Expectations

Expectations are at the root of unhappiness
Zen Buddhists have it right
My mother's commonplace book of sayings
contained a prayer
attributed to Reinhold Niebuhr

"God grant me

the strength to change 

what needs to be changed

the serenity to accept 

what cannot be changed and

the wisdom to know the difference" 

even the economists understand.
with their demand and supply curves,
that it's better to reduce demand!
For Keynes, expectations were...
too "exuberant" 

Le Trahison des Clercs?

This phrase - the title of a famous little French book which was published in 1927 - still reverbates almost a hundred years on. "Clercs" can be translated literally as "scribblers" with the english title "Betrayal of the Intellectuals" giving its true sense. Its basic argument was that the increasing nationalist tone of French intellectuals was a betrayal of the Enlightenment project.

This polemical essay argued that European intellectuals in the 19th and 20th century had often lost the ability to reason dispassionately about political and military matters, instead becoming apologists for crass nationalism, warmongering and racism. Benda reserved his harshest criticisms for his fellow Frenchmen Charles Maurras and Maurice Barrès. Benda defended the measured and dispassionate outlook of classical civilization, and the internationalism of traditional Christianity.Human aspirations, specifically after power, would become the sole end of society.

French intellectuals have, of course, been a more numerous and vociferous bunch than their anglo-saxon counterparts - with Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, William James and Walter Lippmann being amongst the few of the latter at the time. And the French tradition of challenge to power is clearly longer and stronger - stretching  recently from Zola's famous J'Accuse campaign through the French resistance to American culture and La Pensee Unique to Stephane Hessel's Indignez-Vous .

But the massive academic expansion of the past 50 years means that academics and journalists are so numerous these days that we tend to trip over them as they vie for our attention.  The question I want to pursue here is whether this new breed doesn't also deserve to be accused of a massive betrayal of public trust - this time by virtue not of political passion or ideology but of its absence!!

The last post concluded with a suggestion that most of the products of political and social science is of little use to us as citizens.  A spate of books in the past decade about populism and democracy such as Runciman's "How Democracy Ends?" (2018) about which I wrote very positively earlier this year  ; and Yascha Mounk's "The People v Democracy – why our freedom is in danger and how to save it"  (2018) would suggest I may have been a tad critical.  And the list of books at the end of the next post seems to indicate that there has been a reasonably healthy ongoing debate about the reinvigoration of the discipline and a more explicit connection between political science and contemporary politics and public debate.

But the social sciences have, in the past half-century of explosive university expansion , been thoroughly professionalised - with a concomitant increase in their aspirations to scientism. Matt Flinders has a useful discussion about this in his article "The Tyranny of Relevance and the act of translation" which argues that academics do feel incrrasingly under pressure to justify their existence and relevance to those in power - both in the private and public sectors. Indeed such links have attracted occasional criticism - particularly in such sectors as armaments and energy
But what about their sense of duty to the wider public of citizens? How many academics take the trouble to try to communicate with the wider public on issues of public concern? 

Younger academics certainly cannot afford to engage in anything that might smack of popularisation - let alone of politics. Which leaves it up to their older colleagues with tenure to engage in the important but neglected task of communicating with the wider public.
Although there is certainly a welcome increase of popular writing by academics, it is still a tiny percentage of the millions of such staff - and the motives in all too many cases have more to do with reputation than with edification! And consist too often of rehashed dissertations. The thousands of titles on capitalism are a good example - full, as Shakespeare so nicely puts it, "of sound and fury" but offering little to the wider public that bis actionable......
Chomsky is perhaps the most famous of the intellectuals prepared to comment on worldly affairs and demonstrates the risks involved - of being both pigeon-holed and vilified. Here is one of Chomsky's classic statement on the role of the public intellectual - from 1967!

The post is proving more complicated than I had realised - so will be continued........

Why is Political Science so.....irrelevant?

The last 5 posts were sparked off by some articles in "The Political Quarterly" conducting a preliminary post-mortem on government performance during the Covid pandemic - and what that said about the strength (and weaknesses) of the UK, Swedish and New Zealand government systems and/or leadership. The posts wandered a bit - covering such issues as
- the role and scope of individual action
- and "character",
- the role of the state,
- intellectual fashions,
- blunders in government and
- the meaning of the word "governance".
I thought therefore it would be useful to try to tie things together more coherently in this post

British and American political scientists have had from the 1970s a consistent (if intermittent) interest in the issue of what they have variously labelled as government "overload", "disasters" or "blunders" - as you will see from the long bibliography of the Comparing Blunders in government (2016) article

To the extent that they have had anything to say about government per se, it has generally been to suggest that globalisation and other supranational forces have been undermining the significance of that particular system of ultimate authority. 
American political scientists, notoriously, have in recent decades been plagued by a form of penis-envy - namely "economist envy" and have become fixated on quantitative/statistical treatment (of elections etc).

