For
the past 3 weeks I’ve been trying to compress the thoughts I (and many others!!)
have had over the past few decades about administrative reform into a table
whose columns list core questions; narratives; and key texts …..
It
was all sparked off by the book published earlier this year on Dismembering
(the State) – although the subject has been a lot in my thoughts this year
There
may now be hundreds of thousands of academics and consultants in this field
but, when I started to challenge the local bureaucracy in Scotland in the late
60s there were, astonishingly, only a handful of people challenging public bureaucracies – basically in the UK and the US.
In
the US they were following (or part of) Johnston’s Anti-Poverty programmes and
included people such as Peter Marris and Martin Rein whose Dilemmas
of Social Reform (1967) was one of the first narratives to make an impact
on me.
In the UK it was those associated with the 1964-66 Fulton Royal
Commission on the Civil Service; with the Redcliffe-Maud and Wheatley Royal
Commissions on Local Government; and. those such as Kay Carmichael who, as a
member of the Kilbrandon Committee, was the inspiration for the Scottish Social
Work system set up in 1969.
In
the 70s, people like John Stewart of INLOGOV inspired a new vision of local
government…my ex-tutor John MacIntosh focused on devolution; even the
conservative politician Michael Heseltine had a vision of a new metropolitan
politics…..
It
was people like this that set the ball of organizational change rolling in the
public sector…. tracked by such British academics as Chris Hood, Chris Pollitt
and Rod Rhodes – and who have supplied a living first for thousands of
European academics who started to follow the various reforms of the 1970s in
the civil service and local government; and then the privatization and
agencification of the 1980s. Consultants then got on the bandwagon when british
administrative reform took off globally in the 1990s.
Working
on the tables incorporated in the past few posts has involved a lot of googling
- and shuffling of books from the shelves of my glorious oak bookcase here in
the mountains to the generous oak table which looks out on the snow which now
caps those mountains……
Hundreds
of books on public management reform (if you count the virtual ones in the
library) – but, for me, there are only a handful of names whose writing makes
the effort worthwhile. They are the 2 Chris’s – Chris Hood and Chris Pollitt;
Guy Peters; and Rod Rhodes. With Chris Pollitt way out in front……Here’s a sense of how he has been writing in recent years -
There
have been many failures in the history of public management reform – even in
what might be thought of as the best‐equipped countries.
Six of the most common seems to have been:
· Prescription before
diagnosis. No good doctor would ever do this, but politicians,
civil servants and management consultants do it frequently. A proper
diagnosis means much more than just having a general impression of inefficiency
or ineffectiveness (or whatever). It means a thorough analysis of
what mechanisms, processes and attitudes are producing the undesirable features
of the status quo and an identification of how these mechanisms can be altered
or replaced. Such an analysis constitutes a model of the
problem. This kind of modelling is probably far more useful to
practical reformers than the highly abstract discussions of alternative models
of governance with which some academics have been more concerned (e.g. Osborne,
2010). [For a full exposition of this realist approach to
programme logic, see Pawson, 2013. For an explanation of why very
general models of governance, are of limited value in practical analysis see
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, pp11‐25 and 208‐221]
· Failure to build a
sufficient coalition for reform, so that the reform is seen as just the project
of a small elite. This is particularly dangerous in countries
where governments change rapidly, as in some parts of the CEE. Once
a government falls or an elite is ousted, the reform has no roots and dies.
· Launching reforms without ensuring sufficient
implementation capacity. For example, it is very risky to
launch a programme of contracting out public services unless and until there
exists a cadre of civil servants who are trained and skilled in contract
design, negotiation and monitoring. Equally, it is dangerous to impose a
sophisticated performance management regime upon an organization which has
little or no previous experience of performance
measurement. And it is also hazardous to run down the
government’s in‐house IT
capacity 6 and rely too much on external expertise (Dunleavy et al,
2006). In each of these cases in‐ house capacity
can be improved, but not overnight.
· Haste and lack of
sustained application. Most major management reforms take years
fully to be implemented. Laws must be passed, regulations rewritten, staff re‐trained, new
organizational structures set up, appointments made, new procedures run and
refined, and so on. This extended implementation may seem
frustrating to politicians who want action (or at least announcements) now, but
without proper preparation reforms will more likely fail. Endless
reforms or ’continuous revolution’ is not a recipe for a well‐functioning
administration
· Over‐reliance
on external experts rather than experienced locals. As management
reform has become an international business, international bodies such as the
OECD or the major management consultancies have become major players. A
fashion has developed in some countries to ’call in the external experts’, as
both a badge of legitimacy and a quick way of accessing international ’best
practice’ Equally, there is perhaps a tendency to
ignore local, less clearly articulated knowledge and experience. Yet
the locals usually know much more about contextual factors than the visiting
(and temporary) experts. .
· Ignoring local cultural factors. For example, a
reform that will work in a relatively high trust and low corruption culture
such as, say, Denmark’s, is far less likely to succeed in a low trust/higher
corruption environment such as prevails in, say, some parts of the Italian
public sector. In the EU there are quite large cultural variations
between different countries and sectors……………
I would suggest a number of
‘lessons’ which could be drawn from the foregoing analysis:
1.
Big models, such
as NPM or ‘good governance’ or ‘partnership working’, often do not take one
very far. The art of reform lies in their adaptation (often very extensive) to
fit local contexts. And anyway,
these models are seldom entirely well-defined or consistent in themselves. Applying the big models or even standardized
techniques (benchmarking, business process re-engineering, lean) in a
formulaic, tick-box manner can be highly counterproductive.
2.
As many scholars
and some practitioners have been observing for decades, there is no ‘one best
way’. The whole exercise of reform
should begin with a careful diagnosis of the local situation, not with the
proclamation of a model (or technique) which is to be applied, top down. ‘No prescription without careful diagnosis’
is not a bad motto for reformers.
3.
Another, related
point is that task differences really do matter. A market-type mechanism may work quite well when
applied to refuse collection but not when applied to hospital care. Sectoral and task differences are important,
and reformers should be wary of situations where their advisory team lacks
substantial expertise in the particular tasks and activities that are the
targets for reform.
4.
Public Management
Reform (PMR) is always political as well as managerial/organizational. Any prescription or diagnosis which does not
take into account the ‘way politics works around here’ is inadequate and
incomplete. Some kernel of active
support from among the political elite is usually indispensable.
5.
PMR is usually
saturated with vested interests, including those of the consultants/advisors,
and the existing public service staff.
To conceptualise it as a purely technical exercise would be naïve.
6.
Successful PMR
is frequently an iterative exercise, over considerable periods of time. Reformers must adapt and also take advantage
of ‘windows of opportunity’. This
implies a locally knowledgable presence over time, not a one-shot ‘quick fix’
by visiting consultants.
7.
It does work
sometimes! But, as indicated at the
outset, humility is not a bad starting point.