what you get here

This is not a blog which opines on current events. It rather uses incidents, books (old and new), links and papers to muse about our social endeavours.
So old posts are as good as new! And lots of useful links!

The Bucegi mountains - the range I see from the front balcony of my mountain house - are almost 120 kms from Bucharest and cannot normally be seen from the capital but some extraordinary weather conditions allowed this pic to be taken from the top of the Intercontinental Hotel in late Feb 2020

Tuesday, January 27, 2026

Music and Painting for a Rainy Day

It’s just midday here in Bucharest so I have only a few posts to recommend – the first being one of my favourite singers, Alan Price (whom I’m glad say is still alive, being a few months older than me) who supplied the theme songs for the famous  Lindsay Anderson film “O Lucky Man. The other posts are -

The Carney Doctrine Luke Savage Does the US need a Deeper State?. It was a couple of years ago I last posted about the
deep state World War III my Sri Lankan blogger Roger Fry exhibition Systems Thinking for Civil Servants Martin Stanley. I've never really got my head around this notion Timothy Snyder on his Bill of Wrongs. Superb satire from the author of "On Tyranny"

Sunday, January 25, 2026

JUST A TYPICAL DAY

I wanted to share the reading I do each day – before 3.30pm. So let me tell you 

that this Sunday these are the (various blogposter links eg this here) – a strange 
mix of right-wing tracts and left-wing writing
(2024)
(2025) reviewed here
(2020)
Henry Farrell and Abe Newman (2023)

Friday, January 23, 2026

Mark Carney wows Davos

Mark Carney may have been a hit at Davos but history may judge his speech differently. This is a brilliant contextualisation of Carney’s address this year to the Davos audience of company chief executives and government leaders

Mark Carney’s surprise manifesto at Davos got a lot of attention for presenting a big 
vision for the world but also, can I just say: Thucydides and Vaclav Havel in the same 
speech? The guy sure knows how to tug at my heartstrings. Is this what it feels like being 
pandered to? Let me just bask in it for a moment.Usually it’s dangerous to have an intellectual in office, but Carney comes from the 
world of finance and therefore has the requisite amount of cynicism. 
So it’s only right he opened his speech by quoting Thucydides: 
The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” This aphorism, he added, 
“is presented as inevitable, the natural logic of international relations reasserting itself.” 
As the rest of his speech suggests, there’s nothing natural about it. People who consider 
themselves tough-minded pragmatists love to pluck this line from the Melian Dialogue. 
They invoke it as timeless wisdom about power politics and a corrective to liberal 
delusions. 
“We live in a world, in the real world that is governed by strength, that is governed 
by force, that is governed by power,” Stephen Miller said in a recent CNN interview.
These are the iron laws of the world since the beginning of time.”
This is the governing philosophy of Trump’s second term, and it’s also exactly what 
brings down hegemons. The year after Athens delivers that famous ultimatum and 
brutalizes Melos, it launches the Sicilian Expedition. This act of imperial overreach 
destroys a massive portion of its fleet and army. Its alliance begins to fracture as the 
subject states, tired of Athenian arrogance (like the kind echoed by Miller), sense 
weakness and revolt. Within a decade, Athens has lost the war. Its walls are torn 
down and its empire is dissolved.
The Melian Dialogue is not endorsing a timeless law of global politics. It’s showing 
us Athens at the precise peak of its imperial hubris: the moment when a great 
power becomes so convinced of its own invincibility that it can no longer perceive its 
limits. Does that sound like anyone else right now? But their fall only proves the point, 
someone inevitably responds. They became weak and suffered what they must, right? 
No. The Sicilian disaster was not just some unrelated streak of bad luck. 
The same hubris that led Athens to dismiss diplomacy as irrelevant to the strong is 
what led them to believe they could conquer Sicily.
The failure of self-knowledge, and the inability to see your own limits — or worse, 
seeing yourself as exempt from these limits — is what destroys great powers. 
If there’s one timeless lesson of history we can extract from the Peloponnesian War, 
that would be it. But it’s not the lesson Trump or Miller have internalized. 
Despite what self-proclaimed realists like Miller believe, rejecting imperial hubris does 
not require the embrace of mushy liberal beliefs about morality or global justice. 
It’s not about the weak eventually prevailing over the strong, or some other feel-good 
nonsense. For all their faults, actual realists (the ones who write books but don’t make 
policy) recognize the quote for what it is: pragmatic caution about strategic over-reach.