British political science may like to think it's different but a cursory look at any of the flagship political science journals would demonstrate that they don't deal with "big" or important political issues. Political scientists have, for example, been generally missing from discussions about the location of power in the UK. Indeed this has been the subject of some provocative addresses in recent years eg Matt Flinder's "The Future of Political Science" (2016)
And just look at the titles of some of the books in the reading list at the end.... 
This article "Covid19 and the policy sciences" by well-known policy analysts Paul Cairney, Diana Stone et al gives a good sense of how various strands in that related field are dealing with the issue

But it's taken a Professor of Military Strategy to produce the first definitive study (50pp) of the performance of the British Government during the initial 4 months of the pandemic - Strategy for a Pandemic - the UK and Covid19  by Lawrence Freedman
And it takes a rare and brave soul to offer anything about government strategy-making which might be found useful by practitioners - but one of those rarities is Creating Public Value in Practice – advancing the common good in a ….noone in charge world ; ed J Bryson et al (2015),  an update of their fantastic book for 20 years earlier Leadership for the Common Good which can be accessed in full by clicking the title.
Such books tend to be written by those with detailed experience of the management of government policies and practice who will tend to come from the less-highly regarded field of public administration and.or management.

And it is one such author's book which has just come to my attention "Strategies for Governing - reinventing public administration for a dangerous century"  (2019)

In the United States, the field of public administration was launched almost a century ago by people with bold aspirations. They were not interested only in the efficiency of government offices; they wanted a thorough overhaul of the creaking American state so that it could manage the pressures of modern-day life.

Unfortunately, this expansive view of the field’s purpose has been lost. Over the last four decades in particular, the focus within the field has been mainly on smaller problems of management within the public sector. This narrowing of focus might have made sense in the United States and a few other advanced democracies in the waning decades of the twentieth century, but it does not make sense today.
As we shall see, many people have recently protested this shrinking of ambitions.

It is time for a change of direction. We need to recover an expansive view of the field, and I propose a way to do so. We must recover the capacity to talk about the fundamentals of government, because the fundamentals matter immensely.

Right now, there are billions of people on this planet who suffer terribly because governments cannot perform basic functions properly. People live in fear because governments cannot protect their homes from war and crime. They live in poverty because governments cannot create the conditions for trade and commerce to thrive. They live in pain because governments cannot stop the spread of disease. And they live in ignorance because governments do not provide opportunities for education. The expectations that we hold of our leaders can be stated simply: They should protect us from foreign enemies, maintain internal order, increase prosperity, improve well-being, and provide justice.
Even in the twenty-first century, most governments on this planet fail to do this.

I've ordered the book and will let you know whether it lives up to expectations

Conclusion; I had assumed that this post would wrap up the mini-series of the past week but realise that it does not even begin to answer the question of why political science is so irrelevant.....

Studies Critical of Political Science  
Defending Politics - Democracy in the 21st Century; Matt Flinders (2012)
The Political Imagination – a rallying call to university professors of politics (Flinders 2014)
Bridging the Relevance Gap ; Matthew Wood (2014)
Human Wellbeing and the lost relevance of political science ; Bo Rothstein (2014)
The relevance of political science ; Stoker, Pierre and Peters (2015)
Why Politics Matters – making democracy work; Gerry Stoker  (2004; 2016)
Why We Hate Politics ; Colin Hay (2007)

"Governance" as New Kids on the Block

New words do not always indicate a new condition. One of my favourite cartoons is the Jules Feiffer one of a small kid rehearsing the various words which have been used to describe the condition of those like him -

“I used to think I was poor. Then they told me I wasn't poor, I was needy. Then they told me it was self-defeating to think of myself as needy, I was deprived...then underprivileged. Then they told me underprivileged was overused. I was disadvantaged. I still don't have a dime. But I have a great vocabulary”.

