I don’t like giving the orangutan any coverage but can’t ignore Trump’s reelection in the US – how on earth did a felon and rapist manage to convince so many Americans?? Michael Roberts is one of my favourite bloggers and has a good account here
As the FT put it: “In the end, it wasn’t even close. A presidentialelection long forecast to dance on a knife’s edge very quickly turnedout to be a rout for Donald Trump.” Trump polled 73.4m votes or 50%of the those who voted, while Harris polled 60m or 47.7% of the vote.Third party candidates mustered just 1.6%. Trump’s 4.3m lead was morethan Biden had in 2020, or Hillary Clinton had over Trump in 2016 (in fact -
as of 13 Nov - Trump had 3.2 million more votes than Harris). Trump’s vote did not rest on small margins in a handful of swing states, as was thecase when he won in 2016. Instead, he gained support across the electoral map instates both red (Republican) and blue (Democrat). Even in his birthplace ofNew York state, one of the bluest strongholds in the country, Trump winnowed a23-point gap down to 11.
The biggest caveat to Trump’s voting victory is that contrary to the usual hype of a
‘massive voter turnout’, fewer Americans eligible to vote bothered to do so compared to 2020. Then over 158m voted, this time the vote was down to 143m. The
voter turnout of those eligible fell to 58.2% from the high of 65.9% in 2020. Around 40% of Americans registered to vote did not do so. And the number of Americans who failed to register rose to 19m from 12m in 2020. So, although Trump got 51% of those who voted, he actually got only 28% support of Americans of voting age. Three out of four Americans did not vote for Trump. The real
winner of the election was (yet again) the ‘no vote’ party. Indeed, Trump polled fewer votes in 2024 than he did in 2020. But Harris lost around 11m votes compared to Biden in 2020.An interestingarticlehas a sceptical look at some of the conventional
explanations Donald Trump has won, and most shockingly, he won the popular vote. Unlike in2016, which could be explained as a rejection of Hillary Clinton concentrated inthe crucial mid-western states, this year he won convincingly. He has increasedhis share of the vote, as a percentage of the overall national popular vote, in eachof the three elections he has run.One explanation for Trump’s victory is an across-the-board collapse in turnoutand increased apathy caused by an unpopular presidency, an uninspiring presidentand an ideologically spent brand of liberalism. There is some merit to this, buton closer inspection, it’s not why Kamala Harris lost. First, it’s important to note that counting votes in the United States takes avery long time. By the time it’s all said and done, it’s quite likely Trump receivedmore votes in 2024 than he did in the record turnout 2020 election, probablymillions more votes. The second flaw in this idea is that the turnout change wasn’t uniform, nor was thechange in voting behavior. In most swing states, turnout was actually up from 2020,setting records. In the states that decided the election, Democrats got their basevoters to the polls and had the electorate they needed to win (and even did win inmany cases in the Senate and down the rest of the ballot). The problem was shelost on persuasion: many voters who chose Joe Biden four years ago and even votedfor other Democrats this year chose Donald Trump. However, problems with persuasion weren’t the only issue: Democratic turnout did,in fact, collapse in the less competitive states, especially in blue states.This is a unique shift in voting behavior nationally and can’t be explained obviouslyby most existing theories of the electorate. Another explanation is that Democrats have become the party of college-educatedvoters exclusively, and shed working-class voters, especially working-class votersof color. There is some truth to this, especially over the long term. But thisexplanation is also flawed. Trump did better consistently with every demographicalmost everywhere in the country, including college-educated white people andwomen. While these numbers were more pronounced with young voters, Latinosand men, it was only slight. Most highly-educated areas that had swung consistentlyagainst Republicans in 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022 moved back toward Trump thisyear. His victory was not with any one demographic. It was total. As with any massive election loss, recriminations have been swift, and factionsinside the Democratic party are jockeying to make their narrative about theelection the conventional wisdom that shapes the future of the party, whileRepublicans are claiming a sweeping mandate for reshaping society in a darker,more authoritarian way. However, conventional ideological explanations also don’tstand up to scrutiny. One of the most common centrist takes has been: Democrats have become tooprogressive and “woke” on social issues and obsessed with identity politics, andDemocratic staffers and consultants live in a bubble and speak in alienating waysthat have made them seem radical and off-putting to the median voter.The solution is a relentless focus on bread-and-butter issues and moderating,mostly ignoring culture war issues, besides abortion, and aggressively playing upmoderate and bipartisan bona fides. It seems quite likely this narrative will win out among Democrats. It has alreadybeen expressed by elected officials and influential Democratic pundits. The keyproblem with this narrative is that while it may have had merit in 2020 or 2022,the Democratic party has, over the last few years, aggressively purged “woke”-sounding language from their messaging and policies from their agenda.The Harris campaign was almost monomaniacally focused on projecting moderationand bipartisanship and on basic, kitchen-table economic issues.They relentlessly hunted the median voter with targeted messaging.They ran the campaign the popularists wanted, and lost. This theory is also belied by the fact that the most well-known progressive andradical politicians mostly did better than Harris. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez alsowon more votes than Harris. Understanding why thousands of people might votefor Trump and an avowed democratic socialist and vocal supporter of “woke”causes like trans rights is a key to understanding the election. Progressives see the flaws with the centrist analysis and also have an explanation,typified by Bernie Sanders: Democrats lost by abandoning the working class andunions. Like the centrist narrative, it is an outdated explanation that was oncetrue and may be true on a generational scale but is inadequate to capture whathappened in this specific election fully. While Democrats have, over the last50 years, shifted away from unions and redistributive politics, allowing inequalityto grow, and this is the correct explanation for Clinton’s loss in 2016, it doesn’tquite fit here. Joe Biden actually did shift to the left on economic issues afterwinning the primary in 2020, largely due to the mass movement that formed aroundthe Sanders campaign. And while, in the past, this may have been lip service, theBiden administration, for all its shortcomings, did follow through in real, measurableways. Income inequality, the central theme of the progressive movement in the2010s, decreased under Biden. The poorest workers were better off.Biden also pursued aggressive pro-labor and pro-consumer policy through theexecutive branch. Biden was the first president to walk a picket line, and putpolitical capital on the line to bail out union pension funds. For many years, it was easy to explain why workers would leave the Democrats:they were making less money and losing rights. But, while the Biden administrationshould have been far more assertive in redistribution and class-war policy onideological and moral grounds, it doesn’t stand up to scrutiny that workers movedright because of an ideologically neoliberal or austerity-focused policy.Though Democrats have mostly abandoned class as a mode of communication,and struggled to name an enemy and construct a compelling economic narrative,the material explanation for Harris losing votes among the working class and unionmembers doesn’t hold as it may have in the past. The right has its own explanation, seeing a sweeping mandate for the culture war.But Republican candidates who made their campaigns into referenda on culture warissues have uniformly lost or underperformed, in the past, and also this year.Trump is the only candidate who ran aggressively on the persecution of transpeople, for example, and also did better than the partisan baseline. And the idea that this is why voters flocked to Trump is just not compelling.Fifty-four percent of voters thought Trump was “too extreme”, 65% werepro-choice, and, even on immigration, 56% of voters supported a pathway tocitizenship rather than mass deportations. Millions of voters voted for Trumpat the top of the ticket and Democrats down-ballot to check his unpopular agenda.It would be a mistake to think Trump has a mandate to remake society in ahard-right, socially conservative image. So why did people vote for Trump? Most voters still actively dislike him personally(53% of voters had an unfavorable opinion of him) and most of his policies.The obvious explanation is that people trust him more to handle the economy.Although voters didn’t like his presidency, they felt like they were better off fouryears ago. This is true, but also so obviously true as to be facile.More interesting is why, materially, voters trust him more to handle the economy. I propose a different explanation than inflation qua inflation: the Covid welfarestate and its collapse. The massive, almost overnight expansion of the social safetynet and its rapid, almost overnight rollback are materially one of the biggest policychanges in American history. For a brief period, and for the first time in history,Americans had a robust safety net: strong protections for workers and tenants,extremely generous unemployment benefits, rent control and direct cash transfersfrom the American government. Despite the trauma and death of Covid and the isolation of lockdowns, from late2020 to early 2021, Americans briefly experienced the freedom of social democracy.They had enough liquid money to plan long term and make spending decisions fortheir own pleasure rather than just to survive. They had the labor protections tolook for the jobs they wanted rather than feel stuck in the jobs they had.At the end of Trump’s term, the American standard of living and the amount ofeconomic security and freedom Americans had was higher than when it started,and, with the loss of this expanded welfare state, it was worse when Biden leftoffice, despite his real policy wins for workers and unions.This is why voters view Trump as a better shepherd of the economy.