The Greengrocer’s Revenge
Carney then pivots to something clever: Václav Havel’s greengrocer. Every morning, 
the greengrocer places a sign in his window: Workers of the world, unite! He doesn’t 
believe it; no one does. But he places the sign anyway to avoid trouble, to signal 
compliance, to get along, etc. And because every shopkeeper on the street does the 
same, the system trudges on. 
Not through violence alone,” Carney says, “but through the participation of ordinary people 
in rituals they privately know to be false.”
Carney’s argument is that for decades, middle powers like Canada have played the 
greengrocer. They placed the “rules-based international order” sign in the window. 
They knew the story was partially false, that in many places the liberal order was not 
liberal or even orderly. That “the strongest exempted themselves when convenient, 
that trade rules were enforced asymmetrically, that international law applied with 
varying rigor depending on the identity of the accused.”
But it was a useful fiction so long as American hegemony provided public goods: 
open sea lanes, stable finance, global trade, collective security, frameworks for 
resolving disputes. It provided a sense of stability or at least acquiescence to weaker 
states. Not every time, but enough that they would keep the sign in the window.This bargain no longer works,” Carney said. “We are in the midst of a rupture, 
not a transition.

What Havel knew, and what American MAGA triumphalists have forgotten, is that power 
built on performed compliance is fragile in a very specific way. It depends on the continued 
willingness of the powerless to keep performing. The moment the greengrocer removes 
his sign, the illusion begins to crack, because his refusal reveals that the whole edifice 
rests on a mutual agreement. For countries like Canada, their part of the agreement was 
to ignore the liberal order’s partial hypocrisy in order to reap the benefits of cooperative 
coexistence. But that lasts only as long as the hegemon makes cooperative coexistence 
possible.
The self-proclaimed pragmatists who quote “the strong do what they can” imagine this 
as a stable equilibrium, a description of how power works forever. But the Athenians 
who deliver that ultimatum to Melos are not wise statesmen seeing clearly. 
They’re men drunk on their own power, ready to sail into catastrophe.
Carney seems to be betting, I think correctly, that America under Trump has reached its 
Melian moment: maximum confidence, minimum self-knowledge. 
Trump’s tariffs-as-leverage obsession assumes permanent asymmetry, that the United 
States can weaponize economic integration indefinitely while its targets have no choice 
but to comply.
But the greengrocer can remove his sign. Supply chains can diversify. Alliances can 
hedge, as they have already. Each act of coercion accelerates the erosion of the compliance 
that made America’s global order effective to both its originator and its subjects. 
What does it mean for middle powers to take down the sign? 
Carney lays out a proto-doctrine for middle powers. To begin with, refuse to live in the lie. 
Stop invoking the rules-based order as though it still functions. Call the emerging system 
what it is: a world where the most powerful increasingly pursue their interests using 
force and economic statecraft as weapons of coercion. But most importantly, 
reduce the hegemonic leverage enabling this coercion. Countries earn the right to principled 
stands, he said, by reducing their vulnerability to retaliation. 
Rather than waiting for the hegemon to restore an order it’s busy dismantling, 
create your own institutions and agreements that function as intended.Hegemons cannot continually monetize their relationships,” Carney continued. 
“Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty. Buy insurance. Increase options.” 
He got a standing ovation at the end of his speech, which I’m told is an unusual 
reaction at Davos. I think it resonated not just because he’s offering a bigger vision, 
but because it names what everyone in the room already knows but still hesitates to 
say out loud: the old bargain is dead and the grocer’s sign must be taken down. 
This is the insight that Melian Dialogue quote-mongers typically miss. 
Power that rests on the performed compliance of others is more fragile than it looks. 
The strong do what they can, until the moment they discover that “what they can” 
was always bounded by what others were willing to tolerate. Athens found out in Sicily; 
the question is where America finds out.
But my favourite blogger (a Canadian citizen from from Sri Lanka) sounds a 
different and overdue note 