Although I hated the word "governance" when it started to appear in the 1990s, I did understand why some academics felt a new word was needed. A whole new architecture of institutions - Agencies, regulators of privatised public utilities, legally superior (EU/NATO/WTO) and inferior (devolved) bodies; not to mention public procurement and consultation procedures - means that a Government is no longer Master of it's Domain. There are other kids on the block with whom it has to share power

I am aware, however, that there are other, more ideological, reasons for using the term. Recent posts have referred to the role of bodies such as the World Bank and American Think Tanks in weakening the role and power of the State - and the use of the word "governance" has undoubtedly been one the weapons they have used. Take, for example, the famous injunction of the 1991 "Reinventing Government" book to "row - rather than steer"
But I concede that the new institutional complexity does justify the new word. Somewhat reluctantly, therefore, I have accepted that the word is a legitimate one - even if I still shiver when people use it wrongly, when they should have said "government"

But why - as I indicated in the last post - did academics stop using the term some 5-6 years ago? Are they no longer interested? Have other topics become sexier?
Have they exhausted all that can be said on the topic? If so, it would be useful if someone could do a post-mortem article to tell us that was usefully learned from this 25-year episode of scribbling...
Or perhaps this Chinese article - Governance and Good Governance (2018) was that article?
- although I have to say I prefer this 2014 article Making sense of governance

Masochists who really need an answer to such questions are directed to the two definitive Handbooks which were published just as the fashion for the subject was spluttering to an inglorious end. The excerpts give an excellent sense of the field
The Sage Handbook of Governance ; ed M Bevir (2011) 600 pp
The Oxford Handbook of Governance ; ed  David Levi-Faur (2014) 800 pp

Whatever Happened to Governance?

Most people are confused by the word "governance" which crept into our language  some 30 years ago - and which indeed tends now to be used interchangeably with "government".
There is, however, a huge difference in meaning between the 2 words - with "governance" being a dangerous and slippery concept which, significantly perhaps, has now totally disappeared from academic discourse. For me, such sudden academic silences often offer important clues about our political culture - so bear with me while I muse.

An American political scientist by the name of Harlan Cleveland was apparently the first to use the term - as an alternative to the phrase "public administration" - although it was the late 80s before the word came into intensive use. In the mid-1970s, he suggested that:

“What the people want is less government and more governance” (1972).

What he meant by governance was the following cluster of concepts.

“The organizations that get things done will no longer be hierarchical pyramids with most of the real control at the top. They will be systems—interlaced webs of tension in which control is loose, power diffused, and centers of decision plural. 

“Decision-making” will become an increasingly intricate process of multilateral brokerage both inside and outside the organization which thinks it has the responsibility for making, or at least announcing, the decision. Because organizations will be horizontal, the way they are governed is likely to be more collegial, consensual, and consultative. The bigger the problems to be tackled, the more real power is diffused and the larger the number of persons who can exercise it—if they work at it” (p. 13). 

He was, in other words, anticipating the "network" approach which I discussed last year in a review of Niall Fergusson's "The Tower and the Square"

It was, however, only in the 1980s that academic began to notice not just privatisation but the increased tendency of governments to "hive off" decision-making to technocratic "agencies" which were given vast managerial authority. These may still have been state bodies but were run increasingly like private companies.
"Partnerships" - with both private companies and other state bodies - were another device in which power came increasingly to appear "shared"

It was such developments that encouraged academics (and the World Bank) to invent the new term "governance" - not just as a neutral term for a new structure but as a celebration of a new concept of "networking" which, in principle, offered greater pluralism of thinking about an issue.....
Indeed, in typically helpful academic fashion, they added an adjective "multi-level" to most discussions to give us the acronym MLG
In a famous phrase, RAW Rhodes called the result "hollowed-out government" - with one of the consequences being that Governments were able to disown unpopular decisions (not least  of the EU) and Governance and Public Administration (2000) sets out that academic's argument
"Whatever happened to Public Administration? - governance, governance everywhere" was a useful paper which tried to explore (in 2004) what lay behind the word's sudden appearance. 

That's the background.
I now have two questions 
- did the new term actually serve any useful purpose?
- why has the term disappeared from academic discourse?