The American journalist/historian, Thomas Frank, (also the editor of theBaffler) is perhaps the best person to consult about all this. He anticipatedthe first Trump victory in 2016 – not least in an early book What’s the Matterwith Kansas? How Conservatives won the heart of America (2004) and had justwritten this piece -Twenty years ago I published a book about politics in my home state of Kansaswhere white, working-class voters seemed to be drifting into the arms of right-wingmovements. I attributed this, in large part, to the culture wars, which the rightframed in terms of working-class agony. Look at how these powerful people insultour values!, went the plaint, whether they were talking about the theory of evolutionor the war on Christmas. This was worth pointing out because working people were once the heart and soulof left-wing parties all over the world. It may seem like a distant memory, but notlong ago, the left was not a movement of college professors, bankers or high-rankingofficers at Uber or Amazon. Working people: That’s what parties of the left werevery largely about. The same folks who just expressed such remarkable support forDonald Trump. My Kansas story was mainly about Republicans, but I also wrote about the way theDemocrats were gradually turning away from working people and their concerns.Just think of all those ebullient Democratic proclamations in the ’90s about tradeand tech and globalization and financial innovation. What a vision they had: All thosemanifestoes about futurific “wired workers” or the “learning class” … all those speechesabout how Democrats had to leave the worker-centric populism of the 1930s behindthem … all those brilliant triangulations and reaching out to the right.When I was young, it felt like every rising leader in the Democratic Party wasmaking those points. That was the way to win voters in what they called “the center,” the well-educated suburbanites and computer-literate professionals whomeverybody admired. Well, those tech-minded Democrats got exactly what they set out to get, and nowhere we are. At the Republican convention in July, JD Vance described the ruinationvisited on his working-class town in Ohio by NAFTA and trade with China, both ofwhich he blamed at least in part on Mr. Biden, and also the human toll taken by theIraq War, which he also contrived to blame on Mr. Biden. Today Mr. Vance is thevice president-elect, and what I hope you will understand, what I want you to mullover and take to heart and remember for the rest of your life, is that he got thereby mimicking the language that Americans used to associate with labor, with liberals,with Democrats. By comparison, here is Barack Obama in 2016, describing to Bloomberg Businessweekhis affinity for the private sector: “Just to bring things full circle about innovation— the conversations I have with Silicon Valley and with venture capital pull togethermy interests in science and organization in a way I find really satisfying.” I hope Mr. Obama finds his silicon satisfaction. I hope the men of capital whosebanks he bailed out during the financial crisis show a little gratitude and build himthe biggest, most expensive, most innovative presidential library of them all.But his party is in ruins today, without a leader and without a purpose. It would have been nice if the Democrats could have triangulated their way intothe hearts of enough educated and affluent suburbanites to make up for theworking class voters they’ve lost over the years, but somehow that strategy rarelyworks out. They could have gone from boasting about Dick Cheney’s endorsementto becoming a version of Mr. Cheney themselves, and it still wouldn’t have beenenough. A party of the left that identifies with people like Mr. Cheney is acontradiction in terms, a walking corpse. For a short time in the last few years, it looked as if the Democrats might actuallyhave understood all this. What the Biden administration did on antitrust andmanufacturing and union organizing was never really completed but it was inspiring.Framed the right way, it might have formed the nucleus of a strong appeal to thevoters Mr. Trump has stolen away. Kamala Harris had the skills: She spoke powerfullyat the Democratic convention about a woman’s right to choose and Mr. Trump’sunfitness for high office. Speaker after speaker at the gathering in Chicago blastedthe Republicans for their hostility to working people. There was even a presentationabout the meaning of the word “populism.” At times it felt like they were speakingto me personally. At the same time, the convention featured lots of saber-rattling speeches hailingAmerica’s awesome war-making abilities. The administration’s achievements onantitrust were barely mentioned. There was even a presentation by the governorof Illinois, an heir to the Hyatt hotel fortune, in which he boasted of being a realbillionaire, not a fake one like Donald Trump supposedly is, and the assembledDemocrats cheered their heads off for this fortunate son. Then, once Ms. Harris’scampaign got rolling, it largely dropped economic populism, wheeled out anotherbillionaire and embraced Liz Cheney. Mr. Trump, meanwhile, put together a remarkable coalition of the disgruntled.He reached out to everyone with a beef, from Robert Kennedy Jr. to Elon Musk.From free-speech guys to book-banners. From Muslims in Michigan to anti-immigration zealots everywhere. “Trump Will Fix It,” declared the signs they wavedat his rallies, regardless of which “It” you had in mind. Republicans spoke of Mr. Trump’s persecution by liberal prosecutors, of how he wascensored by Twitter, of the incredible strength he showed after being shot.He was an “American Bad Ass,” in the words of Kid Rock. And clucking liberal punditswould sometimes respond to all this by mocking the very concept of “grievance,” asthough discontent itself was the product of a diseased mind. Liberals had nine years to decipher Mr. Trump’s appeal — and they failed. TheDemocrats are a party of college graduates, as the whole world understands bynow, of Ph.D.s and genius-grant winners and the best consultants money can buy.Mr. Trump is a con man straight out of Mark Twain; he will say anything, promiseanything, do nothing. But his movement baffled the party of education and innovation.Their most brilliant minds couldn’t figure him out. I have been writing about these things for 20 years, and I have begun to doubtthat any combination of financial disaster or electoral chastisement will everturn on the lightbulb for the liberals. I fear that ’90s-style centrism will marchon, by a sociological force of its own, until the parties have entirely switched theirsocial positions and the world is given over to Trumpism. Can anything reverse it? Only a resolute determination by the Democratic Party torededicate itself to the majoritarian vision of old: a Great Society of broad,inclusive prosperity. This means universal health care and a higher minimum wage.It means robust financial regulation and antitrust enforcement.It means unions and a welfare state and higher taxes on billionaires, even thecool ones. It means, above all, liberalism as a social movement, as a coming-together of ordinary people — not a series of top-down reforms by well-meaning professionals.That seems a long way away today. But the alternative is — what? To blame thevoters? To scold the world for failing to see how noble we are? No. It will takethe opposite sentiment — solidarity — to turn the world right-side up again.Further Reading Listen, Liberal – or whatever happened to the party of the people? Thomas Frank (2016)