People like Canada's Mark Carney are crying foul about the demise of the ‘rules-based 
order’ now, over fucking Greenland, and not over the whole Palestinian genocide he 
just merrily supplied and supported, or any number of atrocities Canada has been 
involved in, including Canada. White people really want to do crime and high-fives 
for confessing. I hope America does take Canada, to cure them of their delusion of 
being the ‘good guys’ of colonialism. I say this as a passport-carrying Canadian.
Carney's ‘speech of the century’ isn't worth the dust on a Palestinian fighter's 
sandals. His resistance isn't worth a drop of sweat from the actual resistance, 
which Canada still condemns as terrorists. Canada is still on America's side in 
every imperial war, they're not on our side at all. Remember that Canada is a 
card-carrying member of the White Empire and is only complaining now that its 
white privileges are being threatened. Remember that Carney was Central Banker 
for the UK also, he's a ripe example of how Canada is not a real country and how 
the White Empire is one.
What he's complaining about here is not a loss of human rights but white privilege. The privilege to invade other people but to keep your own stolen home. Even within the speech, Carney is proudly talking about funding the corrupt Ukrainian dictatorship, all to further American interests. He's only complaining now that America is interested in his territory, he has no actual principles. Carney is still part of the imperial tail proudly wagging even as the big dog shits on them. Carney just another historical vandal trying to white himself out of history as White Empire becomes a scandal to white people. As AimĂ© CĂ©saire said, 

What he cannot forgive [Trump] for is not the crime in itself, the crime against man, it is 
not the humiliation of man as such, it is the crime against the white man, the humiliation 
of the white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which 
until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the “coolies” of India, 
and the “niggers” of Africa... And that is the great thing I hold against pseudo-humanism.

It's honestly funny watching these colonizers scurry for cover as they discover that 
they're Euro-peons and the 51st State to Americans. ‘The Coalition of The Willing’ 
is baffled that the country that invaded so many countries with might turn around 
and invade them. Remember that colonizers always lie and hide in abstractions, 
there's no general principle at work here, it's just the usual racism.
Hence Carney proposes a whites-only non-aligned movement like he just came 
up with the idea of ‘middle powers,’ when he could just join colored people. 
But he won't. Canada still supports America's war against Russia, 
still exploits Africa via mining, and still backs the death cult 'Israel'. 
Canada has no problem with white supremacism as long as it benefits them. 
That's the only principle at play here, they only speak out when it threatens 
their capital. As Césaire said, continuing,
And that is the great thing I hold against pseudo-humanism: that for too long it has 
diminished the rights of man, that its concept of those rights has been
—and still is—narrow and fragmentary, incomplete and biased and, all things considered, 
sordidly racist.
Mark Carney is just another hand-wringing White guy, his hands 
dripping with blood and his mouth redolent with bullshit. 
As CĂ©saire said (honestly, just read Discourse On Colonialism), 

Before they were its victims, they were its accomplices; that they tolerated that Nazism before 
it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, 
until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples.”

Even worse is the Kingdom of Denmark, which is further up shit creek and furiously 
peddling bullshit. Their Ambassador to the US, Jesper Moller Sorensen, piously 
and pathetically said, 

The Kingdom of Denmark has always stood shoulder-to-shoulder w[ith the USA] After 9/11,
 Denmark answered the US' call. We lost more soldiers in Afghanistan per capita than 
any other NATO ally.” 