Recommended Reading
Rethinking governance – the centrality of the state in modern society; S Bell and A Hindmoor (2009) A good overview of the concept - putting it firmly in its place

Matt Flinders gave us an excellent short article in 1999 with an excellent overview of the word

Peter Drucker's 6 sins of PA - a post with a very comprehensive annotated bib on the key readings
Time to Reclaim public services - an update
Governance in the 21st Century (OECD 2001) an interesting book whose summary suggests first that "old forms of governance in both the public and private sectors are becoming increasingly ineffective. Second, the new forms of governance that are likely to be needed over the next few decades will involve a much broader range of active players eg active citizens. Third, and perhaps most importantly, two of the primary attributes of today’s governance systems – the usually fixed and permanent allocations of power that are engraved in the structures and constitutions of many organisations; and, the tendency to vest initiative exclusively in the hands of those in senior positions in the hierarchy – look set to undergo fundamental changes"

The Pandemic as a Warning Shot

The last post ended with a suggestion that how we behave in a crisis is a mark of our character and that all of us should feel under a moral microscope in times of crisis. A post last autumn had made the point that

Nobody seems to want to talk any more about “character” – perhaps it has shades of “self-discipline” and “self-control” when the spirit of the age continues to encourage the self to flourish?So it took some courage for David Brooks to produce in 2015 a book entitled “The Road to Character” consisting of profiles of 8 people whose life demonstrates “character” including Dwight Eisenhower, Samuel Johnson (!), George Marshall (of Marshall Fund fame), St Augustine (!), the american woman behind Roosevelt’s New Deal (Francis Perkins), the charity worker behind “The Catholic Worker” (Dorothy Day) and George Eliot, the British writer.

I idly googled the Ngram user for "character" to discover that useage of the word "character" has fallen in the past decade to almost zero!
No wonder that I followed up that post by wondering whether our social DNA was changing

Some months back I referred to a vimeo encouraging us to use lockdown to conduct more meaningful conversations . It invited us to consider the following questions -
- what we found the most difficult thing about the lockdown?
- how we reacted to it eg fears and hopes?
- what we were ”bringing” to the experience? eg characteristics/strengths
- which of a range of ”spheres” (work, family, friends, personal development, health, finances, wider community) we actually spent time on?

This was part of what was called the Adventus Initiative  which went on to consider, coming out of Covid19,
- what sort of changes (if any) we might we want to make in our priorities?
- for example in the time we devote to each of those spheres?
- what our first action would be?
In many ways, however, this reflects the privileged world which global warming should have us questioning - with both Extinction Rebellion  and Bill McKibben upping the ante

The Canadian blogger Dave Pollard has a great post today which imagines that we are almost at the end of the 21st century - with "civilisation" as we know it today having completely broken down and our lives lived in small communities - generally in primitive form of wars with one another. His "retrospective" covers 11 points - and I have selected the last three to give you a sense of his argument

9 We have had our share of crises, of course. The Great Earthquakes devastated America’s west-coast cities, though by then the big cities were already starting to be depopulated. We’ve had six pandemics that killed about 400 million people between them, though that number is highly imprecise, since the most recent ones, after the production of vaccines ceased in the third decade of the Long Depression, were uncontrolled and our information systems could no longer gather much reliable data on their impact. The latest one was extremely virulent, but since long-distance travel has pretty much ceased, its effects were severe but localized. We figure it’s likely to be like that going forward. The loss of the great forests to fire and insects has caused a whole cascade of ecological crises, as has the death of the oceans that preceded it. That has caused the hot deserts of the tropics and the cold deserts of the boreal areas to expand enormously, and they’re largely uninhabitable now, as are the semi-arid areas of western North America, central and east Asia, and southern Europe that have grown unbearably hot and have long ago run out of water.

10 And water, always our most precious resource, is now probably the biggest factor driving our population down and our continuing migrations to areas where it is still available. It was the cause of the last great wars, in the northern parts of North America and Europe, and across Asia. When the Long Depression eliminated the capacity to create and maintain pipelines to transport water long distances, those wars ended in a whimper. But with the Long Migration, even that water is in danger of running out, especially as the climate collapse worsens.

11 You might be surprised to learn that, despite not having man-made pharmaceuticals, vaccines, or hospitals, our life expectancy is about the same as it was in 2020. We apparently eat much more nutritious food than people did then — less of it, almost entirely plants, and no processed food — and we of necessity exercise more, as we live without most of the electrically-powered equipment that made lives in 2020 dangerously physically inactive. And I’m not sure why, but we seem less obsessed about dying than people back then were. Maybe it’s because we see it when it happens, whereas in 2020 it was always hidden, in institutions, behind closed doors.

The pandemic tells us, surely, that the sort of modern life we had taken so easily for granted is now over....Some aspects of normality may return - but our easy reliance on air travel, mass tourism and imports will surely reduce significantly. 
If we are to be able properly to anticipate and prepare for our new future, we will all need a strong shot of imagination ...

