of leadership; Keith Grint (2008)

 “Nudge, nudge, think, think”; article by John, Smith and Stoker (2009)

The Rational Paradox of Nudge in a world of bounded rationality; Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich (2016). A quite excellent critique