He's seriously saying we helped you occupy non-Europeans, why would you do it to us? 
Their Ambassador is fondly remembering the murder tour they took of Afghanistan 
together, and wondering where the bromance has gone. 
These people are not mourning the loss of the ‘rules-based order’ here, 
they're bemoaning the fact that the actual rules might apply to them. 
That they might be invaded because they're weak, despite their White skin. 
Europeans are discovering they're the rump end of White Empire, as they get 
slapped 

 Peter Oborne has also been on Carney's track https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/carney-wants-new-world-order-only-west

Monday, January 12, 2026

Apologies

 My deep apologies for the textual overlapping which has become such an annoying feature of these posts. I simply don't know how to deal with this problem - which reflects so badly on blogger.com!

Democratic Backsliding

Designing Resistance -  democratic institutions and the threat of backsliding (IDEA 2023) 

The following (non-exhaustive) list outlines 12 of the most frequently seen trends in backsliding:

    • 1. Draining, packing and instrumentalizing the judiciary. This process begins by diluting the power of the judiciary—for example, by restricting its jurisdiction or lowering judicial retirement ages to purge sitting judges from the bench. The court is then packed, either by filling newly vacant seats or by adding or expanding tribunals in order to allow the current majority to confirm several judges at once. Once reconstituted, power is reinfused into the judiciary, who can act to enable and legitimize the backsliding regime’s policies as well as to attack the opposition. See: Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Hungary, Israel, Nicaragua, Maldives, Poland, TĂĽrkiye, United States of America, Venezuela.

    • 2. Tilting the electoral playing field. This involves making changes to the electoral system to heavily favour the incumbent. This can include changing electoral districts and apportionment (gerrymandering), curating the electorate through selective enfranchisement/disenfranchisement and changing the way that surplus votes and seats are distributed between winners and losers. It might also include finding ways to disqualify opposition members from standing for election or reducing transparency or independence in election management and oversight. See: Albania, Benin, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Georgia, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Serbia, TĂĽrkiye, Ukraine, USA, Venezuela, Zambia.

    • 3. Weakening the power of the existing opposition. Limiting the ability of the existing opposition to check the government complements the tactic of working to keep the opposition from gaining power. It has been achieved by using disciplinary sanctions against opposition members to remove them from parliament and amending parliamentary procedures to reduce the floor time or bargaining power of the minority. See: Ecuador, Hungary, India, TĂĽrkiye, Ukraine, USA (Tennessee), Venezuela, Zambia.

    • 4.Creating a democratic shell. This tactic involves incorporating measures into the constitution or legal system which are ostensibly democratizing or liberalizing but do not necessarily have that effect in practice. This might occur when design choices are imported from other democratic systems but are divorced from other elements central to their functioning or lack the enforcement mechanisms that give them teeth. This strategy allows the backslider to point to design elements borrowed from strong democratic countries and insist that criticism is unfounded or even hypocritical. See: Hungary, North Macedonia, TĂĽrkiye.

    • 5. Shifting competencies/parallel institutions. This strategy entails shifting powers from a non-captured institution to a captured one. This can be useful when the existing institution has effective safeguards for independence. For example, a backslider could set up a new elections oversight committee, which is then given some powers previously held by an independent election management board. While this may, at first glance, appear simply to give greater attention to an important issue, it ensures that this attention is exercised by those chosen by the administration. See: Hungary, Israel, Poland, Venezuela. 5. 5.

    • 6. Political capture: realigning chains of command and accountability. This involves
    • changing appointment procedures or bringing an office under the command of a different (political) office, thus infusing civil service offices with a political pressure that is difficult to detect from the outside. For example, independent prosecutors may be brought under the command of the Minister of Justice, having originally been accountable to an independent judicial oversight board chosen by judges and lawyers. See: Hungary, Israel, Poland.