Resource on global warming
What is wrong with us?
Facing Extinction

Who's having a good Covid19 War?

Covid19 certainly "separates the wheat from the chaff" - it didn't take long, for example, for us to identify the "good" leaders (both political and professional) whose judgements we felt we could trust - for example Ahern and Merkel and the Far-East leaders mentioned in Pankaj Mishra's article in the last post. The 1990s saw an interest in something called "good governance" - which tended to degenerate into a rather mechanistic list of desiderata unable, for example, to throw any light on the odd fact that  two of the countries with the highest Covid19 death rates (US and UK) are also the countries which
- have adversarial,”first past the post”, electoral systems;
- pride themselves on their ”exceptionalism”;
- gave us neoliberalism;
-  have a transactional approach to business which insists on paring costs down to a bare minimum – regardless, as Paul Collier argued recently, of the damage this does to social resilience.

Covid19 offers an opportunity to rethink what became a rather sterile academic debate about what was a pretty vague concept ("good governance") and to craft instead useful guides to the far more important topic of good government
There are, for example, thousands of books about leadership  but not so many about political leadership. It's certainly worth trying to identify what Merkel and Ahern have - which distinguishes them from Trump. Johnson and Bolsonaro - eg calmness under pressure; a search for a diversity of opinions; a refusal to be rushed into decisions; integrity; and effective story-telling are vastly underestimated features of the good leader

Fukuyama is one of many commentators who have identified the issue of Trust as a defining one for government systems in the future.

The crucial determinant in performance will not be the type of regime, but the state’s capacity and, above all, trust in government.
All political systems need to delegate discretionary authority to executive branches during times of crisis. No set of preexisting laws or rules can ever anticipate all of the novel and rapidly changing situations that countries will face. The capacity of people at the top, and their judgment, determine whether outcomes are good or bad.

And in making that delegation of authority to the executive, trust is the single most important commodity that will determine the fate of a society. In a democracy no less than in a dictatorship, citizens have to believe that the executive knows what it is doing.
It is a popular misconception that liberal democracies necessarily have weak governments because they have to respect popular choice and legal procedure. All modern governments have developed a powerful executive branch, because no society can survive without one. They need a strong, effective, modern state that can concentrate and deploy power when necessary to protect the community, keep public order, and provide essential public services. A democracy delegates emergency powers to its executive to deal with fast-moving threats.

But willingness to delegate power and its effective use depend on one thing above all, which is trust that the executive will use those powers wisely and effectively. And this is where the U.S. has a big problem right now.

Trust is built on two foundations.
- citizens must believe that their government has the expertise, technical knowledge, capacity, and impartiality to make the best available judgments. Capacity simply has to do with the government having an adequate number of people with the right training and skills to carry out the tasks they are assigned, from local firemen, policemen, and health workers to the government executives making higher-level decisions about issues such as quarantines and bailouts.
- The second foundation is trust in the top end of the hierarchy, which means, in the U.S. system, the president. Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt enjoyed high levels of trust during their respective crises. As wartime presidents, this trio succeeded in symbolizing, in their own persons, the national struggle. George W. Bush did initially after September 11, but as his invasion of Iraq soured, citizens began questioning the delegations of authority they had made to him via legislation like the Patriot Act. The United States today faces a crisis of political trust. Trump’s base—the 35–40 percent of the population that will support him no matter what—has been fed a diet of conspiracy stories for the past four years concerning the “deep state,” and taught to distrust expertise that does not actively support the president.

And even the world of political science has woken up to the importance of Trust - with the UK's Economic and  Social Research Council funding a programme on the subject which has so far released such papers as
- "Trust, Mistrust and Distrust"
- "Lesson-Drawing from New Zealand"
- "Nudges against pandemics - on the Swedish experience" ( by Swedish political scientist J Pierre)
For a more critical view of the Swedish left's response see here

But it's all of us who should feel under a moral microscope in times of crisis - not just our leaders. How we behave in a crisis is a mark of our character - which often finds expression in our choice of career. I was intrigued by a recent post which suggested that certain character deficiencies of economists had been exposed during the Covid Crisis

Update;

I missed this always-interesting Matt Flinders' article on The Politics of Covid19 - trust, blame and understanding 
The interesting UK Alternative journal commissioned and published this interesting report on how Plymouth activists have responded to the pandemic

We need to talk about ....the state

Governments have long been an easy target for public anger - whether defined as the particular collection of personalities who form a particular political regime OR as the administrative systems which provide our public services. But underlying attitudes to the state  tend to ebb and flow....25 years ago "the State"  was very much out of favour - with the low point being probably the 1997 World Bank annual development report "The State in a changing world" which reflected the neo-liberal critique of the very concept of state provision which had become the default mode.

The new millennium saw the beginnings of a realisation that the pendulum had swung too far toward business and deregulation; and that the state did have important functions to manage The global financial crash of 2008 should have brought us to our senses - but didn't.
It is rather Covid 19  which has brought the whole issue of the role and performance of government back into public debate

Last month Pankaj Mishra had a superb long article in LRB about what the performance of different states on Covid 19 tells us.
And an article in the forthcoming issue of the Political Quarterly - "Covid 19 and the blunders of our governments" - by Gerry Stokes et al is an early example of the sort of academic treatment we can look forward to in the near future (be warned - this may be behind a paywall - but an annual sub for the best UK political journal is under 20 pounds!) The article sets the UK government's performance in the pandemic in the wider context of the political science literature of the past 25 years on "policy blunders" and makes some recommendations which, I have to say, I found very weak.
But first, Mishra

The escalating warning signs – that absolute cultural power provincialises, if not corrupts, by deepening ignorance about both foreign countries and political and economic realities at home – can no longer be avoided as the US and Britain cope with mass death and the destruction of livelihoods.
Covid-19 shattered what John Stuart Mill called ‘the deep slumber of a decided opinion’, forcing many to realise that they live in a broken society, with a carefully dismantled state. As the Süddeutsche Zeitung put it in May, unequal and unhealthy societies are ‘a good breeding ground for the pandemic’. Profit-maximising individuals and businesses, it turns out, can’t be trusted to create a just and efficient healthcare system, or to extend social security to those who need it most. 

East Asian states have displayed far superior decision-making and policy implementation. Some (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea) have elected leaders; two (China, Vietnam) are single-party dictatorships that call themselves communist.
They share the assumption that genuine public interest is different from the mere aggregation of private interests, and is best realised through long-term government planning and policy. They also believe that only an educated and socially responsible elite can maintain social, economic and political order. The legitimacy of this ruling class derives not so much from routine elections as from its ability to ensure social cohesion and collective well-being. Its success in alleviating suffering during the pandemic suggests that the idealised view of democracy and free markets prized since the Cold War will not survive much longer.

Few narratives are more edifying, as economies tank and mass unemployment looms, than the account of the ‘social state’ that emerged in Germany in the second half of the 19th century. In "Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age" (1998), Daniel Rodgers showed that many Americans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries returned from stays in Germany with ideas that would inform the New Deal.

‘The state must take the matter into its own hands,’ Bismarck announced in the 1880s as he introduced insurance programmes for accident, sickness, disability and old age. German liberals, a tiny but influential minority, made the usual objections: Bismarck was opening the door to communism, imposing a ‘centralised state bureaucracy’, a ‘state insurance juggernaut’ and a ‘system of state pension’ for idlers and parasites. German socialists saw that their Machiavellian persecutor was determined to drive a wedge between them and the working class. Nevertheless, Bismarck’s social insurance system wasn’t only retained and expanded in Germany as it moved through two world wars, several economic catastrophes and Nazi rule; it also became a model for much of the world. 

Japan was Germany’s most assiduous pupil, and the Japanese, in turn, inspired China’s first generation of modern leaders, many of whom spent years in Tokyo and Osaka. Despite the defeat and devastation of the Second World War and the US occupation, Japan has continued to influence East Asia’s other late-developing nation-states: South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam.
What made Germany such a compelling prototype for Japan? It is that Germany was a classic ‘late developer’ – the archetype of all nation-states in Asia and Africa. It unified only in 1871 and began to industrialise nearly a hundred years after Britain. Its leaders had to cope with the simultaneous challenges of rapid mechanisation and urbanisation, the disappearance of traditional livelihoods, the growth of trusts and cartels as well as trade unions, and an intensifying demand, articulated by a vibrant socialist movement, for political participation.

Fascinating stuff - which owes not a little to Francis Fukuyama's brilliant 2 volume study of "The Origins of Political Order - and Decay"
Regular readers will know that I am trying to complete a book with the title "Is Admin Reform really all that sexy?"  I last blogged about my efforts at the beginning of the year  This is clearly the signal to get back to work!