    • 7. Selective prosecution and enforcement. Selectivity is one of the most common and liberally used of the backsliding methods. On the prosecution side, it may include prosecuting political opponents for low-level non-political crimes—such as building code violations or tax infractions—which
    • are not generally strictly enforced. On the rights side, it might include having

    • laws on the books that ostensibly protect minorities but failing to enforce them

    • when certain unfavoured minorities are affected. See: India, TĂĽrkiye, Ukraine,

    • USA, Zambia.


    • 8. Evasion of term limits. Eliminating term limits is usually justified by one

    • of two arguments. One is that they obstruct the ability of the people to choose their own leader. The other is that they impede the ability of

    • the backslider—portrayed as the only true representative and defender of the

    • interests of ‘the people’—to vindicate those interests. Term limits may be

    • evaded in a number of ways beyond mere elimination. The toolkit includes

    • examples such as enacting term limits that do not apply retroactively

    • (El Salvador); rotating out of office and then back in (Russia); and delaying

    • elections on purportedly emergency grounds (Ethiopia). See: Armenia, Bolivia,

    • Burkina Faso, Burundi, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Venezuela. 9.


    • Expanding executive power. Most tools in the toolkit involve eroding the

    • checks on the exercise of executive power. The converse of these strategies

    • is the direct expansion of that power. Expanding executive power is, in some

    • sense, the most direct form of backsliding because backsliding largely serves

    • the main end goal of aggrandizing power personally to the backslider.

    • While more efficient and effective, directly expanding power is more transparent and thus politically costly than the subtler art of shaving down checks. Executive powers that have been expanded include control over appointments (Ukraine), control over finances (Hungary) or even the power to decree laws on certain topics, like banking or use of national resources (Venezuela). See: Armenia, Hungary, TĂĽrkiye, Ukraine, USA, Venezuela.
    • 10. Temporal entrenchment (‘harpooning’). This refers to a strategy

    • whereby backsliders make major changes while they enjoy a

    • supermajority and then move to make it as difficult as possible

    • for those changes to be undone. This involves (a) requiring a

    • future supermajority to undo the changes and (b) relying on other

    • measures, such as tilting the electoral playing field, to make it

    • difficult for the opposition to acquire such a supermajority.

    • We refer to this strategy as ‘harpooning’ because the backslider

    • penetrates the halls of power, makes changes and then makes these

    • difficult to undo—much in the way that a harpoon opens and cannot

    • be pulled back out. See: Hungary.

    • 11. Shrinking the civic space. This tactic includes attacks on the media,

    • civil society organizations and the civil liberties of the electorate. These should

    • normally act as checks on government by demanding government transparency

    • and promoting government accountability, facilitating the organization of opposition

    • and protest, and, of course, by exercising the franchise. However, the backslider

    • can significantly impair the ability of these non-government ‘institutions’ to act as a

    • check by buying up, shutting down or regulating the media; placing onerous

    • requirements on unfriendly civil society organizations; and using libel laws or states

    • of emergency to restrict freedoms of expression and association among the electorate.

    • See: Hungary, Poland, TĂĽrkiye, Zambia.

    • 12. Non-institutional strategies. While this Report canvasses

    • institutional tactics by which backsliding is achieved, it is still imperative for the

    • constitution-builder to consider non-institutional strategies, such as using populist

    • rhetoric or supporting discriminatory policies. Account should be given to how

    • institutional design choices can help (a) to address a backslider’s ability to use such

    • non-institutional tactics to their advantage and (b) to prevent the conditions that

    • give rise to backsliding in the first place. Regulation of political parties, for example,

    • may help prevent backsliding candidates from entering office at all.


Wednesday, January 7, 2026

FINAL POST ON LEFTISM

There have, apparently, been posts about 30 books on the leftist theme in my recent writing – of which several are my favourites eg 

Corbyn Leo Panitch and Colin Hay (2020) 

Each of the three great economic crises of the last century – the 1930s, the 1970s and the decade after 2008 – precipitated a crisis in the Labour Party.

Each time, the crisis posed fundamental questions of ideology, organisation and unity, and ended up by propelling into the leadership a radical socialist MP from the party’s left wing. In each instance this produced a sharp reaction aimed at blocking whatever potential the crisis had for taking the party in a new democratic-socialist direction. And in each case Britain’s relationship with Europe played an important role.

the fall of Corbyn Michael Chessum (2022).


Today I have 3 Beyond Social Democracy – the transformation of the left in 
emerging knowledge societies ed S Hausermann and H Kitschelt (2024)

The slow and intermittent electoral erosion of Social Democracy in the late twentieth century has accelerated over the past two decades across much of Europe. Almost none of the European social democratic parties has managed to defy the maelstrom of electoral decline. By the 2020s, most center-left parties carrying the social democratic, socialist, or labor label have become shadows of their former selves in terms of aggregate vote shares, members, activists, legislators, and government cabinet members. Scholars have offered many explanations for Social Democracy’s misfortunes.

No single hypothesis may be sufficient to account for this development exhaustively. Some of the explanations have a nostalgic flavor, arguing that social democratic parties have changed “too much” over the past decades, reneging on their established policy promises and thereby abandoning the needs of an erstwhile loyal electoral constituency. Other explanations posit that social democratic parties have changed “not enough,” failing to adapt to transformed voter potentials and to develop creative responses to novel societal and political-economic challenges that require Social Democrats to reimagine ways to advance social equality and universalism in society.

The first perspective – Social Democracy having changed “too much” – draws empirical support from some undeniable facts, such as the declining propensity to support Social Democracy among the parties’ traditional core constituencies, particularly blue-collar workers. However, the various empirical analyses in the chapters of this volume suggest that the overwhelming balance of evidence points toward Social Democrats not having adapted enough to changing substantive policy challenges, changing programmatic dynamics, and changing electoral landscapes.

Social democratic parties encounter massive difficulties in reimagining their programmatic electoral appeal to stem electoral decline. These difficulties, however, are not simply the consequence of strategic mistakes or myopia. Rather, both structural political-economic change and strategic party calculations make it virtually impossible to capture as encompassing an electoral constituency as many social democratic parties did in the period of post–World War II (WWII) economic prosperity growth in the West. Society has been profoundly transformed both socially and economically; it has become pluralized and more fragmented, and so have programmatic electoral competition and party systems.

In this more scattered and fragmented political space, ripe with political divides over programmatic positions and priorities, social democratic parties can nowhere extricate themselves from their current electoral predicaments. However, their fortunes vary with how they have coped over time with these new competitive situations. Most importantly, they are no longer the only and sometimes not even the largest parties in a “left field” of competitors – all of which embrace fundamental “social democratic values” but articulate them through different policies and by appealing to constituencies absent in the traditional social democratic electoral coalition.

Andrew Murray is a trade union activist with a strange aristocratic pedigree 
and author of The Fall and Rise of the British Left (2019)

While much of this book focuses on the fortunes of the Labour Party over the last fifty years, the Party itself is not necessarily coterminous with the British left. The latter includes all those who politically advocate for a shift to a socialist system of society, a grouping that overlaps considerably with the labour movement. In contrast, the Labour Party has always included an element (usually dominant) not interested in socialism at all, while the left has embraced movements, campaigns, initiatives and parties standing outside the Party.

Today, the left and the Labour Party are more closely entwined than at any point in history. This has been the outcome of the left’s own struggles against a rising and then declining neoliberalism since the 1970s. It is represented by Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership of the Labour Party, although it did not start there and won’t end there either. As a result, this is not another book about the rise of Corbyn. It is about a movement and the ideas underpinning it, which cannot be reduced to any one individual and will outlast any particular leadership and any foreseeable electoral outcomes.Chapters 1 through to 8 are more or less chronological, telling the fall–rise and rise–fall stories together, perhaps informing younger activists how we got here and what debates there were along the way. The two concluding chapters break with the chronology. In essence they seek to answer the question posed by a colleague who read an early draft of this book – ‘How do we win?’ – by which she meant how do we get from here to socialism.

None of the scenarios which gripped the left I grew up with in the twentieth century appear fully plausible any more, although neither 1917 nor 1945 seemed so in prior contemplation. In that spirit, we cross the river a stone at a time. The other bank is there, even if only dimly perceived, the present side no longer habitable. So what’s next? In many countries across Europe and North America, only two choices present themselves – a reconstituted centrism flogging the dead horse of the old dispensation, or a nationalist authoritarianism trading on populist sloganizing. These two live in a symbiotic relationship, sharing far more than either likes to admit. When push comes to shove, liberalism defends property and market rights first of all. If the liberals wanted to stop the rise of the authoritarians, one contribution to that cause might have been the jailing of a few bankers.

Instead, they were rewarded with a super-fast return to business – and bonuses – as usual. The parties and politicians of the left, like Hollande and Obama, who campaigned offering a different approach but ended up abandoning many of their pledges and conforming to the Wall Street–City–Brussels consensus instead, did more than anyone to inculcate a cynicism towards democratic politics and open the door to the nastiest elements of the right wing. The leaders of the authoritarian nationalists’ pseudo-alternative, for their part, treasure most of the system they rail against. Theirs is a rebellion against powerlessness organized by the powerful. Authoritarian populism is neoliberalism’s ugly enabler, not its principled opponent – a ‘populism’ which seeks to entrench gross inequality, strengthen every institution of class power, and preserve the basic institutions of economic liberalism while indulging freely in racism and xenophobia. The main purpose of the lurid Donald Trump is to make the rich still richer (himself definitely included). Indeed, the shift to authoritarianism represented by Trump, ErdoÄźan, Orbán, Modi and Bolsonaro mostly reflects the difficulty in extending neoliberalism by democratic means at a time of its rampant

unpopularity. This is not how history ends. Conjuring the spirit of Rosa Luxemburg, Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin warn that ‘the persistence of neoliberalism alongside hyper-nationalism through the crisis increasingly poses the question of “socialism vs barbarism redux”’.2 Barbarism redux is evidently on the menu, synthesizing elite neoliberalism with authoritarian identity politics – backing the bankers while banning the burka. Behind Boris Johnson, still worse may lurk.

The final book is Our Bloc – how we win James Schneider (2022). 
The Guardian reviewed the book and had this to say -

James Schneider was a co-founder of Momentum, the political movement formed off the 
back of Jeremy Corbyn’s election as Labour leader, and was later the party’s head of 
strategic communications.
In his new book, he takes a different approach. Opening boldly and promisingly, his first 
words are “defeatism plagues the British left”, and his introduction sketches his ambition: 
“To keep the possibilities open and turn winning from a distant hope into a reality, we 
must use the coming years to build power, weaken our opponents, and prepare ourselves 
for the next surge.” At just over 100 pages it is more of a pamphlet and the footnotes are 
vital, linking to books, blogs and articles, and pointing the reader towards a wide range of 
debates. The intellectual parenthood of the book is obvious – the political theorist 
Chantal Mouffe, and in particular her For a Left PopulismAntonio Gramscis Modern 
Prince in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, and the work of Stuart Hall. 
Such influences set severe standards, though, and Schneider fails to meet them.  
The intellectual energy that powered the rise of Corbyn was real, and it puts Labour party 
moderates to shame that the centrist intellectual touchstone Anthony Crosland’s 
The Future of Socialism is nearly 70 years old. Yes, the Labour manifesto was soundly 
rejected by voters in 2019, but it was enthusiastically endorsed by the same electorate in 2017. 
The UK left has to internalise the fact that both general elections were equally 
consequential: currently moderates focus on the landslide in 2019, and the left celebrate 
successfully destroying a Tory majority in 2017. Both sides are right – and both sides 
need each other.